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 Why do justices remain in office such a short time despite having life tenure? The objective of 
this doctoral dissertation is to answer this question by systematically examining which factors 
influence judges’ stability in office at the levels of both the Argentine National Supreme Court of 
Justice and the Provincial Supreme Courts, from 1983 to 2009. The main argument is that, in 
developing democracies like Argentina, the larger the ideological distance between the 
appointing executive and the current executive, the higher the probability that a sitting justice 
appointed by an executive with different preferences will leave office. With Supreme Court 
tenure that averages 4.6 years and a recent re-democratization process that started in 1983, 
Argentina provides a good opportunity to analyze the factors that influence frequent turnover in 
nascent democratic countries.  
The main findings of the research reveal that executives do not trust justices appointed by 
other executives with different political preferences and in fact there is an overlapping between 
the electoral executive cycles and judicial turnover. The evidence in the previous chapters have 
systematically expose that executives (specially at the beginning of their terms) do not buy the 
strategic behavior model that claims that the justices in the court appointed by executives with 
other preferences would rule in favor of the incoming executive so as to survive in office. In the 
end, what this finding reveals is that in general argentine presidents and governors have been 
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very averse to risky outcomes when it came to the Supreme Courts. Executive had been more 
conservative, or reluctant to risk, than what the literature had predicted.  It is precisely because 
executives believe in a more attitudinal behavior of the justices that the political proximity 
between incoming executives and the justice matters to account for judicial stability in the bench. 
The results in Chapter 5 from the provincial level analysis had disclosed with great detail that 
loyalty between executives and justices are highly personalized and thus, strongly controlled. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
During recent years, the front pages of the newspapers have recurrently denounced the lack of 
independence of the judiciaries by revealing corruption cases as well as political manipulation of 
the justices. In November 2004, President Lucio Gutierrez from Ecuador with support from the 
Congress removed 27 justices (out of 31) from the Supreme Court and 7 judges (out of 9) from 
the Constitutional Tribunal as the result of explicit accusations that the justices and judges were 
politically loyal to the former president. In April 2005, the judiciary was, once again, the target 
of political manipulation when Gutierrez purged both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional 
Tribunal as a way to mitigate the critics and the opposition to his government. The country 
remained for seven months without a Supreme Court and for 10 months without a Constitutional 
Tribunal. In July 2007 the Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa carried out a controversial 
restructure of the judiciary, in which the Supreme Court changed not only its name (to the 
National Court of Justice) but also the total number of justices (reduced from 31 to 21). That 
same year, the Constitutional Tribunal was once again purged, in this case as a result of political 
confrontations with the executive. In Argentina in 1990, President Carlos Menem increased the 
number of sitting justices of the Supreme Court from 5 to 9 and appointed 6 new justices to the 
bench, since two of the sitting justices had stepped off because of the excessive political 
manipulation. In 2003, the Argentine President Néstor Kirchner induced the departure of six 
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justices: two of them were impeached, and the other four were forced to leave via threats of 
impeachment and moral coercion. The Latin American courts are not an exception; other 
judiciaries around the world also suffer political manipulation by the executive. In Pakistan, in 
2007, President Pervez Musharraf requested the resignation of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry 
due to their political confrontation. The Chief Justice was physically restrained for several hours 
from leaving the president’s office until he presented his resignation. In Zimbabwe, in February 
2001, President Robert Mugabe threatened to remove the justices of the Supreme Court by force 
unless they resigned from the bench or reversed their rulings on recent land cases. A couple of 
days later, Mugabe forced Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay to resign from the bench, arguing that 
his government could not guarantee Gubbay’s safety if he remained in office. Soon after Gubbay 
left the office, two other high court justices (Ahmed Ebrahim and Nicholas McNally) were also 
asked to resign.1
Political manipulation of the judiciary is a deep-rooted problem for underdeveloped 
countries. The increased number of scandals and corruption cases within the judiciary has 
contributed to a great deterioration in the citizens’ confidence in the institution. According to the 
Latinobarómetro surveys (Corporación Latinobarómetro 2007: 93), from 1996 to 2007, on 
average, only 30.5% of Latin American citizens had confidence in the judiciary, less than half of 
the level of confidence that citizens had in the church (72.3%). More surprisingly, because of the 
 As a way to ensure that the Supreme Court’s decisions would be favorable to 
Mugabe’s regime, in July 2001 the president packed the Court by increasing from five to eight 
the number of sitting justices. Not surprisingly, the new Court overturned the ruling of the old 
Court on the land cases, as the government had expected. 
                                                 
1 By December 2001, Justice McNally had resigned from the Court due to the executive’s excessive abuse 
of the judiciary, followed by Justice Ebrahim in March 2002. 
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authoritarian experience in the region, citizens had greater confidence in television (43.3%), the 
military (40.6%), the president (37.9%) and the police (33.5%) than in the judiciary. Survey data 
from CIMA Barómetro (CIMA 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007) also reveals a 
dramatic situation in the low level of confidence in the institution in individual countries. Since 
from 2001 to 2008 only 7 countries out of 16 (Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Puerto Rico, 
Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela) were above the regional confidence mean 
(28.9%).2 Ecuador (14%), Peru (15%), Paraguay (16%) and Argentina3
Evidently, the scandals related to the administration of justice and the excessive political 
manipulation of judges has undermined the citizens’ level of confidence. Montesquieu (1752) 
and Alexander Hamilton (1787-1788) would argue that the numerous attacks on the judiciary 
happened because the judiciary is the weakest of the three branches of government. Even though 
in most countries justices are appointed for life (or long-term tenures), the fact that the Congress 
and the president are often in charge of both the appointing and removal processes makes 
justices, in underdeveloped countries, often vulnerable to those authorities. Studying the dynamic 
of vacancy creation in the Supreme Court can reveal valuable information about inter-branch 
relations, since judicial nominations offer a key political means for executives to enhance their 
control over the judiciary. Under normal circumstances, vacancies should be isolated events 
 (23%) ranked lowest in 
the confidence scale.  
                                                 
2 Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras were excluded from this sample because of the few data points 
provided by the sample.  
3 The confidence level in the judiciary for Argentina ranged from 19% in 2002 to 26% in 2006;, likewise, 
the regional trend, on average, indicated that Argentines had greater confidence in the church (58.5%), the 
press (46.5%), ONGs (38.6%), the military (35.4%) and the police (26.3%) than in the judiciary (CIMA 
2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). 
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resulting from retirement, death, or the end of the term (in those cases where justices do not have 
life tenure); however, if vacancies appear frequently, then this pattern may be indicating that 
there are other factors affecting the stability of a justice in office. In industrialized democracies 
like the U.S., vacancies in the Supreme Court are isolated events, since justices serve an average 
of 12.5 years (Zorn and Van Winkle 2000); in contrast, in underdeveloped countries like Bolivia 
(with a 10-year tenure), vacancies are much more common, since the average tenure is less than 
4 years (Pérez-Liñan and Castagnola 2009). In Argentina, between 1900 and 2009, justices have 
stayed in office on average less than 7 years; furthermore, every 1.2 years there has been a 
vacancy on the Court. At the subnational level in Argentina there is also great variation in the 
stability of the justices: between 1983 and 2009, justices from Corrientes with life-tenure 
remained in office an average of 2.5 years, while justices from Buenos Aires, also with life-
tenure, have served, on average, 8.41 years. These significant variations in the level of judicial 
turnover reveal that in some cases justices do not voluntarily leave the bench; rather, there must 
be other factors influencing their departure. Why do justices remain in office for such a short 
time despite having life-tenure or long-term tenure? What factors account for variations in 
judicial turnover across cases? The objective of this research is to provide an answer to these 
questions by systematically examining what factors have influenced justices’ stability in office 
over time on both the Argentine National and the Provincial Supreme Courts. By studying the 
timing of judicial turnover it is possible to identify whether justices voluntarily step off the bench 
or leave as the result of political manipulation by the incoming executive. This close examination 
of the instability of Argentine justices aims to shed light on debates about judicial independence 
in developing democracies. 
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More generally, the puzzle of justices’ instability in office challenges several assumptions 
about executive-court relations and judicial behavior. First, the American political literature 
offers a model of judicial turnover based on the assumption that the justice’s own decision to 
step off the bench is influenced by whether or not the justice shares the same political 
preferences as the president and the Senate (Hagle 1993; Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1995; Zorn and 
Van Winkle 2000). The rationale of the strategic retirement strategy is based on the idea that 
justices are willing to give their seats to another like-minded justice but not to a justice with 
opposite political preferences. The underlying assumption of this argument is that the longevity 
of justices in office is mainly determined by the justices’ own decision. Even though this 
assumption holds perfectly for the American case, for underdeveloped countries it is 
problematic, because there the longevity of justices in office appears to be determined by the 
executive rather than by the justices themselves. As the earlier examples illustrated, in those 
countries vacancies in the high court are basically triggered by presidents either inducing the 
departure of justices through undemocratic decisions, or threatening them with impeachment or 
moral coercion. Historical data on justices of the U.S. and Argentine Supreme Courts reveals that 
in Argentina justices have not voluntarily stepped off the bench. Between 1900 and 2007 in the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 54 justices departed from the bench mainly due to death (46%) and 
voluntary retirement (44%), while a small number (10%) resigned for other reasons (Ward 
2003). In Argentina, in comparison, during that same period 834
                                                 
4 The situation is even more problematic when the size of the Supreme Court is considered. Since 1869 
the number of U.S. justices was fixed at nine, whereas in Argentina during this period the number of 
justices has varied between five and nine. 
 justices departed from the bench 
for these reasons: 37% were removed as a consequence of a change in the political regime from 
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military to democratic or vice versa; 30% resigned from office as a consequence of a change of 
government within the same political regime; 20% died while in office; 6% were impeached; and 
the remaining 6% retired voluntarily (Bercholc 2004; Kunz 1989; Pellet Lastra 2001; Tanzi 
2005).5
Second, there has been a large increase in the study of judicial independence in Latin 
America. Even though Argentina has the most studied Supreme Court in Latin America 
(Kapiszewski and Taylor 2008), the existing literature does not explicitly address the factors that 
influence a justice’s decision to leave office.  Studies to date affirm that life tenure for Argentine 
justices is not respected, given that the way justices vote (regarding, say, the constitutionality of 
a proposed law) can account for their instability in office (Helmke 2005; Iaryczower et al. 2002; 
Scribner 2004). More precisely, these studies focus on how political incentives and the political 
environment shape the justices’ decisions and assume that those decisions ultimately determine 
the justices’ stability in office; however, no systematic research empirically tests this assumption. 
Thus, if justices can regulate their stability on the bench by whether or not they rule against the 
ruler, then why don’t they simply do that? Why is there, in fact, a high judicial turnover in the 
country? In other words, the importance of the justices’ voting behavior as a mechanism of 
survival strategy on the bench is called into question. 
 Consequently, in Argentina voluntary departure (as the result of natural legal – that is, 
retirement – and biological – that is, death – conditions) was not the most common explanation 
for the high judicial turnover.  
                                                 
5 In other nascent democracies, like Colombia, there are more serious and severe ways of creating 
vacancies such as the massive killing of the justices of the Supreme Court that took place in 1985.  
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The puzzle of justices’ instability in office also raises concern about executive-court 
relations. Along with the previous hypothesis, another relevant untested assumption in the 
literature is that only those presidents with strong political power (i.e., unified governments with 
supermajorities in the legislature) can craft a supportive court and affect justices’ stability in 
office (Chávez 2004; Iaryczower et al. 2002). This assumption is related to the previous one, 
since it implies that only those presidents who have the political power to formally remove a 
justice from office (i.e., by impeachment) will obtain a supportive court. These studies are 
severely limited because they examine only whether or not the president has the political power 
to remove a justice from office, but not if it is only those strong presidents who actually do so. 
Even though this assumption seems convincing, governments rarely have had supermajorities in 
the legislature sufficient to impeach a justice. If that is the case, how can the high instability of 
justices be explained? Were those justices removed from office only by those presidents who had 
the political power formally to do so? 
As a way to fill the gap between the American and the Latin American theories, this 
study begins with the alternative hypothesis that in developing democracies, the greater the 
political proximity between the ruling executive and the justice, the lower the probability that the 
justice will leave office. In contrast, in industrialized democracies, judicial turnover is 
independent of ideological changes in the executive. This is because executives, while in power, 
want to have a supportive court as a way to maximize their political influence on the decisions of 
the judiciary. The executive can craft a supportive court not only by appointing friendly justices, 
as the American literature has long recognized, but more interestingly by influencing when a 
vacancy will occur either by removing unfriendly justices or by packing the court with loyal 
justices. 
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1.1 DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Argentina, in terms of both the National Supreme Court and the Provincial Supreme Courts, 
represents a textbook case for the study of factors affecting the instability of justices in office. 
Argentina is a federal country with separate judicial entities at the provincial level; moreover, 
each province is autonomous vis-à-vis the national government in the design of its own 
institutions, producing a high degree of internal heterogeneity in the constitutional design. 
Precisely because of the persistent institutional instability, where from 1930 to 1983 democratic 
and military governments ruled interchangeably followed by a period when the administration 
changed as the result of party competition, Argentina can be considered a developing democracy. 
In the early ‘80s, the country, as well as other countries in the world, entered what is known as 
the third wave of democratization and thus the democratic institutional consolidation process 
(Huntington 1991).  
Previous studies have also shown that Argentina is the theory-generating case for 
studying executive-court relations in developing democracies. Argentina was used in studies as 
the classical example of a third wave democracy born with a weak judiciary (Chávez 2004). The 
constant political manipulation by the executive, and the incapacity of the judiciary to limit 
attacks on itself, illustrate the difficult situation also present in other developing democracies. 
Another group of scholars (Helmke 2005; Iaryczower et al. 2002; Scribner 2004) chose 
Argentina as a case study to demonstrate that, even with the presence of a weak judiciary, 
Argentine justices have challenged executives by strategically ruling against them; what they 
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reveal, however, is simply that executives do not have total control over the justices’ decisions.6 
However, these studies have clearly overlooked the high degree of internal heterogeneity in the 
country, since most of the research was carried out at the national level (i.e., on the National 
Supreme Court). Even though Chavez (2004) incorporates into her research two Argentine 
provinces (Mendoza and San Luis), the research illustrates only that there is an internal 
heterogeneity at the subnational level; it does not examine the causal connections in the other 
provinces that have undergone other experiences. As a way to overcome this deficit, this research 
employs the subnational comparative method (including all 23 Provincial Supreme Courts)7
More generally, studying the provincial judiciaries in Argentina is of substantive 
relevance. First, the provincial judiciaries play a central role in local politics, since governors 
envision this institution as another key political resource to enhance their power. Studying the 
judiciary over time and across provinces can contribute to understanding how the configuration 
of local power, as well as diverse institutional design, affects the stability of the justices in office. 
By doing so, this research redirects attention to the neglected role of the separation of powers at 
the subnational level, the most overlooked aspect of the literature on federalism (Cameron and 
 to 
analyze within-country variations (Snyder 2001). It is precisely these variations at the 
subnational level that would not only shed light on the factors that account for those differences 
but also would allow development of a mid-range theory about the stability of justices in office 
that should be applicable to other developing democracies.  
                                                 
6 Moreover, and contrary to theoretical expectations of judicial independence, these studies elucidate that 
justices who lacked independence, because of the unstable institutional context, were precisely the ones 
who challenged the executives (Helmke 2005). 
7 Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires was excluded from the sample, since the Supreme Tribunal started 
to function only in 1998. 
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Falleti 2005). Second, studying the provincial judiciaries also provides valuable information 
about the differences and similarities between the trajectories of the national Supreme Court and 
the provincial Supreme Courts. The subnational comparative method helps to explain the 
variations not only across space and time but also across different political regimes (Snyder 
2001). 
The research proceeds as follows. The next chapter discusses the main contributions and 
ideas underlying the existing literature. It traces the main theories of judicial turnover both 
within and outside the American literature, and then develops a theory of vacancy creation that 
builds on the main contributions of existing research. This theory provides a unified framework 
for bringing together the preferences and incentives of executives for crafting a supporting court 
with the different strategies employed by the executives for forcing the retirement of certain 
justices from the bench. Specifically, the chapter examines how executives can trigger 
institutional and non-institutional strategies so as to obtain a friendly court. 
The third chapter assesses the adequacy of the theory of vacancy creation by an historical 
examination of executive-court relations in Argentina. Using primary and secondary sources, the 
chapter traces the different ways in which justices have stepped off the bench from 1916 to 2009. 
Until the massive impeachment trial of 4 of the 5 members of the Supreme Court in 1946, 
justices had remained in the bench for long periods, the main reason for their departures being 
biological (death) and legal (retirements). However, since 1946 justices have been highly 
unstable on the bench, with the executive in most cases having forced their retirement. Since the 
1946 impeachment trial constitutes a critical junction in the history of the executive-court 
relationship, the chapter shows how the events after the impeachment trial have reinforced 
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practices undermining the independence of the justices and increasing the cost of changing the 
direction of events. 
Chapter 4 provides a quantitative analysis of the theory of vacancy creation for the 
Argentine justices of the National Supreme Court between 1916 and 2009. The evidence shows 
that the preferences and incentives of the executives can affect the stability of the justices on the 
bench. Specifically, the data reveal that politics matters when accounting for induced retirements 
from office while non political reasons for non induced retirements. Justices with similar 
political preferences as the ruling executive are less likely to be forced to step off the bench than 
are justices with different political preferences. Moreover, political loyalties between justices and 
executives were proved to be more sophisticated than expected, since what matters is the loyalty 
of the justices to the faction of the political party of the appointing executive rather than to the 
political party itself. Finally, the data also show that there is a timing effect with regard to 
involuntary retirements, since justices are more likely to leave the bench at the beginning of a 
new administration, revealing that executives prefer to craft a supportive court early in their term 
so as to leverage their political power. Overall, judicial turnover is not a random event but rather 
the result of the strategic political behavior of the ruling executive.  
Chapter 5 uses original data gathered from the provincial Supreme Courts to 
systematically examine the factors that account for the judicial instability at that level since 
1983. Descriptive statistics reveal that provincial justices have been on average more unstable 
than the justices from the National Supreme Court both before 1983 and afterwards. Governors 
have recurrently reshuffled their local courts so as to craft a more favorable judiciary, and the 
qualitative data gathered about the departures of the justices shows that governors have triggered 
both institutional and non-institutional mechanisms of vacancy creation. Because at the 
12 
 
subnational level there is significant heterogeneity, it was possible to elucidate more clearly how 
political factors matter under different scenarios. In those provinces with a single-party system 
(where the same political party has ruled since 1983), governors would not trust justices 
appointed by a governor from a different political faction. Intra-party competition plays a central 
role in those provinces to account for judicial instability. However, in provinces with a multi-
party system, governors do not trust justices appointed by a governor from a different political 
party as well as from a different political faction (as, for example, in Córdoba with Mestre, or in 
Santiago del Estero with Iturre). Furthermore, the quantitative data reveal that, even though the 
political proximity between the governors and the justices matters in accounting for the judicial 
instability, institutional rules may matter as well. Governors have recurrently changed the 
regulations regarding the number of sitting justices to craft a more favorable court either by 
enlarging its size (to create new vacancies) or by reducing it (to permit removing unfriendly 
justices).  Institutional rules appear to be a significant factor affecting the stability of the justices. 
The findings of the previous chapter laid the groundwork for Chapter 6, which aims to 
explore to what extent institutional rules can facilitate or constrain judicial turnover. The fact that 
the Argentine provinces are autonomous and retain all the power that was not specifically 
entrusted to the national government allows them to dictate their own constitutions. This is 
precisely the reason for exploring how different institutional rules influence the stability of the 
justices on the bench. This chapter uses original data collected from the provincial constitutions, 
as well as other laws and regulations related to the functioning of the local supreme courts since 
1983. The analysis of the 54 provincial constitutions suggests that there is great heterogeneity 
regarding the institutional design in the provincial judiciaries. Chapter 6 presents an econometric 
model designed to assess the combined effect of institutional rules and political factors (analyzed 
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in the previous chapters) so as to determine to what extent institutional rules can promote or 
impede judicial turnover. The findings in this chapter provide evidence to support the theory of 
vacancy creation. First, the model reveals that political factors, rather than institutional rules, 
play a central role in accounting for judicial instability. Having life tenure is the only institutional 
rule that matters in accounting for judicial instability, while rules regarding appointment and 
removal processes do not. Second, it was demonstrated that changes in the institutional rules, 
rather than the rules themselves, help account for judicial turnover on the bench; which suggests 
that governors have triggered both institutional and non-institutional mechanisms of vacancy 
creation to manipulate the composition of the court.  
The last chapter summarizes the main findings of this research and explores the 
theoretical relevance of the findings for the study of judicial instability in other developing 
democracies like Peru and Indonesia. The latter become interesting case studies to extend the 
theory of vacancy creation in which executives manipulate the conformation of the court. 
However, the experiences of other countries in the region like Ecuador reveal that, in fact, there 
are different mechanisms of vacancy creation that still need to be addressed by future research. 
Ecuador illuminates a different way in which judicial turnover is driven ─ that is, by a coalition 
of parties in Congress. Ecuador combines features of strong presidentialism with a highly 
fragmented party system in which the President’s party rarely has control over the Congress; 
thus, it is the Congress rather than the President that manipulates the conformation of the court 
(Mejía Acosta 2006; Shugart 1995; Shugart and Carey 1992).  
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2.0   EXPLAINING JUDICIAL TURNOVER: VACANCY CREATION THROUGH 
INDUCED RETIREMENTS 
One of the most fundamental principles of democratic government is to guarantee the 
independence of the judiciary from the legislative and executive branches. This is necessary 
because, as signaled by Alexander Hamilton (1787-1788), when the three branches are 
concentrated in one hand, tyranny is likely to result. The essence of judicial independence is that 
judges are free from the influence or control of the government when deciding on a case (Fiss 
1993). When the judiciary is guaranteed this political insularity, judges can act as a 
countervailing force within the political system, thus ensuring the necessary checks and balances 
between the legislature and the executive. But when the judiciary does not have this political 
insularity, then judges become the target of political manipulation, and the principle of 
separation of powers vanishes.  
In many developing democracies the executive branch often influences the composition 
of the Supreme Court by forcing the resignation of unfriendly justices or by packing the court 
with friendly justices. Judiciaries in developing democracies are often dysfunctional with regard 
to the political system, because the political institutions are still in the process of consolidation 
and there is a lack of effective horizontal accountability (Diamond 1999). Precisely because of 
the poor consolidation of the institutions, inter-branch relations in developing democracies have 
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remained distorted, with the judiciary harmed the most. This political manipulation of the 
judiciary means that the members of the judicial branch are unable to place real constraints on 
the executive branch.  The high judicial turnover of Supreme Court Justices is one indicator of 
this problem.  
The objective of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework from which to study 
judicial turnover in developing countries, both at the national and subnational level. To this end, 
Section 2.1 assesses the previous theories in the American and Latin American literature that can 
help explain judicial turnover. Section 2.2, building on the previous theories, presents a 
theoretical framework for studying vacancy creation, focusing, first, on the preferences and 
incentives of executives to craft a supporting court and, then, on the different strategies that 
executives can develop to create vacancies. The final section of the chapter presents a set of 
testable hypotheses related to which factors account for judicial turnover and when justices are 
more likely to leave office. 
2.1 ASSESSING PREVIOUS THEORIES 
2.1.1 The strategic retirement theory 
American scholars have long been studying the factors that explain variations in the composition 
of the U.S. Supreme Court. The existing research is mainly of two types: qualitative and 
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quantitative.8 Qualitative studies, mostly biographic and chronological accounts of the justices 
who served on the Supreme Court, provide detailed and valuable information about the justices 
themselves as well as about how the political and social context of the time influenced the Court 
and its justices (Atkinson 1999; Ward 2003; Schwartz 1993; Rehnquist 2002). On the other hand, 
quantitative studies have developed a provocative theoretical framework that aims to understand 
what factors influence the rate of judicial retirement not only at the Supreme Court but also at the 
lower federal courts. Scholars argue that judicial retirements are not a random event but rather 
reflect strategic decisions by the justices.9  Furthermore, some authors argue that it is politics that 
motivates justices to strategically retire from the bench (Barrow and Zuk 1990; Hagle 1993; Hall 
2001; King 1987; Nixon and Haskin 2000; Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1995; Zorn and Van Winkle 
2000; Epstein and Segal 2005), while others insist that personal and economic reasons dominate 
(Squire 1988; Yoon 2006, 2003).10
The political retirement rationale is based on the idea that justices are more likely to retire 
under an administration that shares the same political party as they do. More precisely, the 
literature suggests that a justice is more likely to retire from office whenever she belongs to the 
same political party as the President and the majority of the Senate. This is based on the 
assumption that the justice shares the same political preferences as the executive’s appointing 
 
                                                 
8 For earlier works on the topic, please refer to Schmidhauser (1962), Wallis (1936), Callen and Leidecker 
(1971), Ulmer (1982), and King (1987). 
9 Some of the few exceptions to this argument can be found in Ulmer (1982) and Wallis (1936). 
10 Even though some of these works account for vacancies in the Supreme Court and others only for those 
in the lower federal courts, all of them use the same hypotheses to account for judicial retirements. The 
only exception is the literature on state supreme courts, since in this case scholars pay special attention to 
the role of judicial elections and institutional variables in understanding the retirements of state supreme 
court justices (Hall 2001). 
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political party; in that event, it is more likely that a justice will retire from office because the 
President will appoint a replacement with the same political preferences as the outgoing justice 
(Zorn and Van Winkle 2000). Evidently, it is politics that motivates strategic behavior, since 
justices will be willing to give up their seats only to other like-minded justices and not to justices 
with different political preferences (Hagle 1993; Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1995; Zorn and Van 
Winkle 2000). Consequently, if the political party of the President and the Senate is not the same 
as the political party of the justice, then it is more likely that the justice will “hold off” on retiring 
until a more favorable political scenario arises. This strategy of “wait-and-see” which political 
party will be next in office is likely to take place during the last year of the Presidential term but 
not in the first or second year of the administration, since justices may not or maybe cannot wait 
that long to step down and also cannot predict in advance who will win the next election (Hagle 
1993; Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1995; Zorn and Van Winkle 2000). The opposite is true when 
executives are reelected, since justices may not be willing to continue holding on to their seats 
for another four years.  
Along with the strategic retirement argument, scholars have included in their statistical 
analysis non-political variables as a way to control for other factors that may be also affecting 
judicial turnover. The non-political factors suggest that justices also depart from the bench 
because of personal and economic reasons. The more common variables associated with this idea 
are age (used as a proxy for health conditions), salaries, pension benefits, caseload, and job 
satisfaction. Even though most of the scholars found supporting evidence for some of these 
explanations along with the political ones, only Squire (1988) and Yoon (2003, 2006) found 
evidence supporting these non-political factors alone.  
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In sum, what these empirical studies reveal is that the main underlying assumptions of 
these models of judicial turnover is that it is the justice’s own decision what will determine when 
a vacancy occurs. As Ward argues, “… what is significant about departure [in the U.S. Supreme 
Court] is the power of the justices themselves to influence who their successor will be by the 
timing of that departure….” (Ward 2003, 6). In these models of judicial turnover, the justice’s 
own decision to retire from office will still be influenced by whether or not s/he shares the same 
political preferences as the President and the Senate as well as other personal reasons.  
Even though the U.S. literature offers an interesting model of judicial turnover, this 
hypothesis is based on assumptions that hold perfectly for the American case, and maybe also for 
other advanced industrial democracies, 11
                                                 
11 Maitra and Smyth (2005) found similar results when studying the determinants of judicial turnover on 
the Supreme Court of Australia. 
 but probably not for developing democracies like 
Argentina. As previously mentioned, in developing democracies the judiciary and the executive 
branches often becomes indistinguishable from each other because of the difficulties of the 
judiciary in placing real constraints on the executive manipulation of the branch. The main 
problem with using the strategic retirement assumption in developing democracies is that it is the 
motivation of the president rather than of the justice that determines when a vacancy will occur. 
In other words, in developing democracies the stability of a justice in office is affected by a 
presidential decision to remove her, whereas in the American literature the stability of the justice 
in office is solely determined by the justice’s own decision. Along these lines, a recent article by 
Pérez-Liñán and Castagnola (2009) on Latin American Supreme Courts from 1904 to 2006 
demonstrated the logic of the above conclusion. More precisely, in Latin American countries, 
contrary to the American case, presidents, rather than justices, have influenced the timing of 
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judicial retirements and nominations. In sum, even though politics is the main explanation of 
judicial turnover in both the US and the Argentine cases, politics operates differently in each. 
Where in the U.S. retirements result from a strategic political calculation by the justices in office, 
in developing countries retirements come about through a strategic political calculation by the 
executive in office. As Epstein and Segal point out “… ideology and partisanship have not 
figured prominently in most judicial removals in the United States….” (2005: 32). In developing 
democracies many of the vacancies in the court are the result of induced retirements stimulated 
by pressures from the executive to craft a supportive court rather than the decision of a loyal 
justice to retire from office. 
2.1.1  Strategic decision making 
Legal scholars were the first to conduct research about the judiciaries in developing countries. 
These works mainly focused on the constitutional and legal aspects of the judiciary; little 
attention was paid to the political role of the courts.12 Even though in the early eighties scholars 
begun to focus more on the political aspect of the judiciaries in Latin America,13
                                                 
12 See, for example, Eder (1960), Rosenn (1974) and Biles (1976). 
 it was not until 
the last decade that there has been an increased interest among political scientists in studying 
judicial politics in developing countries (Russell and O'Brien 2001; Malleson and Russell 2006; 
Sieder et al. 2005; Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008; Smulovitz 1995; Ginsburg 2003; Schwartz 
2000; Gauri and Brinks 2008).  Most of the research about Latin American judiciaries is country-
13 See, for example, Verner (1984). 
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specific (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico are the most studied judiciaries, with Central 
American countries the least studied), but during the last years comparative studies have started 
to appear more frequently (Pérez-Liñán and Castagnola 2009; Scribner 2004; Finkel 2008; Ríos-
Figueroa 2006; Staats et al. 2005; Navia and Ríos-Figueroa 2005; Ansolabehere 2007).14
Since the beginning there has been general consensus that “… Latin American Supreme 
Courts are politically dependent and dominated by the political environments within which they 
are embedded….”(Verner 1984: 468). More precisely, the conventional wisdom was that judicial 
independence was in jeopardy because these countries were embedded in a political environment 
strongly characterized by executives controlling the judicial branch. Since then, executives have 
had a crucial role in explaining or defending the independence of the judiciaries. But it was not 
until the late nineties that a group of scholars returned to this idea and developed a more specific 
theory about inter-branch relations in developing countries. Based on the principle of separation 
of powers, these authors theorized about which factors influenced the strategic decision-making 
of justices from different perspectives. One group concentrated on the conflictive executive-
judiciary relationship by paying attention to the voting behavior of the justices (Helmke 2005; 
Leoni and Ramos 2006; Magaloni and Sanchez 2006; Scribner 2004; Herrero 2007), while the 
other group focused on how the partisan power of executives can conditioned the decision-
making of the justices (Chávez 2004; Domingo 2000; Pérez-Liñán and Castagnola 2009; Ríos-
Figueroa 2007). Still others concentrated on both aspects  (Iaryczower et al. 2002).
 
15
                                                 
14 For an extensive list of works about judicial politics on Argentina or other Latin American countries, 
please refer to Kapiszewski and Taylor (2008). 
 These 
15 There is not much research on Latin American countries about how the Supreme Court and District 
Courts influence the decision-making of the judges from lower courts, with the exception of Pérez-Liñán 
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studies reveal that presidents tend not to trust justices and, therefore, are willing to use their 
political power to craft a supportive court. Even though these studies assume that life tenure for 
Latin American Supreme Court Justices is not respected (especially for Argentine justices), there 
is no systematic research that tests this assumption. The only exception to this trend is the 
recently published article by Pérez-Liñán and Castagnola (2009c), in which they empirically 
demonstrate that political realignments of the executive can affect the rhythm and flow of 
judicial turnover in Latin American Supreme Courts. The reminder of this section outlines the 
main contributions of the existing literature related to the case of Argentina. 
Previous studies have examined the relationship between justice preferences and their 
voting behavior (during the current government and during the last months of the previous 
government) about the constitutionality of a norm (Helmke 2002, 2005; Iaryczower et al. 2002). 
Under this line of research, Iaryczower, Spiller and Tommasi (2002) examine how political 
incentives influence the final decision of justices about the constitutionality of a norm between 
1935 and 1998 (Iaryczower et al. 2002). The main findings of the authors are that, first, a justice 
will support the current government if the government has strong political power to formally 
remove a justice from office, and, second, a justice will not support the current government if 
s/he has opposite political tendencies from the president.  From a different perspective, Helmke 
(2002, 2005) studies why under an insecure institutional context, Argentine justices ruled against 
the government in decisions about the constitutionality of a norm. Contrary to the theoretical 
expectations of judicial independence, Helmke finds that justices who lack independence are 
                                                                                                                                                             
et al. (2006) piece where the authors empirically examine this relationship in the Bolivian judiciary 
system.  
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precisely the ones who rule against the government during the final months of that government.16 
Helmke solves this puzzle by arguing that it is precisely the lack of independence that motivates 
justices to rule against the current government and in favor of the incoming one, a voting 
behavior that she calls strategic defection, since only when weak governments approach the end 
of their terms are justices politically motivated to vote against the current government and in 
favor of the incoming one.17
These lines of research suggest that the longevity of a justice in office is determined by 
whether or not justices are willing to modify their behavior in order to circumvent reprisals from 
the executive branch. Like in the American literature, the underlying assumption of these 
theories is that the stability of the justice in the bench is determined by the justice’s own 
decision, in this case whether or not to rule against the current or previous ruler. Even though 
these studies suggest that life tenure in Argentina is not respected, they have failed to empirically 
demonstrate it, since they examine only the relationship between justices’ preferences and their 
voting behavior. They assume, but do not test, the hypothesis that voting behavior has an impact 
 The main difference between Helmke and Iaryczower et al is that 
Helmke is assuming that the previous voting behavior (i.e., the voting during the previous 
government in office) rather than the current voting behavior of the justices (i.e., the voting 
during the current government) affects their stability in office.  
                                                 
16 Theories about judicial independence (and also Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi 2002) argue that 
justices who lack independence will rule in favor of the government, whereas the opposite is true when 
justices are independent (Larkins 1996). 
17 Evidently, strategic defection behavior is strongly associated with a surviving strategy, since those 
justices who lack independence are precisely the ones who will carry out strategic defection to remain in 
office when a weak government approaches the end of its term. Therefore, the implicit assumption is that 
the stability of justices in office can be achieved by defecting from the current government and voting in 
favor of the incoming one. 
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on their stability in office. More surprisingly, if Argentine justices have indeed behaved 
strategically as a survival strategy, then, why justices have been so unstable in the bench? 
Another interesting line of research, examine how the partisan power of executives can 
conditioned the decision-making of the justices (Chávez 2004; Iaryczower et al. 2002). The idea 
is that, if a president has a supermajority in Congress, then justices will vote as the president 
would prefer, since the president has the political power to formally remove the justice from 
office. In order to prevent that from happening, justices will behave as the president would wish, 
simply as a survival strategy. Conversely, if a president is weak (i.e., his or her party does not 
have a supermajority in Congress to formally impeach a justice), then justices can vote honestly, 
challenging the president’s preferences because the latter is not able to punish them for voting 
against the president (Iaryczower et al. 2002: 701). According to these authors, justices will vote 
honestly or strategically depending on the political power of the current executive. As in the 
previous case, these studies examine only whether or not the president has the political power to 
remove a justice from office; they do not test if, in fact, only those strong presidents remove 
justices (Chávez 2004; Iaryczower et al. 2002). The underlying assumption in the literature is 
that impeachment (or the fear of impeachment) is the only way to remove justices from office, 
whereas this research proposes that there are other mechanisms that presidents can use to induce 
justices to retire. Like in the previous line of research (strategic voting behavior), within this 
research is also assumed that the longevity of the justice in the bench is determined by the justice 
decision to whether or not challenge executives with supermajority in the Congress.  
To sum up, the existing literature provides an interesting and challenging foundation 
from which to start studying which factors may account for the short average time that justices 
stay in office. It also reveals that executives do not trust justices. Building on the contribution of 
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the literature, the task of the next section is to develop a theoretical framework from which to 
study judicial turnover by moving from assumptions borrowed from the American literature to 
assumptions specifically conceived to underdeveloped democracies. 
2.2 A THEORY OF VACANCY CREATION 
The starting point of the theoretical framework of this research is that presidents and governors, 
while in power, want to have a supportive court as a way to maximize their political influence on 
the decisions of the judiciary. The chief guiding hypothesis is that judicial turnover is mainly the 
result of changes in the political configuration in the executive. The executive can craft a 
supportive court not only by appointing friendly justices, as the American literature has long 
recognized, but more interestingly by influencing when a vacancy will occur either by removing 
unfriendly justices18
                                                 
18  “Unfriendly justices” refers to justices who were appointed by an executive with different political 
preferences from those of the current executive. 
 or by packing the court with loyal justices. The theoretical framework of 
this research aims to identify which factors shape judicial turnover over time, when justices are 
more likely to leave office and how executives craft a supportive court. The framework is 
applicable to analysis at both the national and subnational levels, since executives, both 
presidents and governors, envision the judiciary as a key political resource to enhance their 
power in the government. Because the theoretical framework applies to both the national and 
subnational levels, “executive” refers to either president or governor and “legislature” to either 
the National Congress or provincial legislatures. The first part of the section examines the 
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preferences and incentives of executives to craft a supportive court, while the second part of the 
section introduces the different strategies for vacancy creation. 
2.2.1 Preferences and incentives of executives to craft a supportive court 
The underlying assumption of this study is that the proportion of justices who depart from the 
bench in a given year is not a randomly occurring event but rather a function of certain political 
variables. Politics matters when explaining judicial turnover, since executives want to have a 
supportive court to maximize their political influence not only on the judiciary but also on 
policy-making. Also executives prefer to have a supportive court earlier in their term so as to 
have control over the judiciary during the whole term. A supportive court is one in which the 
majority of the justices share the same political preferences as the executive (i.e., like-minded 
justices), and the opposite is true for an unfriendly court. When executives do not have a friendly 
court, then it is likely that they will try to remove those unfriendly justices because they do not 
trust them.  
Justices are very important players for executives, because they have the capacity to 
overrule legislation or an executive decision. Even though Tsebelis (2002) argues that justices 
are not constantly making constitutional interpretations, the fact that they have the capacity to do 
it makes them influential actors in the political arena. As Chapter 3 shows, the Argentine 
Supreme Court could have had the capacity to rule in favor of habeas corpus during the military 
regime and thus put an end to state-sponsored violence and repression; or it could have ruled 
against the state-owned privatization companies during the Menem administration and prevented 
the implementation of neoliberal economic policies; or it could have ruled against the 
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constitutionality of “pesification” during the Kirchner administration and protected the property 
right of the citizens. The executives’ policy objectives were accomplished in those years because 
they had crafted a supportive court.  
It is precisely because justices have the capacity to frustrate policy-making (and thus 
affect the stability of the administration) that incoming executives do not trust justices appointed 
by executives with different political preferences. The desire to have a supportive and 
dependable court (one that does not constrain the decisions of the ruling executive) is part of the 
logic that political actors seek to increase their political leverage.19
                                                 
19 A similar logic applies to the implementation of judicial reforms in Latin America. Jodi Finkel (2008) 
argues that the implementation of judicial reforms takes place when the ruling party realizes it will not be 
able to maintain political dominance for another term. Judicial reforms act as an insurance policy for the 
outgoing ruling party against the incoming party. 
 Therefore, it is argued that 
the political proximity between the justice and the executive matters for understanding judicial 
turnover. Friendly justices are those that are political and ideologically closed to the executive, 
whereas the opposite is true for unfriendly justices. This is because, in general, a justice who 
shares the same political preferences as the executive would likely rule in favor of the executive 
rather than against. Measuring a justice’s political preferences is a difficult task in this case 
because partial data are available about the vote of the Argentine justices at the National 
Supreme Court and no data are available about the votes of Argentine justices at the Provincial 
Supreme Courts. Chapter 4 discusses the measurement issue regarding this variable, but the main 
idea is that the political preferences of the justices have significant explanatory value for 
understanding judicial instability in developing democracies. It is argued that the greater the 
ideological and political distance between the sitting justice and the executive, the higher the 
probability that the justice will leave the bench. 
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Incoming executives confronting an unfriendly court would hardly trust justices not only 
with a different political ideology but also with a different political background. In developing 
democracies, Supreme Court Justices do not necessarily come from a judicial career, since it is 
often the case that former deputies, senators, or ministers are appointed to the bench. For 
example, in 2002 the Peronist Governor Ángel Maza from La Rioja appointed to the court 
Agustín Benjamín de la Vega, another Peronist former Governor of the province; similarly, the 
former Peronist Senator from the province of Tucumán, Ricardo Tomás Maturana, was 
appointed to the provincial Court in 1990 by the Peronist Governor José Domato; again, in 2002 
President Eduardo Duhalde, from the Peronist party, appointed Carlos Maqueda to the Court, 
who at that time was a Peronist Senator and President of the Senate. Even though the National 
and Provincial Constitutions in Argentina, and in most developing countries, clearly prohibit 
justices and judges from participating in politics while in office, constitutions do not necessarily 
forbid the appointment of justices who had a previous political career. One result of this 
vagueness in the law is that executives have been choosing candidates with dubious 
independence from political power. In general, executives often prefer to designate a loyal 
member of their government rather than a candidate with a judicial background, so that their 
interests and desires will be carried out in the court. Precisely because of this, it is likely that the 
incoming executive will initially choose to remove justices with a political background rather 
than justices with a judicial one, because they represent a clear political threat.  
When executives confront an unfriendly court, it is likely that they would manipulate the 
composition of the court during their first years in government rather than during the last years. 
This is because having a loyal court at the beginning of the term (rather than at the end) is more 
likely to guarantee executives the fulfillment of their policy goals. Moreover, at the beginning of 
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their terms executives have more ability to influence politics (the “honeymoon effect”) than 
during their last year. For these reasons is that the electoral cycle can set the timing of the 
judicial turnover. Yet even if the American literature endorses the electoral cycle hypothesis, this 
hypothesis has a different effect in developing democracies. Under the American model justices 
retire from the bench when they expect that a like-minded justice will be appointed to succeed 
them, whereas in the Argentine case the executive seeks to replace justices with others holding 
different political preferences. For this reason, in the American model, new appointments to the 
bench are more likely to maintain the ideological balance of the court (Franklin 2002), whereas 
in the Argentine case it is the opposite that prevails. Electoral cycles turn out to be special 
moments in which the Court can change its political configuration; indeed, as will be shown in 
Chapter 3, reshuffles in the Argentine Supreme Court have often occurred after a change in 
administration. Therefore, in developing democracies it is likely that realignments in the 
executive power would produce realignments also in the political conformation of the court.  
2.2.2 Strategies of vacancy creation: induced retirements 
In a recent study, Ríos-Figueroa (2006) demonstrates that between 1950 and 2002 Argentina had 
at the national level the highest level of de jure judicial independence in the Latin American 
region and also that those levels had been constant throughout those years. If this is the case, 
then why are Argentine justices so unstable in office? Based on a preliminary analysis of 
Argentina (Castagnola 2006), it is argued that, as in most developing democracies, presidents 
have often induced the retirements of unfriendly justices through institutional mechanism but 
also through non-institutional ones. In the U.S. Supreme Court there are isolated cases of 
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induced retirements through non-institutional channels,20
This research examines the different mechanisms for induced retirement by which 
executives, both presidents and governors, may be able to create vacancies without using the 
full-fledged impeachment process. Induced retirements, or involuntary departures, take place 
when the executive is able to manipulate the resignation of unfriendly justices by triggering 
institutional and/or non-institutional strategies to force their departure. The recurrent use by 
politicians of these institutional and non-institutional strategies for inducing the retirement of 
justices had transformed them into informal rules of action both at the national and subnational 
levels (Helmke and Levitsky 2006). The existing literature has mostly acknowledged 
impeachment trials as the institutional mechanism for vacancy creation and little attention was 
given to other institutional rules. This research discloses the importance of studying changes in 
the institutional arrangements of the judiciary (like tenure system, court-packing, appointment 
and removal) since they are parts of the “packages” of legal provisions that executives can 
employ for crafting a supportive court.  
 but that is not the case in developing 
democracies like Argentine with unstable judiciaries (Chávez 2007; Verbitsky 1993). Chapter 3 
will show that in Argentina since 1946 presidents have systematically used induced retirement 
strategies, using both institutional and non-institutional mechanisms, to remove troublesome 
justices from the bench while Chapter 5 the strategies that governors had employed to craft a 
supportive court since 1983. 
                                                 
20 For example, President Lyndon Johnson on two occasions persuaded justices to retire from office: in 
1965 he convinced Justice Arthur J. Goldberg to become the United States ambassador to the United 
Nations, and in 1967 he indirectly forced the troublesome Justice Tom C. Clark to resign from the bench 
when he appointed Justice Clark’s son Ramsey to be Attorney General (Hagle 1993). President Richard 
Nixon in 1969 also forced the resignation of Justice Abe Fortas due to the latter’s fear of impeachment 
when it was revealed that Fortas had taken money from a charitable foundation. 
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Even though originally, the Constitution and other legislation have been conceived as 
structural protections against the potential abuses of power committed by political authorities; 
executives have often managed to manipulate those rules so as to leverage their political power. 
As Douglass North (1990) asserts, whenever a politician has the capacity to restructure political 
institutions, he will do it in such a way that his goals are more likely to be achieved. If that is the 
case, then studying the evolution of institutional arrangements can provide significant evidence 
for understanding how executives were able to manipulate the composition of the high Courts. 
American scholars have also shown that institutional arrangements, especially electoral rules, 
matter when studying judicial turnover of those elective justices on state supreme courts 
(Bonneau 2005; Bonneau and Hall 2003; Hall 2001; Hall and Bonneau 2006).  
The study of the evolution of institutional arrangements becomes relevant especially for 
the subnational level analysis due to the internal heterogeneity of the judiciaries. The variations 
in the constitutions and regulations within the provinces over time, as well as across the 
provinces, can shed light on how the institutional design affects the stability of the justices as 
well as the independence of the judiciary from the other branches. It is precisely through changes 
in the institutional design that governors and presidents can craft a supportive court and enhance 
their capacity to manipulate the judiciary. It is argued here that constitutional provisions and 
norms that infringe on the justices’ rights and independence will produce an unstable 
environment for the justices, thus increasing their instability on the bench, while provisions and 
norms that protect the justices’ rights will produce a more secure environment for them, thus 
reinforcing their stability in office. For example, the tenure system becomes relevant for the 
analysis when the length of the tenure is shorter than the tenure of the appointing authority, since 
in those cases there can be a potential for political manipulation (Rios-Figueroa 2009). Even 
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though most of the Argentine provinces guarantee life tenure to provincial high court justices, 
there are some that establish fixed terms: Catamarca until 1988, Jujuy until 1986, La Rioja until 
1998, Salta and San Juan until 1986, and Tucumán until 1991 (Castagnola 2009). Except in the 
province of Tucumán, the other five listed above had fixed tenure ranging from one year to six. 
Bearing in mind that the tenures of governors and legislators range from four to six years, 
judicial tenure in those provinces should be, at a minimum, longer than six years to prevent 
abuses.  
There is also a difference regarding the court-packing capacity of governors, since 
nowadays only three provinces (Córdoba, La Rioja, and Neuquén) and the Ciudad de Buenos 
Aires have clearly established in their Constitutions the total number of justices sitting on the 
high Courts; while in the rest of the provinces, the number of sitting justices is not clearly 
determined. Governors and executive can benefit from the vagueness in the rules when 
confronting and unfriendly court since they can pack the court with friendly justices. Rules 
regarding retirement age also vary greatly from province to province. Since the ’90s, provinces 
have started to incorporate such a restriction into their constitutions so as to limit the tenure of 
the justices. All these variations in the institutional designs of the provinces have to be taken into 
account, because they can have significant effects on the stability of the justices and can provide 
valuable explanations regarding what is really going on.  
However, scholars like Charles Cameron (2002) pose questions about the importance of 
institutional design for studying the judiciary. Cameron argues that institutional arrangements, 
though important, cannot account for all the variation among judiciaries, since in some cases, 
like Argentina, they become only nominal protections, or “parchment barriers,” against abusive 
executives willing to manipulate the country’s judiciary. In other countries, with no structural 
32 
 
protection for the justices, the judiciary is not threatened by the authorities. According to this 
view, it is the social environment that produces, or does not produce, a cultural norm in favor of 
the rule of law; thus structural protections are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to 
guarantee respect for the judiciary. In the American case, John Ferejohn (1999) asserts that 
constitutional protections for the judiciary have remained stable over the years, because the 
people have not wanted to alter them. Along this line, Catalina Smulovitz (2003) argues that a 
decentralized mechanism of control can impose reputational costs on those politicians who use 
their political resources to transgress the law. In that way, societal accountability strategies 
became relevant to respecting institutional arrangements and, in this case, the judiciary as well.  
Yet the existing research at the subnational level in Argentina reveals that governors have 
changed institutional arrangements, regardless of the reputational cost, so as to better uphold 
their interests.21 A recent study at the subnational level demonstrates that there is a relationship 
between changes in the institutional design and protection of the judiciary (Castagnola 2009).22
                                                 
21 The province of San Luis is the most representative case; for further information, please refer to 
Castagnola (2009 Chapter 7). 
 
A historical comparative analysis of all the constitutions and norms for all the provinces between 
1983 and 2009 reveals, for example, that those provinces that have had relatively vague rules 
related to court-packing were the most likely to experience changes in the number of the sitting 
justices, compared to those that have explicit regulations. The historical analysis also discloses 
that during this period provinces have changed their constitutions by incorporating rules to fix 
the retirement age of the justices so as to get rid of troublesome ones. For the above reasons, 
22 A common thread within provincial regulations is ambiguous protection for justices’ constitutional 
rights (like the tenure of the justice on the bench or the salary paid), as well as the publicity 
accompanying the appointment process. 
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institutional designs have to be taken into account when studying how executives can craft a 
supportive court, since changes in the rules regarding the retirement age of the justices, tenure 
system and the constitutional rights of the justices, among other, can reveal undisclosed 
strategies of vacancy creation.  
Therefore, it is relevant to incorporate in the analysis the institutional design accounting 
judicial turnover, since executives have often manipulated the legislation so as to craft a 
supportive court. Common practices of institutional induced retirement have been: offering 
attractive retirement benefits to the justices (as happened in Tierra del Fuego, Entre Rios, 
Neuquén, and Misiones), allowing the reappointment of justices to a federal court,23 removing 
justices via decree (as the military did in the Supreme Court in 1955, 1966, and 1976), changing 
the Constitutional rules regarding retirement age (as happened in Chaco in 1994, La Rioja in 
1998, and Santiago del Estero in 2005), modifying the number of sitting justices in office (as 
occurred in La Rioja in 2002), and cutting back the salaries of the justices via a budgetary 
reduction (as happened in San Luis and Río Negro).24
                                                 
23 The occasion of the reappointment of a justice to a federal court gives the executive, either the president 
or the governor, an empty seat to which to appoint a loyal justice while relocating the outgoing justice to 
another court with low political impact.  
 Interestingly, even though constitutions 
and the existing literature identify impeachment as the institutional mechanism of vacancy 
creation, all these other (complementary) institutional strategies have the same effect as the 
impeachment process (i.e., removing a justice from the bench) without the same public visibility 
and political cost. This is why these other institutional mechanisms of vacancy creation have 
24 Another institutional mechanism used to get rid of troublesome justices can be to reorganize the courts 
and not reappoint all the justices, as happened in Australia (Williams 2001). 
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become used more often in Argentina at both the national and provincial levels since the mid-
nineties.  
However, executives have also used non-institutional mechanism of vacancy creation. 
The more common practices are: threatening a justice with possible impeachment due to 
accusations of corruption or wrongdoing (successfully used in the 23 provinces), discrediting a 
justice’s decision or performance in the media (as happened in San Luis), implicating the 
justice’s family in a scandal so as to harm the reputation of the justice (as occurred in Chaco and 
Santiago del Estero), and exploiting internal disputes in the Court between the “disloyal” justice 
and the loyal ones (as in Rio Negro). The fear of impeachment can be an effective mechanism to 
persuade an unfriendly justice to step down, since it not only harms the reputation of the justice 
but also imposes economic costs (since in most cases, if the justice is convicted, s/he is 
automatically prohibited from receiving any type of pension, and the Senate’s verdict can inhibit 
the justice from ever working again in the judicial system).   
These informal strategies are powerful, since many justices do not outlast the political 
persecution, moral attrition, and coercion, and thus ending up resigning from the bench. The 
importance of these non-institutional induced retirement strategies are that they can have the 
same effect as a full-fledged impeachment process – that is, the removal of a justice from the 
bench- but through a less rigorous process. Precisely because these practices are informal, it 
requires less legal argumentation and evidence to endorse the accusations to the unfriendly 
justice. These types of unverified denouncements against justices undermine the justices’ own 
credibility within the society. Furthermore, as in the case of institutional mechanisms, these 
informal practices also have a low public visibility and political cost in comparison to the 
impeachment process, since the discrediting campaigns and denunciations are not necessarily 
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undertaken by the executive himself but rather by his collaborators. As the result of the excessive 
use of these informal practices, Argentine justices – both at the national and subnational levels – 
have denounced the existence of an “industry of impeachment” based on its improper use for 
partisan reasons. 
Nonetheless, there are two important caveats to consider in terms of the non-institutional 
practices. First, these practices do not have a guaranteed result. Their success will depend not 
only on the persistence of the government in using these practices against the unfriendly justice, 
but also on the capacity of the justice to endure the moral and political persecution. Secondly, 
these informal practices are more time-consuming than the impeachment process; thus, it may 
take longer (or maybe never) to see the desired effect. Due to the uncertainty of the results, when 
triggering informal practices intended to lead to induced retirement, the executive should be 
aware of the likelihood of having to dedicate more time and resources than might otherwise be 
anticipated.  
Under what circumstances would an executive activate an institutional or non-
institutional mechanism for inducing the retirement of an unfriendly justice? Basically, the 
decision will be determined by the partisan power of the executive in Congress (meaning 
whether or not the executive has support in the Deputy and Senate Chambers to impeach a 
justice or to change the relevant legislation). When the executive has a low popularity and his 
party does not have full control of both houses of the legislature, then non-institutional strategies 
will likely be followed, given that the executive does not know a priori what the verdict of the 
legislature on an impeachment process will be (i.e., how the other parties will vote in Congress). 
Even in a context in which the executive has a low amount of congressional power, the non-
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institutional strategies of vacancy creation can still be effective. For example, justices may not 
survive the political persecution when they are constantly accused of wrongdoing in the media.  
Even though the main induced strategy for weak executives is the non-institutional one, 
there are some cases in which the executive can count on the support of other political parties 
and, thus, make credible their threats against the justices to activate institutional strategies. It is 
often the case that the target justice does not have a good reputation either because he had a 
previous political career or he had prior accusations of corruption or wrongdoing. In those cases, 
even though the ruling party does not have the political power to carry out an impeachment 
process, the mere accusations or threat of an impeachment become credible since the justice has 
already a bad reputation within society and the justice knows that sooner or later the 
impeachment will be carried out. For example, during the Nestor Kirchner administration, it was 
possible to impeach 6 out of the 9 justices in the bench without the ruling party having the 
necessary seats in the Congress because those justices had been involved in several corruption 
scandals and thus their reputation was strongly harmed. Threats of impeachment process can turn 
into a formal impeachment when the executive can count on the support from other political 
parties. Therefore, when the troubled justices have an unpopular reputation in society, the non-
institutional strategies can turn into institutional strategies because the executive can count on the 
support from other political parties. It is precisely under these circumstances that threats of 
impeachment are credible.  
On the other hand, when executives have the partisan power in the legislature to either 
impeach a justice or pass legislation to change the rules of the Court, then executives can activate 
both institutional and non-institutional strategies. These executives, in sum, have more resources 
available to craft a supportive court, making it more likely that they would obtain favorable 
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results in a shorter time than those executives without comparable partisan power in the 
Congress. Evidently, changing the rules of the Court is not cost-free, but powerful executives can 
handle the costs associated with it. At the same time, executives have to be extremely careful 
when selecting incoming justices since it would be very difficult for them to face the political 
cost associated with the removal of a newly appointed justice. This happened to President 
Frondizi in 1960 when the newly appointed justices did not support his policies, so he decided to 
increase the number of justices to 7 to craft a supportive court. President Alfonsín faced the same 
dilemma when his newly appointed justices started to rule against his will; however, Alfonsín’s 
desire to enlarge the court did not come true due to the lack of congressional support.  
It is important to recall that the existing literature on Latin American courts has assumed 
that, even though executives always want to craft a supportive court, only those presidents or 
governors with strong support in the Congress will be able to do it (Chávez 2004; Iaryczower et 
al. 2002). Under this logic, the authors conclude that judicial turnover is reduced when weak 
presidents or governors are in power, not because they are benevolent toward the existing 
justices, but rather because they do not have the political capacity to craft a supportive court 
(Chávez 2004; Iaryczower et al. 2002). However, between 1916 and 2009 in Argentina, 
governments had a supermajority in the National Congress in only 11 years. Therefore, what can 
account for the high instability rate of Argentine justices? Were those justices removed from 
office only by those presidents with the political power to formally do so? It may be argued that 
the non-institutional strategies of induced retirement can also help weak governors and 
executives to craft a supportive court. The political power of the executive can influence the type 
of strategy that executives use as well as the timing of the creation of vacancies, since the 
institutional mechanism of induced retirement may be more expeditious than the non-
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institutional ones (due to the uncertainty associated with the result). This does not necessarily 
guarantee the removal of a justice from the bench. Table 2.1 outlines the main characteristics and 
differences between the institutional and non-institutional channels of induced retirement. 
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Table 2.1: Main features of institutional and non-institutional mechanisms of induced retirement at 
both the national and subnational levels 
 Institutional Non-Institutional 
Who? Strong executives Strong executives, weak executives 
What? • Offer attractive retirement 
benefits to the justices. 
• Allow reappointment of the 
justice to a federal court. 
• Remove the justice via 
executive decree (extraordinary 
mechanism). 
• Change the Constitutional 
rules regarding retirement age and 
the number of sitting justices in 
office. 
• Cut back the salaries of the 
justices via a budgetary reduction. 
• Threaten a justice with possible 
impeachment due to accusations of 
corruption or wrongdoing. 
• Discredit the justice’s decision 
on a case in the media. 
• Implicate the justice’s family in 
a scandal. 
• Foster internal disputes in the 
Court between the “disloyal” justice 
and the loyal ones. 
Effectiveness? Yes Uncertain 
Timeframe? Specified length Uncertain length 
2.3 CONCLUSIONS 
Overall, the previous discussion provides the foundations for a new approach for studying 
executive-court relations in developing democracies. Building off the existing literature, the 
chapter showed that many of the underlying assumptions are not applicable to the Argentine 
judiciary and may not be applicable to other developing democracies. Specifically, the chapter 
reversed the directionality of the relationship between executives and justices by proposing that 
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executives (either presidents or governors), rather than justices, can determine the stability of 
justices on the bench. Based on this idea, the chapter then presented a novel framework for the 
study of judicial instability in office by examining the preferences and incentives of the 
executive to craft a supportive court. This last section outline the hypotheses to be tested both at 
the national and subnational level analysis.25 The political proximity of the justice and the ruling 
executive matter greatly, since executives prefer to have justices on the Court who share their 
political preferences. This generates the following hypothesis: 
Political preference hypothesis
Due to the importance of justices for policy-making, executives would not trust justices 
appointed by executives with different political preferences and would seek to manipulate the 
composition of the court during the first years of the administration so as to maximize their 
leverage in the court. Stated as a testable hypothesis: 
: A justice with different political preferences from the 
ruling executive will be more likely to be removed from office than a justice who shares the 
same political preferences as the executive. 
Timing hypothesis
The next hypothesis stems from the untested assumption held by a group of scholars 
(Chávez 2004; Iaryczower et al. 2002) about the partisan power of the executive to craft a 
supportive court. These authors argue that only those executives who have partisan support in 
Legislature to formally remove a justice from office (i.e., by impeachment) will obtain a 
: The likelihood that an incoming executive removes a justice from 
office will be higher during the first year of the government. 
                                                 
25 For simplicity issues, “executive” refers to either presidents or governors while “legislature” to either 
the National Congress or the provincial legislatures. 
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supportive Court. Even though this study challenges this assumption, it is included in the 
analysis as a competing a hypothesis: 
Executive partisan power hypothesis
Executives who inherit an unfriendly court from previous administrations would hardly 
trust justices with a different political ideology any more than justices with any political 
background at all. It is often the case that, during the nomination time, executives prefer to name 
a loyal member of their government or political party rather than a person with judicial 
background so as to guarantee that their interests will be accomplished in the court. 
Consequently, executives who confront an unfriendly court would first prefer to remove those 
justices with a political background rather than those with a judicial one, since they represent a 
political threat. Stated as a hypothesis: 
: The likelihood that a justice is removed from office 
will be higher when the government has a supermajority in Legislature. 
Justice’s political background hypothesis
 
: A justice with a political career will be more 
likely to be removed from office compared to a justice with a judicial career. 
Along with the previous hypothesis, the chapter also explored the different institutional 
and non-institutional strategies executives may employ to create vacancies in the court. Besides 
the increased importance of impeachment trials in the literature as the institutional mechanism 
for vacancy creation, the chapter uncovered other such mechanisms that, even though they have 
been used as often as the impeachment trials, have been generally overlooked. The next chapter 
shifts to the empirical facts by examining executive-court relations in Argentina since 1916, 
while the following chapter provides empirical evidence to test the theory of vacancy creation in 
the National Supreme Court and the Provincial Supreme Courts in Chapter five. 
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3.0  DISCLOSING THE LOGIC OF VACANCY CREATION IN THE ARGENTINE 
SUPREME COURT, 1916-2009 
One of the most striking historical facts about the Argentine Supreme Court is that, regardless of 
the fact that justices are appointed for life, since 1947 presidents have had a significant power to 
manipulate the composition of the Supreme Court by inducing, with different strategies, the 
retirement of the justices from office (Pellet Lastra 2001). Even though the power to craft a 
supportive court was far more evident during military regimes, democratically elected presidents 
also have been able to assemble a friendly court. Even more interesting, in 1994 President Carlos 
Menem, the second democratic executive since the last military regime, increased the number of 
justices from five to nine. This last enlargement of the Court gave birth to what was later known 
as the “automatic majority,”26
                                                 
26 The logic behind the idea of “automatic majority” is that the enlargement of the Court to 4 more 
members ensured that the president, Carlos Menem, would have at least four votes out of nine favorable 
to his own interests. However, Carlos Menem was able to appoint two more justices to the bench since 
Justices Adolfo C. Caballero and Jorge A. Bacqué resigned as a consequence of the political manipulation 
of the Court. In 1990, Menem appointed 6 out of 9 justices in the Court. 
 which reinforced the idea that presidents have an “addiction” to 
composing their own Supreme Court (Pellet Lastra 2001). This unbalanced relationship between 
the president and the justices has contributed to the deterioration of public opinion of both 
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branches, but more importantly of the Judiciary.27
This chapter applies the notion of positive feedback to illustrate how events in the early 
stages fed on themselves and reinforced the unbalanced relationship between presidents and 
justices (Pierson 2004). The 1946 impeachment trial of the Supreme Court justices represents a 
critical juncture in the history, since it initiated a process of positive feedback whereby the cost 
of changing the direction of the events was raised significantly. It is precisely the identification 
of this reinforcing process that can contribute to the understanding of why this unequal 
executive-court relationship has persisted over time. This chapter employs qualitative data, from 
primary and secondary sources, to trace the evolution of the inter-branch relationship. Section 
3.1 examines the executive-court relationship before 1946, paying special attention to the ways 
in which vacancies were created. During this first stage, executives had limited incentives to 
remove justices from the bench, since they shared the ideology of the conservative regime (Pellet 
Lastra 2001). Consequently, changes in the composition of the Court occurred gradually and as 
the result of natural causes like death or retirement. Section 3.2 focuses on the second stage of 
executive-court relations in the country, with the 1946 impeachment trial as the starting point. 
Contrary to the first part of the history, throughout this period executives had political incentives 
 A similar story of political manipulation of the 
courts takes place in the provincial Supreme Courts, since the consecutive changes between 
military and democratic regimes has also affected the composition of the local courts, in most 
provinces producing reshuffles.  
                                                 
27 In 1984 the public opinion surveys of institutional prestige revealed a 57% positive image towards the 
Judiciary, but as time went by that positive image decreased to 16% in 1991, 11% in 1999, and 8% in 
2001 (Poder Judicial de la Nacion Argentina 2004). With the re-democratization process in 1983, political 
institutions had high levels of prestige within society but as time went by political and economic crisis 
undermined the reputation of the institutions and increased the social dissatisfaction in the judiciary. 
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to craft a supportive court since justices had stronger bonds to the appointing executive than to 
the regime. This particular shift in conceiving the executive-court relationship triggered a self-
reinforcing dynamic leading towards a less independent judiciary. The changes in the political 
regime (from military to civilian and vice versa) were accompanied by purges in the Supreme 
Court, each one of which amplified the difficulties of reversing the course of the history. During 
this stage, vacancies in the Supreme Court were mainly induced by the executives. The final 
section outlines the main changes in the executive-court relationship and lays the ground for the 
empirical analysis of the vacancy creation framework. 
3.1 THE TRADITIONAL WAY OF CREATING VACANCIES: NATURAL CAUSES, 
1916-1946 
3.1.1 The Radical administrations: 1916-1928 
In 1916, the first presidential election conducted under secret and compulsory voting was held in 
Argentina. Law 8.871, sanctioned in 1912, known as the Sáenz Peña Law, aimed to put an end to 
electoral fraud in the country, not only by eliminating the open ballot but also by creating a new 
electoral roll (known as pardon electoraI). The Ministry of War and the Judiciary, no longer the 
Executive, were in charge of composing the list of people allowed to vote. Even though suffrage 
was still restricted to males, this was a very significant step toward eliminating electoral fraud. 
Therefore, the 1916 presidential election is considered to be the first democratic election in the 
country. The Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) party ended its electoral abstention and competed for 
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the presidency. From 1916 until 1930 the UCR governed the country: Presidents Hipólito 
Yrigoyen from 1916 to 1922, Marcelo T. de Alvear from 1922 to 1928, and Yrigoyen again from 
1928 to the military coup in 1930, were all from that party. This was the first time that 
democratically elected Presidents succeeded each other consecutively without a military 
interruption; it would be another 59 years before it happened again (Romero 2001).  
Yrigoyen was a very charismatic leader, probably the most popular president of the 
country before Perón (Potash 1982a). When Yrigoyen assumed the presidency in 1916, all the 
sitting members of the Supreme Court had been appointed by former presidents who were 
members of the Partido Autonomista Nacional (PAN). There was only one vacancy on the Court, 
since Justice M.P. Daract died in office on December 25, 1915. It took Yrigoyen three years to 
fill that vacancy (with Justice Ramón Méndez), partly due to low presidential support in the 
Senate. In the presidential election of 1922, Yrigoyen supported Marcelo T. de Alvear as the 
candidate from the UCR party; Alvear assumed the presidency shortly thereafter. As time went 
by, however, problems arose in the party due to differences in political style between the current 
and former executives. President Alvear, contrary to his predecessor, decentralized power and 
did not have strong visibility in the government. As a result of these differences, the UCR 
divided in two factions: personalist (pro-Yrigoyen) and anti-personalist (pro-Alvear). 
The Alvear administration was the first one in the century to have a high judicial turnover 
in the Supreme Court. Between 1922 and 1928 four justices left the Court (see Table 3.1) due to 
natural causes (i.e., deaths and retirements). On March 6, 1923, Justice D.E. Palacio died while 
in office, as did Justice Nicanor Gonzalez del Solar on September 24, 1924. In less than eight 
months Alvear filled the first vacancy with Justice Roberto Repetto, and in less than three 
months he appointed Justice Miguel Laurencena to the other open seat. The third vacancy 
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occurred on June 1, 1927, when Justice Ramón Méndez retired after eight years of service; it 
took Alvear only one month to appoint Justice Ricardo Guido Lavalle to replace him (Molinelli 
et al. 1999). The last vacancy came on February 3, 1928, when Justice Laurencena died in office; 
on September 10 of the same year, Alvear appointed Justice Antonio Sagarna to the Court. It is 
important to point out that, contrary to what happened during the first Yrigoyen administration, 
in this case Alvear had full support in the Senate, since more than half of the seats belonged to 
the president’s party (Molinelli et al. 1999). In 1928, despite the divisions in the UCR party, 
Alvear supported the candidacy of Yrigoyen in the election; at the age of 76 years, he was 
reelected president. 
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Table 3.1: Number of justices appointed by executives, 1900-2009 
Executive  Party Number of justices 
Julio A. Roca (1898-1904) PAN 3 
Manuel Quintana (1904-1906) PAN 1 
José Figueroa Alcorta (1906-1910) PAN 2 
Roque Sáenz Peña (1910-1914) PAN 0 
Victorino de la Plaza* (1914-1916) PAN 1 
Hipólito Yrigoyen (1916-1922) UCR 1 
Marcelo T. de Alvear (1922-1928) UCR 4 
Hipólito Yrigoyen (1928-1930) UCR 0 
José Felix Uriburu (1930-1932) Military 1 
Agustín P. Justo (1932-1938) PDN 3 
Roberto M. Ortiz (1938-1940) UCR(A) 1 
Ramón Castillo* (1940-1943)  UCR(A) 0 
Pedro Ramirez (1943-1944) Military 0 
Julián E. Farrell (1944-1946) Military 1 
Juan D. Perón (1946-1955) PJ 5 
Pedro A. Aramburu (1955-1958) Military 6 
Arturo Frondizi (1958-1962) UCR(I) 6 
José Maria Guido (1962-1963) UCR(I) 1 
Arturo U. Illia (1963-1966) UCR(P) 2 
Juan C. Ongania (1966-1970) Military 6 
Roberto M. Levingston (1970-1971) Military 1 
Alejandro Lanusse (1971-1973) Military 0 
Juan D. Perón (1973-1974) PJ 51 
María Estela M. de Perón* (1974-1976) PJ 2 
Jorge R. Videla (1976-1980) Military 9 
Eduardo Viola (1980-1981) Military 0 
Leopoldo Galtieri (1981-1982) Military 1 
Reynaldo Bignone (1982-1983) Military 2  
Raul Alfonsín (1983-1989) UCR 6 
Carlos S. Menem (1989-1999) PJ 10 
Fernando de la Rua (1999-2001) Alianza 0 
Eduardo Duhalde (2002-2003) PJ 1 
Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007) PJ 4 
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (2007- ) PJ 0 
Note: *Vice President assumed the Presidency due to the death of the President. PAN: Partido Autonomista 
Nacional; UCR: Unión Cívica Radical; UCR(I): Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente; UCR(A): Unión Cívica Radical 
Antipersonalista; UCR(P): Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo; PJ: Partido Justicialista; PDN: Partido Demócrata 
Nacional. 1 Justices appointed under the Cámpora Presidency but informally by Juan Perón. 
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During the second Yrigoyen administration, the divisions inside the party intensified and 
corruption scandals increased. By 1930 the antipersonalist faction was strongly against the 
president’s actions. Yrigoyen faced severe criticism also from politicians outside the party, 
especially when he decided on federal intervention in the province of Entre Rios (Potash 1982a). 
Although Justice Antonio Bermejo died on October 18, 1929, before the military removed the 
president from office on September 10, 1930, Yrigoyen had not filled the vacancy on the Court. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court had at that time only four members: three appointed by Alvear 
(Justices Antonio Sagarna, Ricardo Guido Lavalle, and Roberto Repetto), and one (Justice José 
Figueroa Alcorta) appointed by the PAN. 
3.1.2 The infamous decade: 1930-1943 
On September 10, 1930, José Felix Uriburu became the first de facto president of the country, 
when Hipólito Yrigoyen was forced out of power and Congress was closed. The military coup in 
1930 initiated the infamous decade, a period characterized by electoral fraud, political 
persecution of the members of the UCR (forcing former President Alvear into exile), and an 
increased in the government corruption. General Uriburu was in office from 1930 until 1932, 
when General Agustín Justo won the presidential election and remained in power until 1938. 
Roberto Ortiz won the next election, but a serious health problem made him resign in 1940; his 
Vice President, Ramón Castillo, assumed the presidency until June 4, 1943, when a second coup 
removed him from office. As Table 3.1 shows, during this term, General Justo appointed a 
majority of the justices to the bench. 
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As soon as Uriburu seized power, Ernesto Padilla (the new Minister of Justice) and 
Matías Sánchez Sorondo (the new Minister of the Interior) informed the members of the 
Supreme Court that General Uriburu was now the head of the country. Immediately after 
receiving the official notice, the justices began to consider whether or not to confirm the coup. 
Justices Repetto, Sagarna, and Guido Lavalle were inclined to give legitimacy to the military 
government, whereas Justice Figueroa Alcorta was more concerned about the aims of the 
military and seemed ready to resign (Pellet Lastra 2001). In the end, the four justices signed the 
“Acordada” recognizing the new government, but at the same time reaffirmed that the National 
Constitution guaranteed individual liberties and private property (Articles 14 and 17) (Barrancos 
y Vedia 2000; Pellet Lastra 2001).28
On February 22, 1932, General Agustín Justo, from the Partido Democrático Nacional 
(PDN), won the election with the support of the military. This first election after the coup was 
 This controversial pronouncement by the justices of the 
Supreme Court, that legitimated a military government, would lead to one of several complaints 
made by the Peronists when they impeached the members of the Court in 1946. One month after 
the justices’ validation of the Acordada, General Uriburu filled the existing vacancy in the Court 
with Justice Julián Pera. This was the first time that a military president had appointed a justice 
to the Supreme Court without the support of the Senate. Another vacancy opened up when, on 
December 27, 1931, Justice Figueroa Alcorta died in office, but General Uriburu did not have 
time to fill that seat. 
                                                 
28 Within the Argentine legal studies there are numerous works that analyze the political consequences of 
the “Acordada”, some of the defending it while other attacking (Nino 2005; Oteiza 1994; Oyhanarte 
1972; Pellet Lastra 2001; Pérez Guilhou 1989). 
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carried out under suspicion of electoral fraud promoted by the Conservative sectors.29
In the clearly fraudulent presidential election of 1937(Romero 2001), Roberto Ortiz from 
the antipersonalist faction of the UCR won with the support of Justo and the Concordancia. One 
of Ortiz’s main goals was to put an end to the manipulation and fraud of the elections, but he was 
not able to accomplish that task. During his term, there was only one vacancy in the Supreme 
Court, when the recently appointed Justice Terán died in office on December 8, 1938. Twenty 
days later Justice Francisco Ramos Mejía was appointed to replace him. Ortiz resigned in mid-
1942, due to a serious illness, and his Vice President, Ramón Castillo, assumed the presidency 
until he was deposed by the military one year later.  
 One of 
Justo’s main challenges was to mitigate the consequences of the Great Depression on the 
national economy. Under his administration there were a couple of replacements on the Supreme 
Court. On July 1, 1933, Justo appointed Justice Luis Linares to fill an existing vacancy, but a 
couple of months later Justice Guido Lavalle died in office. Shortly thereafter, Justo appointed 
Justice Benito Nazar Anchorena to the second vacancy in the Court. A third vacancy came about 
on July 26, 1935, when Justice Pera died; to replace him, Justo appointed Justice Juan B. Terán. 
3.1.3 Revolution of ’43 and the military governments: 1943-1946 
Prior to this second coup, there had been other attempts to remove President Castillo from office 
because of an increasing number of corruption scandals and high social discontent. One day 
before the coup, Castillo forced Pedro Ramirez, his Minister of War, to resign, since he had met 
                                                 
29 The Conservative sectors would later create the electoral alliance known as “Concordancia” among the 
PND, the antipersonalist UCR, and the Partido Socialista Independiente. 
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with the leaders of the UCR to explore the possibility of his becoming that party’s presidential 
candidate in the forthcoming election. As a result of this conflict, Generals Arturo Rawson and 
Pedro Ramirez planned the removal of Castillo for the next day (Potash 1982a). Contrary to the 
circumstances of the coup of 1930, in this case the coup was not expected and was not supported 
by the people. Even though General Rawson was supposed to assume the presidency, he resigned 
a couple of days later due to disagreements with the rest of the military. Thus, General Pedro 
Ramirez assumed the presidency on June 7, 1943, with Colonel Juan D. Perón appointed 
Minister of War.30
As with the military coup in 1930, General Ramirez also closed the Congress and sent an 
official note to the Supreme Court informing it of the changes in the executive branch. The 
members of the Supreme Court faced the same dilemma as in 1930: whether or not to legitimize 
the military coup. Justice Repetto suggested applying the same principles as to the “Acordada” in 
September 1930, but this time Justices Sagarna and Linares were reluctant to comply, since they 
did not share the ideology of the military regime (Pellet Lastra 2001). Justice Linares tried to 
convince his colleagues until the last minute not to sign the new Acordada, since he feared that 
the military would respect neither the rule of law nor the stability of the justices and judges in 
office. Linares’s arguments, however, did not persuade the rest of the justices; thus they ended 
up replicating the Acordada of 1930 and giving legitimacy to the military regime. Linares, 
annoyed  with the decision, gradually cut back his attendance on the Court, until he finally 
resigned from the bench on July 1, 1944 (Pellet Lastra 2001). His departure from the bench is 
 
                                                 
30 Rawson chose an eclectic group of people for the Cabinet, some of whom had supported the Allies 
during World War II, while others had supported the Axis powers. His selections were not approved by 
the rest of the military (Potash 1982a).  
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considered to be the first time in the twentieth century that a justice voluntarily left office for a 
reason other than natural causes. 
It did not take long for Linares’s fears to be realized. As soon as Ramirez had seized 
power, he removed several judges from the federal courts without an impeachment trial. By the 
time Linares stepped off the bench, General Julián Farrell was the military President of the 
country, following General Ramirez’s resignation due to internal conflicts in the military.31
In the provinces, the incoming military governors, appointed by the military regime, also 
set in motion a plan to attack the local judiciaries, especially the Supreme Courts. The partial 
data available for some provinces during those years reveal that in the Provinces of Buenos 
Aires, Mendoza and Tucumán the military governors were able to reshuffle the composition of 
the courts. In contrast, in the case of Córdoba, the military governor removed only one justice 
from the bench but ended up appointing two new justices out of five due to a vacancy on the 
court.  These clear attacks on the Provincial Supreme Courts, not clearly present in regard to the 
National Supreme Court, would become recurrent at the national level during subsequent years. 
 
General Farrell appointed Justice Tomás D. Casares to the Court on September 27, 1944. When 
Farrell assumed the Presidency, Juan D. Perón became Vice President, while the Secretary of 
War remained as head of the Department of Labor. By that time, Perón was increasing his 
popularity and gaining support from the people, especially the working class.  
During the military regime, the National Supreme Court made some decisions that aimed 
to limit the de facto government. For example, in 1945 the Court annulled the decision of the 
                                                 
31 Ramirez wanted to break relations with the Axis and gradually incorporate civilians into his 
government, but another faction of the military (Grupo de Oficiales Unidos – GOU) wished to continue 
the military revolution and remain neutral in World War II (Potash 1982a). 
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executive to create federal tribunals in Chaco; also that year, the Court invalidated the 
executive’s decision to relocate the federal judge Salvador Dana Montaño from the city of Santa 
Fe to San Rafael, and reversed the executive’s decision to remove Judge Barraco Mármol from 
the Federal Court in Córdoba (Carrio 1996). Furthermore, the Court did not allow the 
appointments of the members of the Labor Appeal Court in the bench. One of the most important 
decisions of the Supreme Court against the military government and, especially, in favor of 
Perón’s labor initiatives, was the “Dock Sud Buenos Aires” case, in which the Court declared 
unconstitutional an executive decree that aimed to allow the Department of Labor to impose 
monetary penalties on the regional secretaries (Carrio 1996). Perón and his allies interpreted all 
these decisions as a way to undermine the executive’s power and bolster his opponents before 
the presidential election for the democratic transition. 
When World War II ended, popular demonstrations erupted against Argentina’s regime. 
By October Perón’s popularity reached its maximum when he was forced to resign and was 
arrested in Martín Garcia Island. Eva Duarte, her partner, and the General Confederation of 
Labor (CGT) organized mass demonstrations supporting Perón and when Perón was released 
free elections were promised. On the day of the presidential election, Colonel Perón won the 
presidency. His party obtained more than 2/3 of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and all but 
two seats in the Senate (Molinelli 1999).   
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3.2 A NEW WAY OF CREATING VACANCIES: INDUCED RETIREMENTS, 1947-
2009 
3.2.1 The Peronist governments: 1946-1955 
Juan Perón assumed the presidency on June 4, 1946, at which time he was also promoted from 
Colonel to General within the military, revealing that his candidacy was supported by both 
military and civilians (especially the working class) (Potash 1982b). Four days after the 
investiture ceremony, Deputy Rodolfo A. Decker from Perón’s party requested the impeachment 
of Justices Repetto, Sagarna, Nazar Anchorena, and Ramos Mejías, as well as the Solicitor 
General Juan Alvarez. Most of the accusations against the justices were related to decisions, 
previously mentioned, that aimed to control the de facto government. Justices Repetto and 
Sangarna, were held responsible also for the “Acordadas” of 1930 and 1943 by which they had 
legitimatized the military governments. Justice Casares , a representative of the Catholic church, 
was excluded from the impeachment action, despite having made the same decisions as the other 
justices in the controversial cases, because Perón preferred to avoid creating problems with that 
sector of society (Pellet Lastra 2001). Historians agree on the unfair accusation of the justices 
and the violation of due process,32
                                                 
32 A couple of weeks prior to the trial in the Senate, the rules regarding the trial procedure were changed: 
first, the defendant lawyers were not longer able to present their defendant statement since the president 
of the Senate would be in charge of reading it out loud, and, second, the defendant lawyers were not able 
to sit next to the accused but rather in common areas.  
 understanding that the impeachments were motivated by 
political reasons (Pellet Lastra 2001; Oyhanarte 1972; Carrio 1996). The absurd accusation of 
Justice Repetto exemplifies the suspicious trials carried out in the Senate. When Repetto was 
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formally accused on July 8, he was at that time no longer even a member of the Supreme Court. 
Having foreseen Perón’s intention to manipulate and control the Supreme Court, Repetto had 
deliberately resigned before that could happen. The executive had, indeed, accepted his 
resignation on May 22, but he was, nevertheless, formally accused in the Senate. Since there 
were Perón majorities in both chambers, the impeachment process developed as expected. Nine 
months later, on April 30, 1947, Justices Sagarna, Nazar Anchorena and Ramos Mejías were 
found guilty and removed from the bench. Regarding Justice Repetto, the Congress admitted 
that, by the time of the accusation, he was no longer part of the Court; thus the case against him 
was dismissed. 
The impeachment trial of the justices of the Supreme Court and the subsequent 
appointment of friendly justices to the Court represent a critical juncture in the evolution of the 
executive-court relationship, because they established a different logic of interactions that in the 
following years would become difficult to reverse. The tough confrontation between the 
Supreme Court and the executive during the previous military regime proved, first, the key role 
played by the judiciary in policy-making and, second, the lack of tolerance of executives of 
justices ruling against their will. Moreover, the reshuffle of the court demonstrated that 
executives do not necessarily have to deal with an unfriendly court. In the end, what made this 
event “critical” is that it triggered a process of positive feedback that would reinforce a less 
independent pattern of relations.  
On August 1, 1947, Perón appointed Justices Felipe S. Pérez, Justo L. Alvarez 
Rodriguez, Luis R. Longhi, and Rodolfo Valenzuela to the Supreme Court, the first voluntary 
reshuffle in the Court (see Table 3.1). These four justices shared in common not only their 
loyalty to Perón but also their prior political association with the PJ (Pellet Lastra 2001). Two 
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years later, Justice Alvarez Rodriguez died in office; Perón appointed Justice Atilio Pessagno, 
also one of his political allies, to replace him. In addition to these justices having had clear 
political associations with Perón and his party before their appointment to the bench, they 
continued to be publicly connected with the ruling party during their time in office. A clear 
example is their participation during the Constitutional Reform of 1949 as representatives of 
Perón’s party, despite criticism from the opposition. The constitutional reform introduced two 
important changes in the functioning of the judiciary, as well as several other workers’ rights and 
the possibility of presidential reelection. From 1949 on, the justices of the Supreme Court would 
no longer be removed from office by the impeachment process but rather by a jury conformed by 
judges (Article 91); secondly, the judges from the federal courts would lose their tenure on the 
bench and have to be reappointed to office (Transitory Article 4). Like the impeachment process 
for members of the Supreme Court, these changes in the Constitution aimed at the same result: 
removing from office those judges who were deemed unfriendly to Perón. In the end, 74 judges 
from the lower courts were not reappointed, and others were forced to retire (Pellet Lastra 2001). 
In order to avoid future problems with members of the Judiciary, one of the requirements for 
future justices was to be affiliated with the Partido Justicialista (Pellet Lastra 2001). In 1951 
Perón was reelected president and remained in office until September 1955, when a military 
coup overthrew him. Problems with the economy, the church, and society, due to political 
persecution of the opposition, encouraged military dissidents to remove Perón from office. 
At the provincial level, the partial data available reveal that the Supreme Courts of 
Buenos Aires, Córdoba and Mendoza were also reshuffled when Perón assumed the presidency.  
The positive feedback provided by the replication at the subnational level of the political 
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manipulations of the Supreme Courts definitely complemented the process of creating a less 
independent pattern of relations between the executive and the judiciary.  
3.2.2 The Liberating Revolution and the military governments: 1955-1958 
General Eduardo Lonardi assumed the de facto presidency on September 23, 1955, thus initiating 
the Liberating Revolution that was to end as soon as the country was “reorganized.” However, 
two months later, an internal mutiny within the military, originated by the hardliners, deposed 
General Lonardi and placed General Pedro Aramburu in the presidency. The military issued a 
decree that removed all the members of the Supreme Court, and appointed all new justices as 
part of their plan for reorganizing the country. The second purge of the Supreme Court 
reinforced Perón’s initiative in how to deal with unfriendly justices and, thus, reaffirmed the 
political process of political manipulation of the judiciary. Keeping the Peronist justices on the 
bench, which was not an option for the military, could have stopped the emergence of an unequal 
interaction between the executive and the judiciary. However, the purge of the Court reinforced 
the political process of manipulation launched by Perón. 
The Peronist party (PJ) suffered proscription, and all public reference to the leader or to 
the party was forbidden (Decree-Law 4161 of 1956). If Perón wanted to “Peronize” the country, 
the military wanted to reverse that action. Thus the main task of the revolution was to “de-
Peronize” the country and its institutions both at the national and subnational level. One of the 
main targets of the military was the judicial branch; indeed, their first symbolic action was to 
officially restore the reputation of the justices who had been impeached in 1947. The military 
removed the members of the Supreme Court and 70% of the lower court judges were “puestos en 
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comisión” (suspended) (Pellet Lastra 2001). Aramburu appointed to the Supreme Court five anti-
Peronist justices with strong judicial experience as well as a firm commitment to the Liberating 
Revolution (Justices Alfredo Orgaz, Manuel Argañarás, Enrique V. Galli, Carlos Herrera, and 
Jorge Vera Vallejos). Along these lines, in April 1956, the de facto government knocked down 
the last foundation of the Peronist administration: the 1949 National Constitution. Aramburu, via 
a decree-law, abolished the Peronist Constitution and restored the Constitution of 1853. Justice 
Vera Vallejo interpreted this action as a clear abuse of the power of the military government and 
resigned from the bench (Pellet Lastra 2001). Four months later, Aramburu appointed Benjamín 
Villegas Basavilbaso to fill the vacancy. 
The “de-Peronization” plan affected also the judiciaries in the provinces. In 1955, the 
Supreme Courts of Buenos Aires, Chaco, Córdoba, Entre Rios, Jujuy, La Pampa, Mendoza, 
Santa Fe and Tucumán were also reshuffled as soon as the military government seized power. 
The provinces of Chaco, Entre Rios and La Pampa experienced their first purge since their 
Supreme Courts were created in 1953, 1950 and 1954, respectively. Even in the case of La 
Pampa, the local military governor not only removed from the bench all 5 justices appointed a 
couple of months earlier but also reduced the number of sitting justices to three. Evidently, the 
provincial Supreme Courts were following the same pattern of reshuffles as the National 
Supreme Court and thus reinforcing this process of positive feedback.   
In February of 1958 Aramburu called for presidential elections, but the PJ was still 
proscribed. The UCR presented two candidates: Ricardo Balbín (endorsed by General 
Aramburu) from the Popular faction, and Arturo Frondizi from the Intransigent faction. Four 
days before the election, Frondizi and Perón (from his exile) made a secret pact in which the 
Peronists would support Frondizi’s candidacy in return for his promise of giving them a voice in 
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the government and remove all the Supreme Court Justices (Potash 1982b). The Peronist votes 
became Frondizi’s votes allowing him to win the election. This was the first time in forty years 
that a presidential candidate not supported by the outgoing administration won an election.  
3.2.3 The radical governments: 1958-1966 
Frondizi assumed the presidency on May 1, 1958. His most important tasks were to reconcile the 
Peronists and the anti-Peronists, solve the economic crisis, and avoid undue military pressure. 
One of his main priorities was to reorganize the National Supreme Court, since all of its 
members had been appointed during the military regime. Contrary to the strategy followed by 
Perón, Frondizi took a different tack. He was not able to remove all of the justices at once, 
because that would have annoyed the military, so he decided to confirm two of the existing 
justices and then submitted a bill to Congress to enlarge the Court. Evidently, Frondizi violated 
the secret pact with Perón. Justices Villegas Basavilbaso and Orgaz remained on the bench as a 
symbol of tolerance of the previous administration,33
                                                 
33 Justice Orgaz remained in office as a symbol of juridical continuity and Justice Villegas Basavilbaso as 
a special request from the Navy (Pellet Lastra 2001). 
 and Frondizi decided to buy off the other 
three justices if they quietly left the bench. Justice Herrera was offered the post of Argentine 
ambassador in Switzerland; Justice Argañaras (by that time 70 years old) was forced to retire; 
and Justice Galli was offered a place on the National Commission in charge of reforming the 
Civil Code. He refused it, however, without compromising the incoming government (Pellet 
Lastra 2001). On May 12, 1958, Frondizi appointed justices Luis M. Boffi Boggero, Julio C. 
Oyhanarte, and Aristóbulo D. Aráoz de Lamadrid to fill the three vacancies and thus produce the 
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third reshuffle in the court. All three incoming justices had clear bonds with the president and his 
party (Pellet Lastra 2001). 
At the subnational level, the Supreme Courts of Buenos Aires, Chaco, Córdoba, Jujuy, La 
Pampa, Mendoza and Tucumán were also reshuffled. The Supreme Courts of Chubut, Formosa 
and Santa Cruz started to function in 1958, so in those provinces the incoming governors 
appointed new justices to the Courts, thus crafting a supportive body. In the case of the Supreme 
Court of Entre Rios, by the end of 1957 four justices had resigned from the bench; thus the 
incoming governor in 1958 appointed 5 out of the 9 justices, since there was one vacancy on the 
Court. The similarities in political manipulation between the National and Provincial Supreme 
Courts would become stronger in the coming years.  
Once the National Supreme Court was “reorganized,” Frondizi, like the previous 
administrations, moved on to the judges in the lower courts. Based on the fact that the current 
judges had been appointed by the military and thus without Congressional support, Frondizi 
decreed that all judges needed to have Senate support. Evidently, this strategy was aimed to 
remove unfriendly judges from office, as Perón and the military had done before. The judges 
who had not been confirmed by the Senate or agreed to retire presented writs of amparo arguing 
that the government had violated their right of life tenure.  The Supreme Court denied the writs 
of the judges, which ended up intensifying their discontent.  Meanwhile, Chief Justice Orgaz was 
the person responsible for leading the swearing-in ceremonies of the incoming judges. A couple 
of weeks later, all the judges of the National Criminal Appeals Court resigned in solidarity with 
the recently displaced Judge Sagasta (from the same court), and the conflict between the 
executive and the judges increased dramatically. A couple of days later, the Chief Justice 
resigned from the bench due to popular discontent with the political manipulation of the federal 
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judiciary. Frondizi decided to mitigate the judicial crisis by meeting with members of the Bar 
Association in order to take into account their opinions on how to proceed. As a result of the 
meeting, Frondizi was advised to reappoint the displaced judges who were members of such 
critical courts as the Criminal and Federal. Thus the judges from the Federal Court, as well as the 
recently resigned Chief Justice Orgaz, decided to return to the bench; the judges of the Penal 
Court, however, did not do so, being offended by the president’s manipulation of the judiciary. 
On February 3, 1960, the Senate approved enlarging the Supreme Court from five to 
seven members (Law 15.271). Chief Justice Orgaz, who strongly criticized the enlargement of 
the Court, took a twenty-day leave from the bench. In the meantime, Frondizi appointed Justices 
Ricardo Colombres and Pedro Aberastury to fill the two new vacancies, both of them with close 
connections to Frondizi and to Quijano (the Assistant Secretary of Justice) (Pellet Lastra 2001). 
Shortly after Orgaz returned to the bench, he resigned, due to his discontent with the political 
manipulation of the Supreme Court. Six months later, Frondizi appointed Justice Esteban Imaz to 
replace him. Unlike the previous appointees, Justice Imaz had no political or ideological bond to 
either Frondizi or his political party; rather, he was considered a candidate who had had a purely 
judicial career. Historians argue that, by the time Orgaz resigned from the bench, Frondizi 
already had a majority (five out of the seven justices), which explains both the delay in the 
President’s appointment of Imaz to the bench and his lack of a political connection to the ruling 
party (Pellet Lastra 2001). By September 12, Justice Oyhanarte resigned, and Justice José F. 
Bidau was appointed to replace him. In total, Frondizi appointed 6 out of the 7 justices in the 
Court (see Table 3.1). 
 In the gubernatorial election of 1962, Frondizi allowed the Peronist candidates to run for 
election under a neo-Peronist party label since the PJ was still banned. The Peronist candidates 
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won most of the governorships, generating nervousness among the military, who were not 
willing to allow the reappearance of the Peronists in the political arena. As a result, Frondizi 
carried out massive federal interventions to prevent the elected Peronist governors from 
assuming power. These interventions were, however, not enough for the military, so on March 
29, 1962, Frondizi was overthrown. Unlike the previous coups, the military decided to carry out 
a democratic transition and allowed a civilian to take power. José Maria Guido, president of the 
Senate, was the next person in the line of succession, since the Vice President had already 
resigned. 
The main task for the interim president was to schedule immediate presidential elections, 
so as to secure a democratic transition. The Peronista party was again banned from participating. 
On July 7, 1963, presidential elections were held. Arturo Illia, from the people’s faction of the 
UCR, won with only 25% of the vote, giving him a low level of legitimacy. By the time Illia 
assumed the presidency, the majority of the justices had been appointed by Frondizi, so he sent a 
bill to Congress to enlarge the number of sitting justices from 7 to 10 (Oteiza 1994). As a way to 
increase his legitimacy, Illia offered one of the vacancies to Carlos Fayt, at that time the 
President of the Bar Association, but only if he supported the enlargement of the Court. Carlos 
Fayt rejected the proposition and publicly condemned the president’s proposal (La Nación 
23/02/2008). The enlargement bill was approved in the Senate but not in the Chamber of 
Deputies; thus Illia’s intent to craft a supporting court vanished. However, during his short 
administration two justices stepped off the bench: Justice Villegas Basavilbaso retired on 
September 22, 1964, and Justice Bidau resigned the following month. Justice Carlos Juan 
Zavala, who shared a political sympathy with the UCR, was appointed on November 26, and 
Justice Almílcar Mercader, a candidate with a strong connection to the party, was appointed on 
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February 3, 1965. Besides the enlargement proposal, there are not many records on secondary 
and primary sources about the executive-court relations during Illia’s administration. However, 
one of Illia’s decisions was to abolish all restrictions on the PJ, which caused anger and surprise 
among the military. Two years later, in the legislative elections of 1965, the Peronists obtained 
55% of the vote; this triumph stimulated a fear among the military of a possible return to power 
of the PJ. Thus on June 28, 1966, Illia was removed from office by a military junta. 
3.2.4 Argentine Revolution and the military governments: 1966-1973 
On that date, the military, therefore, seized power for the fourth time. General Juan Carlos 
Onganía became president. During this period, Onganía announced new repressive legislation to 
strengthen anti-communism and reduce the power of the trade unions. The first decisions of the 
junta were to remove the constitutionally elected president and vice-president from office, close 
the Congress and provincial legislatures, and remove from office all the members of the National 
and Provincial Supreme Court along with the Solicitor General (Decree 3 and Revolutionary 
Statute art. 9, 1966). Onganía’s decision reinforced the previous strategies of dealing with 
unfriendly justices. General Onganía decided to reduce the number of justices to five (Decree-
Law 16.895 of July 5, 1966) as a way to reestablish the previous order. Onganía appointed 
Justices Eduardo A. Ortiz, Roberto E. Chute, Marco Aurelio Risolía, Guillermo A. Borda and 
Luis C. Cabral to the Supreme Court. The purge of the Court corroborated the logic of political 
manipulation of the judiciary as well as increasing the cost of switching to a different alternative. 
The removal of the Supreme Court justices exhibited a process of positive feedback and 
contributed to consolidate this even pattern of executive-court relations. 
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The manipulation of the judiciary was also carried out at the subnational level, which 
ended up reinforcing the positive feedback. Onganía allowed the military governors 
(“interventores”), if necessary, to remove the justices from the local Supreme Courts; in fact, the 
governors had 30 days to send the composition of the court to Onganía for formal ratification. 
The military governors of the provinces of Buenos Aires, Chaco, Chubut, Córdoba, Entre Ríos, 
Formosa, Jujuy, La Pampa, Mendoza, Neuquén, Rio Negro, Santa Cruz and Tucumán decided to 
reshuffle their local Courts. In the case of Buenos Aires, 4 justices departed from the bench, 
allowing the military governor to appoint 5 justices out of 9 since there was a vacancy on the 
Court. In the case of Santa Fe, there was not a complete reshuffle of the Court; however, the 
military governor appointed 2 out of 5 justices. Evidently, many of the military governors took 
advantage of the opportunity that General Onganía gave them to craft a supportive court. 
Contrary to the previous military coups, the federal judges were not removed from office. 
At the beginning of 1967, Onganía offered the Ministry of the Interior to his loyal friend Justice 
Borda, which prompted Borda to resign from the Court. In his place, Justice José F. Bidau was 
reappointed to the bench. During this period, the Supreme Court confirmed the military power in 
several cases like “Molina Ricardo”, “Ricardo Sofía” and “Pucci”, however, there were also 
some exception like the “Azul y Blanco” case in which the members of the Supreme Court 
protected the freedom of the press by annulling the shutting down of the magazine (Carrio 1996; 
Oteiza 1994). 
During this period, the repressive actions of the military government generated violence 
in political life. May 1969 was marked by the “Cordobazo,” a series of violent confrontations 
between the military and society (mainly students and workers). By this time, Montoneros, a 
military organization from the PJ, and the Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP), a military 
65 
 
organization from the Revolutionary Labor Party, emerged as a counter force to the military 
government, using guerilla warfare tactics. By June 1969, the government declared a state of 
siege (Decree-Law 18.262), and Onganía explicitly ordered the shutting down of the newspapers 
“Primera Plana” (Decree 4.179) and “Ojo” (Carrio 1996; Oteiza 1994). The Supreme Court 
supported those restrictions on the freedom of the press.  
By 1970, and as a result of an internal revolt within the military, General Levingston 
became president of the country. As in 1930, this time the Supreme Court also recognized 
Levingston as the new executive of the country. In July 1970 Justice Bidau died while in office 
and Levingston appointed Margarita Argúas to the Court, resulting in the first time that a woman 
was a Supreme Court justice in the country. In 1971, as a result of another military revolt, 
General Agustín Lanusse became military president of the country with the consent of the 
Supreme Court. Since Lanusse faced strong protests, the government employed violent tactics to 
silence the dissenters. However, by 1973 the escalating unrest had pushed the military 
government to schedule a presidential election to achieve stability. 
3.2.5 The return of the Peronist government: 1973-1976 
This time, the PJ was allowed to run for elections, but not Juan Perón himself. Héctor Campora, 
Perón’s personal delegate, ran for the presidency as a way to circumvent the veto on Perón. The 
slogan for the election was “Campora to the government and Perón to power.” Campora obtained 
49% of the votes; Ricardo Balbín, from the UCR, 25%. The second-round election between the 
two candidates was suspended, because Balbín resigned his rights and recognized his defeat. 
After Campora assumed the presidency on May 25, 1973, his first executive order (Amnesty 
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Law 20.508) was to grant amnesty to almost 400 political prisoners who had been jailed during 
the Argentine Revolution.  
As soon as the military stepped down, all the members of the Supreme Court resigned. 
Based on the previous experience with the Peronists government, along with rumors of possible 
impeachment, they were less than confident about their future on the Court. The retirement Law 
19.939 facilitated the departure of the justices since the law established that: first, the justices 
would be able to retire from the bench without any restriction regarding of number of years in 
service, and, second, that the retirement pension would be equal to the current salary of the 
justices. As expected, on June 8 the Supreme Court was purged again and 5 new justices were 
appointed (Justices Justices Miguel A. Bercaitz, Agustín Díaz Bialet, Manuel Guillermo L. 
Aráuz Castex, Ernesto Corvalán Nanclares, and Héctor Masnatta). Evidently, the cost of 
switching to some other alternative of how to deal with an unfriendly court raised as time went 
by.  
As in 1947, all the incoming justices had in common a strong loyalty to Perón (Pellet 
Lastra 2001). The swearing-in ceremony of the justices was held as a Peronist victory, and the 
hall was crowded with loyal people from the party singing Peronist songs. On June 20 Perón 
returned to the country, and the different factions of the PJ ended up in a bloody confrontation 
near the airport, forcing President Campora and his Vice President to resign. Raúl Lastiri, the 
next in the line of succession, assumed the presidency and scheduled another election for 
September. Juan Perón won that election with 62% of the votes, and his wife, María Estela 
Martínez de Perón, became the first woman Vice President of the country.  
At the subnational level the local Courts also experienced changes. The Courts of Buenos 
Aires, Chaco, Chubut, Córdoba, Entre Ríos, Jujuy, Mendoza, Rio Negro, Santa Cruz, Santa Fe 
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and Tucumán were reshuffled, while on the Court of Neuquén only two justices out of 5 were 
replaced, as was 1 justice out of 3 in San Juan. Based on the partial data available for the 
provinces, the province of Formosa was the only one that did not remove any of the justices 
appointed during the military regime, since Governor Antenor Argentino Gauna sent the same 
list of justices for congressional approval. The local legislature confirmed the justices on the 
bench.   
As in the previous Peronist government, the lower courts of the judiciary became also the 
target of attacks. Before the democratic transition took place, Lanusse issued the Decree 4.502, 
which declared that the judges appointed during the military government had received the 
support from the Senate since during those years the Argentine Revolution had self-imposed 
those attributions. Evidently, the objective of the decree was to prevent that the next incoming 
executive would remove the judges appointed by the military government arguing that those 
appointments did not have the Senate’s support. As expected, the president submitted to the 
Senate for consideration the list of judges whose appointment took place during the military 
government. As a way to solve out this conflict, and secure a number of seats for friendly and 
reliable judges, in November 1973, Perón passed a transitory law (Law 20.550) allowing sitting 
judges, prosecuting attorneys, secretaries, and defense attorneys to retire in advance from the 
bench with exceptional benefits in comparison to the ordinary retirement law. About 35% of the 
members of the judiciary did retire in advance, allowing the government to fill those vacancies 
with its supporters (Pellet Lastra 2001).   
Less than a year after Perón assumed the presidency, he died in office (July 1st, 1974) and 
his wife became president. The Court changed its conformation, however, during the presidency 
of Perón’s wife, María Estela Martínez de Perón. During that short period, Justices Aráuz Castex 
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and Corvalán Nanclares resigned in response to a presidential request (Pellet Lastra 2001). 
Martinez de Perón, who then appointed Justice Corvalán Nanclares as her loyal Minister of 
Justice and Justice Aráuz Castex as her faithful Minister of Foreign Affairs, named Justices 
Ricardo Levene and Pablo A. Ramella to fill the two new vacancies.   
But the days of the government of Martinez de Perón were numbered. Her downfall was 
a severe economic crisis, including hyperinflation, along with major political confrontations in 
society, as bloody terrorist attacks ended again with a military coup. On March 24, 1976, a 
military junta formed by General Jorge Videla (representing the Army), Admiral Emilio Massera 
(representing the Navy), and Brigadier Ramón Agosti (representing the Air Force) removed 
Martinez de Perón from power. Two days later General Videla seized the presidency of the 
country. Martinez de Perón remained under house arrest for five years and then was sent into 
exile in Spain. 
3.2.6 National Reorganization Process: 1976-1983 
The aim of the military coup was to carry out a National Reorganization Process. The justices of 
the Supreme Court were automatically removed from the bench as well as the justices from the 
Provincial Supreme Courts. Moreover, Law 21.258 suspended (“declarar en comisión”) all the 
members of the judiciary including the provincial ones. Once more, the incoming executive 
reinforced the practices carried out by the previous presidents, and the judiciary was reshuffled 
one more time. The permanent purge of the Court after a change in government reaffirmed the 
positive feedback process. On April 2, 1976, General Videla appointed Justices Carlos Heredia, 
Adolfo Gabrielli, Alejandro R. Caride, Abelardo F. Rossi, and Federico Videla Escalada to the 
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bench. These justices had had judicial careers, and some of them had connections with the 
military, but none of them had been involved in politics (Pellet Lastra 2001). The newly 
Supreme Court was subservient to the interest of the executive, and the first proof was the 
rejection of the amparo writ presented by Enrique V. Rocca against his illegal removal from the 
Electoral Court. Justices Videla Escalada and Caride were the first to resign from the bench for 
personal reasons, whereupon Justices Pedro J. Frias and Emilio M. Daireaux were appointed to 
replace them. In 1978 and 1980 Justices Heredia and Daireaux died while in office, and Videla 
appointed Justices Elías Gustavino and César Black in their stead.  
At the subnational level the local Supreme Court witnessed one more time the political 
manipulation by the executives. The Courts of Buenos Aires, Chaco, Chubut, Córdoba, Entre 
Rios, Jujuy, La Pampa, Mendoza, Neuquén, Río Negro, Santa Cruz, Santa Fe, San Juan and 
Tucumán were reshuffled, while in the Court of Formosa 2 out of 5 justices departed from the 
bench. The military governors reproduced the purge of the National Court at the subnational 
level, reinforcing one more time the positive feedback and lack of judicial independence.  
In 1981 an internal confrontation within the military produced the resignation of General 
Videla and a short presidency of General Viola until General Leopoldo F. Galtieri assumed the 
presidency. During his administration Justice Frías resigned, to be followed by Galtieri’s 
appointment of Justice Carlos A. Renom in February 1982. The following year, Galtieri ordered 
the invasion of the British Falkland Islands, but two months later the British regained control and 
Galtieri was removed from power. General Reynaldo B. Bignone seized the presidency on July 
1, 1982, and was charged with reestablishing democracy in the country. In the beginning of 
October 1983, foreseeing the return of democracy and difficulties in their confirmation by the 
Senate, Justices Black and Renom resigned and were replaced by Justices Julio J. Martínez Vivot 
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and Emilio P. Gnecco. Bignone, however, conditioned the return to democracy by imposing 
limits to any future investigation of human rights violations; moreover, he decreed an amnesty 
for military personnel involved in human rights abuses (Law 22.924), even though both these 
decisions were strongly criticized by society. Elections were scheduled for October 30, and it 
was clear that the military regime would end. Raúl Alfonsín, a centrist from the UCR’s 
progressive wing, won the election. Thus democracy was reestablished in the country after a long 
period of dictatorship.  
The period of this last military government is known as the Dirty War, since these years 
were characterized by state-sponsored violence and repression against suspected terrorist and 
political opponents of the regime. Violation of human rights became commonplace, since in the 
vast majority of cases the judiciary did not protect those rights. Relatives of political prisoners 
started to submit writs of habeas corpus to federal courts, but in only a few cases did those writs 
reach the Supreme Court (Helmke 2005). The illegal detention of Jacobo Timerman, a director of 
the newspaper “La Opinión,” was one of the most important cases that did reach that court. It 
received a lot of international attention, and the international community advocated for the 
release of Mr. Timerman. This was the first and only time when the Supreme Court granted a 
petition in favor of a plaintiff; otherwise, the Court would have simply denied jurisdiction to hear 
the case (as happened, for example, in the “Pérez de Smith, Ana María y otros” case) (Carrio 
1996; Oteiza 1994).   
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3.2.7 The return of democracy: Alfonsín 1983-1989 
Alfonsín assumed the Presidency on December 10, 1983. Since Alfonsín was not willing to keep 
in office the justices appointed by the junta, he had already considered different possible 
strategies in case those justices remained on the bench. Even though justices are appointed for 
life, it was often the case that those justices appointed during the military regime without 
congressional approval were often subject to congressional reappointment during democratic 
transitions so as to legitimize their seats. In this case, the justices appointed during the military 
regime voluntarily left the court due to the uncertainty of their reappointment by Congress, thus 
reshuffling the court one more time. The same thing occurred at the subnational level with all the 
provinces except for San Juan, since the previous military governor and the incoming democratic 
governor belonged to the same family; thus, it was not necessary to change the composition of 
the Court. The incoming governors of all the other provinces were able to appoint new justices to 
the bench with the approval of the legislature.   
At the national level, Alfonsín appointed to the bench Justices Genaro R. Carrió, José S. 
Caballero, Augusto C. Belluscio, Carlos S. Fayt and Enrique Petracchi, what produced, once 
again, a reshuffle in the Court. The logic behind the appointments of the justices was different 
from the one adopted by the Peronist governments. In this case, Alfonsín appointed three justices 
with a clear bond to the UCR party (Carrió, Caballero, and Belluscio) and two justices lacking a 
UCR connection but with a socialist (Justice Fayt) or a Peronist (Justice Petracchi) bond. In this 
case, and contrary to the previous reshuffles in the Court, the court was not packed with all 
friendly justices. Nevertheless, the distribution adopted aimed to secure the president the 
majority of the votes. In 1985, Justice Carrio resigned from office for health reasons (Pellet 
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Lastra 2001; Verbitsky 1993), the last departure from the bench that was not induced by the 
executive. In his place Justice Jorge A. Bacqué was appointed; he was a person with no political 
connections to the UCR party but with an ideology similar to that of the outgoing justice 
(Verbitsky 1993).  
Even though Alfonsín was able to craft a supportive court, the problem of what to do 
with the judges from the lower court who had served during the military regime remained. After 
a failed attempt, during the first months, to pass a law similar to the one sanctioned during the 
third Peronist administration (Law 20.550), Alfonsín proposed a more flexible law affecting only 
to those members of the judiciary who had not been confirmed by the Senate. The judges would 
have the opportunity to present their retirement papers in advance if they had worked at least 25 
years (including 15 years as a justice, with 8 years of those on their current bench). 
Unsurprisingly, the law had the expected result: in a couple of months, 500 judges retired from 
the bench (Pellet Lastra 2001). 
During the first years of the Alfonsín administration, criminal trials in civilian courts of 
the officers implicated in killings during the military period were carried out;34
                                                 
34 The Congress via law 23.040 declared unconstitutional the military law (Law 22.924) that prevented 
the prosecution of human right abuses during the military government.  
 obviously, these 
trials met with disapproval from the military. By the end of 1986, Alfonsín was encouraged to 
pass a Full Stop Law (Ley de Punto Final 23.492) that aimed to end the investigation and 
prosecution of the officers implicated in crimes against humanity by giving prosecutors no more 
than a 60-day period to file criminal charges. Although the law was clearly intended to minimize 
the anger of the military, during the Easter weekend in 1987, a military cadre staged a mutiny in 
a training camp. The rebels were objecting to the ongoing civil trials against the military, so the 
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president negotiated more concessions with them. The only way out of this situation for Alfonsín 
was for the lawsuits to end up in the Supreme Court, where the justices would rule according to 
Alfonsín’s will. This meant exempting officers from prosecution based on the idea that they were 
merely obeying orders (Verbitsky 1993). In this way, the president could satisfy requests from 
both his constituencies: the civilian insistence on taking officers to trial, and the military demand 
to stop the trials. But the justices of the Supreme Court were not willing to do what Alfonsín 
wanted. So to resolve the situation, the president issued a bill the Law of Due Obedience (Law 
23.521), in June 1987, to exempt subordinates from prosecution.35
In 1989 presidential elections took place during a serious economic crisis and an always-
increasing hyperinflation and Carlos Menem, from the PJ, won the election. By the end of May, 
 By that time, it was clear that 
Alfonsín did not have a friendly and loyal Supreme Court, after all; thus, in November 1987 he 
presented a bill to enlarge the court from five to seven justices. The Radicals did not obtain 
support from the Peronists to approve the law, but the latter made a counteroffer to increase the 
number of justices from five to nine; that way, the Radicals and the Peronists would each appoint 
two additional justices (Verbitsky 1993). In the meantime, there was no other alternative for 
Alfonsín but to keep the peace with the justices, since removing one of the unfriendly justices 
whom he had appointed would exact a high political cost (even more difficult after the return of 
democracy). The justices of the Supreme Court strongly opposed the enlargement, and Justice 
Belluscio even threatened to resign if the Court was enlarged (La Nación 6/1/1988). As expected, 
as soon as the presidential campaign started, the enlargement project was dropped (Verbitsky 
1993). 
                                                 
35 The National Congress repealed the Full Stop and the Due Obedience laws in 2003 and in 2005 the 
Supreme Court declared those laws unconstitutional. 
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riots and looting broke out in a number of cities, while the proportion of people in poverty 
reached 47%. These events led Alfonsín to transfer power to Carlos Menem in July rather than in 
December. 
3.2.8 The Menemist governments: 1989-1999  
Even though Menem was from the PJ, his economic and social policies were very different from 
those Perón had supported during his administrations (Sidicaro 2002). In a couple of months, 
President Menem sent to Congress bills that aimed to privatize state-owned industries and cut 
government spending, clearly the opposite of Perón’s policies. During his first months in office, 
Menem reactivated the project of increasing the number of justices on the Supreme Court to nine 
so as to craft a supportive court. Now the Radicals, in the opposition, were against the project 
and thus blocked the bill in the Congress. In the meantime (as a backup alternative), Menem and 
his collaborators launched a plan to induce the retirement of Justices Fayt and Caballero. Menem 
offered Justice Fayt the Argentine ambassadorship to Colombia, but he rejected it by sending 
him as a present a copy of his book titled “Law and Ethics.” (Verbitsky 1993) Justice Caballero 
was offered the opportunity to become the Argentine representative at the international 
organizations headquartered in Geneva (La Nación 3/8/1989), but following the request of his 
colleagues at the court he refused (Verbitsky 1993). However, a couple of month later, he 
resigned from the bench.  
During that time, Justice Belluscio’s partner apparently committed suicide in Paris. 
Menem’s allies saw this as a perfect situation for impeaching the justice (one of Alfonsín’s ally) 
and obtaining another vacancy as a result. Senator Alicia Saadi from the PJ requested that the 
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justice be impeached. The Chamber of Deputies approved the request, but it was later rejected in 
the Senate. In April 1990, however, the enlargement bill was passed (Law 23.744), creating a 
total of five new vacancies (four from the enlargement bill and one from the resignation of 
Justice Caballero). The opposition publicly denounced the government for using irregular 
procedures to approve the law, since not only was the necessary quorum not present in the 
Chamber of Deputies at the time of the voting, but also the law was voted as a whole rather than 
article-by-article (Verbitsky 1993). During that controversial session, the opposition asked 
Alberto Pierri, the President of the Chamber, to call for another ballot, but the proponents of the 
law were already celebrating their victory (Verbitsky 1993).  
 In sum, the Peronist court-packing plan worked perfectly, not only because the bill was 
approved, but also because it induced Justice Bacqué to resign from the bench as a protest 
against the political manipulation of the Court (La Nación 11/05/1990). Consequently, there 
were six empty seats out of nine to be filled (four from the enlargement law, one from 
Caballero’s resignation and the other one from Bacqué’s departure), just what the government 
needed to craft a supportive court. The following day, the government sent up a list of candidates 
for the Court, which gained support from the Senate in 24 hours. Justices Julio Oyhanarte (for 
the second time), Julio Nazareno, Rodolfo Barra, Mariano Cavagna Martinez, Ricardo Levene 
(for the second time), and Eduardo Moliné O’Connor were the new members, all of them with 
clear connections either to Menem himself or to the PJ (Verbitsky 1993; Chávez 2007; Helmke 
2005). One year after the appointment of these justices, Julio Oyhanarte resigned from the bench. 
The official explanation was that he wanted to resume working in the private sector; however, 
unofficial sources revealed that the justice was strongly disappointed because he had not been 
appointed Chief Justice (La Nación 23/11/1990) (Verbitsky 1993).  
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But the political manipulation of the justices was not restricted to the Supreme Court; it 
also applied to other critical courts at lower levels. In addition to enlarging the number of sitting 
judges in the federal courts from six to twelve, Menem was able to induce the retirement of five 
of those judges,36
Political opponents, journalists, members of civil society, and the bar association 
condemned many of the decisions of the manipulated lower courts as well as the Supreme Court 
and suspicions of the “automatic majority” in the Court increased as time went by. For example, 
between 1990 and 1997 there were 170 requests for judicial impeachment (Poder Ciudadano 
 which resulted in his gaining complete control of those courts by way of 
appointing eleven of the judges (Verbitsky 2007).  Furthermore, in 1992 Menem created a new 
Appellate Criminal Court (Cámara Nacional de Casación Penal) to which he was able to appoint 
nine out of ten judges (Verbitsky 1993, 2007). This court is the second most important body in 
the judiciary (after the Supreme Court), since it is in charge of establishing all the jurisprudence 
regarding penal law, and its decisions as a collegiate body are binding on all the judges. The 
court has jurisdiction over all the lawsuits to which a member of the Executive Power is a party, 
evidently a very sensitive area for the government that was to be handed over to friendly judges. 
The selection of the candidates for the court created a scandal, since one of Menem’s protégées, 
Ana María Capolupo, admitted publicly that she did not know penal law but would learn it 
(Verbitsky 1993). An investigation carried out by the newspaper Página/12 revealed that Ana 
María Capolupo’s announcement was indeed truthful, since at the university she had twice failed 
her final exams in Penal Law I and once in Penal Law II (Verbitsky 1993). The Minister of 
Justice, León Arslanian, subsequently resigned due to the excessive manipulation of the justices.  
                                                 
36 Menem promoted all the judges except Judge María Servini de Cubria, because at that time she was 
working on the Yomagate (Jacquelin 1998). 
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1997), but the majority of the Peronists in the Congress, especially in the Impeachment 
Committee, blocked the investigation and processing of those requests. One of the first most 
controversial cases that reached the Supreme Court  was that of “Aerolineas Argentinas.” In 
1990, after the enlargement of the Court, the government planned the privatization of the 
national airline (Aerolineas Argentinas) via Decree 1.024. The opposition presented a writ of 
amparo against the sale of the shares of the company because of the fraudulent process 
underway. In order to prevent the case from reaching a tribunal with unfriendly judges, the court 
adopted, for the first time, the per saltum doctrine, whereby the case would go directly to the 
friendly Supreme Court, which was expected to comply with the president’s interests. 
Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court rejected the writ of amparo and the privatization was 
accomplished.  
Meanwhile, President Menem started to explore the possibility of remaining in office for 
a second term, despite the fact that the ruling constitution did not allow for reelection. In order to 
change the Constitution, Menem needed the support of the Radicals to obtain 2/3 of the votes of 
both houses of Congress; thus he arranged a private meeting with former President Alfonsín 
(known as the Olivos Pact). The result of the meeting, which was hosted in the presidential 
residence in Olivos, was that the Radicals agreed to support the incorporation of reelection of the 
president in exchange for including stronger checks on the executive power plus the resignation 
of three justices of the Supreme Court (Página/12 1/12/1993). Menem started to work 
immediately on the requests. The first candidates whom Menem considered were: Justice 
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Boggiano, due to the recent scandal on the disappearing of a ruling of the Court,37
President Menem and Alfonsín agreed to appoint Gustavo Bossert and Guillermo Lopez 
to the seats left by Barra and Cavagna, while Héctor Masnatta was to replace Levene. Guillermo 
Lopez was Menem’s candidate, Héctor Masnatta was Alfonsín’s, and Bossert was considered to 
be a neutral or independent candidate (Página/12  11/12/1993). However, his systematic 
participation in Menem’s “automatic majority” would reveal that he was not really a neutral 
 Justices 
Nazareno and either Moliné O’Connor or Barra, because of their unconditional loyalty 
(Página/12  1/12/1993). Boggiano refused to leave the bench. President Menem, as a means to 
encourage the justices to voluntary depart from the bench, claimed that resigning was a “patriotic 
act.” In December 1993, Justices Barra and Cavagna complied with Menem’s desires; as a 
reward for their loyalty, Barra was appointed Minister of Justice and Cavagna was offered the 
Argentine ambassadorship to Italy (Diario de la República 2/12/1993). The third vacancy would 
come from Justice Levene, since he had publicly announced that he would retire in February 
1994 if all the impeachment demands against him were dismissed (Jacquelin 1998). As it turned 
out, Levene did not retire from the bench until two years later than had been agreed. 
                                                 
37 One of the most important incidents inside the Supreme Court during this period was the scandal 
inspired by the disappearance of a ruling of the Court against the Central Bank. The Court was deciding 
whether or not Ricardo Montesori, a lawyer who was involved with the bankruptcy of the Patagonia 
Bank, could also receive fees from the Central Bank for carrying out that transaction (Verbitsky 1993). 
On February 16, 1993, Justices Boggiano, Barra, Petracchi, Belluscio, and Moliné O’Connor signed a 
ruling in favor of the attorney, but the Central Bank responded by presenting a writ to reconsider the 
decision. On June 8, Justices Barra, Levene, Fayt, Belluscio, Petracchi, and Nazareno rejected the writ 
and reiterated their previous decision. However, that ruling somehow disappeared from Court records, 
and a new ruling favoring the Central Bank was handed down by Justices Boggiano, Barra, Moliné 
O’Connor, and Nazareno. After Justice Belluscio realized that the original ruling was missing from the 
file, he found out that it had been removed by the secretary of Chief Justice Boggiano. It did not take long 
for the denunciation of their four colleagues by Justices Petracchi and Belluscio to become a national 
scandal. The political opposition, bar associations, and several NGOs called for the impeachment of the 
four justices involved, while at the same time the Minister of the Economy, Domingo Cavallo, publicly 
accused Justices Petracchi and Belluscio of lying (El Tribuno 2/10/1993). 
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justice. In actuality, Masnatta was never appointed to the third vacancy, since Menem decided to 
appoint his close friend Adolfo Vazquez, a change of mind that caused anger and frustration 
among the Radicals because of the violation of the pact (Clarín 8/12/1995). The appointment 
process of these justices was highly criticized due to the increased number of irregularities 
(Verbitsky 1993). Perón and Menem have been the two presidents, both from the PJ, to appoint 
the largest number of justices to the bench (ten justices each), even more than General Videla, 
who appointed nine justices during the military regime (see Table 3.1). 
3.2.9 The short stay of the radicals in the government and the convoluted succession: 
1999-2001  
By the end of the second term of the Menem administration, social and economic problems had 
undermined support for the government and the party, which affected the results of the 
presidential election of 1999. The two most popular candidates were Fernando de la Rua, from 
the newly created Alianza (an alliance between the Radicals and FREPASO), and Eduardo 
Duhalde, from the PJ. Fernando de la Rua won with 48% of the votes. The investiture ceremony 
was a historic occasion; not only was it the first time that a Peronist handed over the government 
to a Radical, but it was the longest period of uninterrupted democracy in the twentieth century.  
During the presidential campaign, the members of the Alianza outlined several strategies 
of how to resolve the difficulties of dealing with an unfriendly court, in case they should win the 
elections. Deputy Melchor Cruchaga advocated reducing the number of sitting justices to five, 
while Deputy Rodolfo Terragno campaigned for the creation of a Constitutional Tribunal so that 
the Supreme Court would not be responsible for ruling on cases related to the constitutionality of 
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a norm (La Nación 31/05/1999). At the same time, Carlos Alvarez, the vice presidential 
candidate of the Alianza, suggested that they were, in fact, expecting that the justices from the 
“automatic majority” would voluntary resign from the bench, since they were not willing to 
contribute to the instability of the judiciary that had started in 1947 (La Nación 1/06/1999). The 
members of the PJ, obviously, criticized all those ideas. 
As soon as De la Rua assumed the presidency, his advisors started to explore the 
possibility of creating a couple of vacancies in the court. Justice Fayt appeared as the perfect 
candidate, because he had at that time reached the age retirement limit. The constitutional reform 
in 1994 modified the life tenure system for the justices. Article 99, subsection 4, included the 
restriction that “… once they [the justices] have reached the age of seventy-five years, a new 
appointment, with the same consent, shall be necessary if they are to continue in office….” 
Reappointments after five years could be repeated indefinitely. The expiration of the judicial 
appointment previously established became effective five years after the enactment of the 
constitutional reform (Temporary Provision No. 11). By 1994, Justice Fayt was 75 years old, so 
this was the first sign that the in those years Menem wanted his seat (Página/12 1/12/1993). In 
1999, when the restriction became effective, Justice Fayt presented a declarative action to the 
judiciary in an attempt to void the reappointment provision. According to Fayt, the constitutional 
reform law (“núcleo básico de coincidencias”) did not include the requisite modification to 
Article 99, subsection 4; therefore, the modification should be discarded. After a long judicial 
process, the case reached the Supreme Court, where the justices annulled Article 99, subsection 4 
(Hernández 2001). The Alianza lost the perfect candidate for the potential vacancy in the court. 
De la Rua’s administration was characterized by an ongoing economic crisis and 
continuous fights between the coalition members. The dissension ended up with the resignation 
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of the vice president in 2000 (after 10 months of government) as the result of a bribery scandal in 
the Senate. Moreover, the Supreme Court was showing a slow and sporadic support for the 
government, as evidenced by its ratification of the Decree 433 of salary reduction for state-
workers. Popular support decreased rapidly, due to the sense of an inactive administration that 
had failed to tackle corruption (like the fruitless imprisonment for a government corruption 
scandal of ex-President Menem, who was released after six months). The economy of the 
country was in almost complete stagnation after three years of recession, while the convertibility 
law (that fixed the peso to the US dollar) made exports uncompetitive, which worsened the 
situation. Argentine individuals and businesses feared a complete crash of the economy as well 
as a devaluation of the currency, motivating them to exchange pesos for dollars and withdraw 
large amounts of money from the banks, thereby putting the banking system of the country in 
risk due to the diminishing US dollar reserves in the Central Bank.  
On December 1, 2001, the Minister of the Economy, Domingo Cavallo, announced a 
restriction38
                                                 
38 Initially, account holders were allowed to withdraw US$250 on a weekly basis, and then US$300, from 
accounts denominated in pesos.  
 on cash withdrawals from bank accounts for a 90-day period (Decree 1570/01). In 
fact, bank accounts were virtually frozen, causing discontent and fear among the people. The PJ 
announced that the decision was unconstitutional; to counteract it, they would present a writ of 
amparo against it. One week after the decree was promulgated, there were 200 writs of amparo 
claiming its unconstitutionality (Smulovitz 2005). By mid-December of 2001, the financial crisis 
and the growing popular unrest had led to riots and looting in several cities, which motivated the 
president to declare a state of siege and forced the resignation of Cavallo. Argentines held 
responsible for the economic crisis the Supreme Court Justices and protesters daily gathered 
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outside the court and the justice’s houses to demand their resignations. On December 21, de la 
Rua resigned from office as a result of violent riots and strong popular pot-banging 
demonstrations (“cacerolazos”) all over the country. 
Determining the succession of the presidency, however, was not an easy task, not only 
because the vice president had also resigned, but because the social and economic chaos of the 
country was discouraging potential candidates from assuming the position. The next in line of 
succession was Ramón Puerta, the President of the Senate from the PJ; he took office 
temporarily on December 21. Two days later, the PJ appointed Adolfo Rodríguez Saá as the 
interim president of the country, but on December 30 he resigned due to lack of support from his 
party. Ramón Puerta again assumed the presidency (since he was first in line), but resigned the 
following day, at which point Eduardo Caamaño, the Peronist President of the House of Deputies 
and next in line, became president. That same day Caamaño called for an extraordinary session 
of Congress to choose an interim president. On January 1, 2002, the Congress chose Eduardo 
Duhalde, the Peronist candidate who had been defeated in the 1999 presidential election, as 
interim president.  
3.2.10 The Peronists again in government: Duhalde and the Kirchner couple 
During the first months of 2002, Duhalde ended the ten years of US Dollar-peso parity (Law 
25.561 – the Emergency Law); combined with the restrictions on withdrawing money from the 
banks, that produced an avalanche of lawsuits against the government. The judiciary rapidly 
became the epicenter of the conflict and a key player in the policy-making. The first case to 
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reach the Supreme Court was the “Smith case.”39 The president Duhalde tried to convince the 
justices to declare unfounded the accusation of unconstitutionality, because, according to the 
government, pesification was the only way out of the financial crisis (La Nación 13/02/2002). 
Members of the executive specifically let Justice Petracchi know that, if he ruled in favor of the 
unconstitutionality of the decree, they would provide evidence about the bribes he had received 
during the Menem administration (Abiad and Thieberger 2005). In February 2002, six out of the 
nine justices decided that the restrictions imposed by Decree 1.570 were, in fact, 
unconstitutional; Justices Petracchi, Belluscio, and Bossert abstained from voting. As a 
consequence of that decision, the president issued Decree 214, which forced the pesification of 
all obligations then in foreign currency.40  Likewise, on March 5, considering a lawsuit brought 
by the province of San Luis against Banco de la Nación (a bank owned by the Argentine 
government), the Supreme Court declared again the unconstitutionality of the pesification of 
bank deposits and ordered the bank to return the money to the province. Even then, however, the 
scope of the decision was limited to the case under analysis, because of the diffuse Argentine 
constitutional review system.41
In February 2002, the opposition requested the impeachment of all the members of the 
Supreme Court due to misconduct and possible crimes committed during the Menem 
 At the same time, it showed that the Court was not willing to 
conform automatically to the executive’s interests. 
                                                 
39 Carlos Antonio Smith, from the province of Corrientes, presented a lawsuit requesting to withdraw 
more than US $200,000 from his bank account. 
40 The “pesification” of the economy not only affected bank deposits, since dollar deposits were forced 
into pesification at the rate of 1.4 pesos per US dollar, but also triggered inflation, since the exchange rate 
plummeted  to 3.37 pesos to the dollar in June 2002 and recovered only to 2.98 pesos to the dollar. 
41 Because of the lack of a binding precedent, the decision of the case affects only the parties involved.   
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administration. Impeaching all the justices at the same time was not the best strategy since it 
produced a great delay and errors in the process, undermining the support from the elites in the 
impeachment trial (Helmke 2005). After nine months of investigation and debates, the 
impeachment process was dismissed. Ten days later, Justice Bossert, the justice who had 
received the least number of votes for impeachment,42
In April 2003, Néstor Kirchner, from the PJ, won the presidential elections and assumed 
office on May 25. Kirchner assumed the presidency with only 22% of the votes, since former 
president Menem decided not to run for the ballotage. Therefore, one of his most important goals 
during his term was to obtain legitimacy and popular support. Kirchner’s first target was to clean 
 resigned from the bench because of 
political persecution. In his resignation letter he confessed that “… I have had enough of the 
unfair damages I suffered, the unmerited charges presented against myself …” on top of “… the 
disappointment I suffered [which has] contributed to my spiritual satiation.…” (Periodismo 
2002). The point of interest here is that the Bossert’s resignation revealed the existence of a 
mutual extortion between the justices and the president, since the justices were able to undermine 
the stability of the administration by ruling against the pesification and, at the same time, the 
executive was forcing a reverse in the ruling by threatening the justices with an impeachment 
trial. The resignation of Bossert from the bench allowed Duhalde to appoint a very loyal 
candidate to the Court, the Peronist President of the Senate at that time, Juan Carlos Maqueda. 
The opposition and the Bar Association fruitlessly and publicly criticized the nomination due to 
the candidate’s strong political connections to the PJ (Diario C 27/12/2002).  
                                                 
42 Justice Vazquez received 140 votes in favor of impeachment, Justice Moliné O’Connor 139, Justice 
Lopez 132, Justice Boggiano 131, Justice Belluscio 122, Justice Fayt 85, Justice Petracchi 72, and Justice 
Bossert 63 (Clarín 11/10/2002). 
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the Supreme Court, as the society was requesting, so he impeached all the justices who belonged 
to Menem’s automatic majority in order to gain the confidence and support of the people. 
Kirchner had been governor of the province of Santa Cruz, where he was considered a local 
caudillo, since 1991 (Gatti 2004). He was Duhalde’s candidate, against former President Menem. 
Duhalde’s support for Kirchner was interpreted by political analysts as his attempt to continue 
ruling “behind the throne”; however, as soon as Kirchner became president, he distanced himself 
from Duhalde by appointing him the Argentine representative of Mercosur in Uruguay. In the 
legislative elections of 2005, their wives actually competed for a seat in the Senate. 
Immediately thereafter, he started to explore how to overcome the difficulties with the 
members of the Supreme Court, since they appeared determined to continue ruling in favor of the 
unconstitutionality of the pesification, i.e., against government interests. He decided to change 
the strategy of attack: rather than impeaching all the justices at the same time, he did it one by 
one. Undoubtedly, the fact that Nestor Kirchner’s wife, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, had a 
seat in the Senate and on the Impeachment Trial Commission; assured that the president’s wishes 
would be heard in the sessions.  
His first attack was on Justice Fayt (one of the non-Peronist justices). His party started to 
prepare a request for impeachment, but members of the opposition were not willing to support it; 
instead, they chose to encourage the impeachment of Justice Nazareno, because he was one of 
the most controversial members of the “automatic majority” during the Menem administration 
(Abiad and Thieberger 2005) (BBC 05/06/2003). On June 2, 2003, Justice Nazareno publicly 
condemned the desire of the government to remove the current justices in order to craft a 
supportive court. According to Nazareno, “If they change this court now, do you think that they 
[the government] will put their enemies [on the bench]? If they are telling me that I was devoted 
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to Menem, with that same logic I should say not to take out this Court because Menem is no 
longer in power.…” (Abiad and Thieberger 2005: 49). This was the perfect excuse for the 
government to start working on Nazareno’s resignation rather than Fayt’s. Kirchner responded to 
Nazareno’s comment via a nationwide broadcast, and the very next day the government was 
composing its request for the impeachment of Nazareno. In the meantime, the government was 
threatening the rest of the justices by saying that many of them shared in common crimes rather 
than a true vocation for justice; evidently, this declaration annoyed all the members of the Court 
(Abiad and Thieberger 2005). As a way to differentiate himself from previous presidents, 
especially Menem, on June 16 Kirchner issued Decree 222, by which he automatically imposed 
limitations on the appointment process, thereby showing society that he was not intending to 
manipulate future nominations to the Supreme Court.  That same day the Peronist congressmen 
presented the impeachment request for Nazareno, and a public hearing was scheduled one week 
later. On June 27 Nazareno resigned from the bench due to the political pressure and the high 
possibility of being impeached (Clarín 27/06/2003). This was Kirchner’s first victory over the 
Court. He then chose Eugenio Zaffaroni, a very prestigious and well-known lawyer with a 
judicial career in the federal judiciary as well as a short political one.43
                                                 
43 In 1994 he was a representative of the Frente Grande party for the reform of the National Constitution 
and in 1998 he was a legislator from Ciudad de Buenos Aires from that party (Abiad and Thieberger 
2005). 
 The nomination was 
welcomed in academia because of Zaffaroni’s faultless background, though some sectors from 
the church tried to impugn the candidate because of his views about the rights of gays and 
lesbians. Zaffaroni’s swearing-in ceremony was in mid October 2003.  
87 
 
On August 13, 2003, two-thirds of the members of the Chamber of Deputies approved the 
impeachment request for Justice Moliné O’Connor. During the whole process, Moliné O’Connor 
was constantly advised to resign from the bench before the Senate made the final decision, but he 
was not willing to do so (Abiad and Thieberger 2005). Meanwhile, the government started to 
work on Justice López’s departure. Miguel Ángel Pichetto, a PJ senator, arranged a private 
meeting with López to discuss his retirement from the bench (Abiad and Thieberger 2005). The 
government was planning to use the same strategy as before – that is, impeachment, if López was 
not willing to cooperate. Apparently, López agreed to resign from the bench, but not 
immediately. Just in case López changed his mind or took more time than the government was 
willing to wait (as occurred with Justice Levene that resigned two years later), an impeachment 
request was forwarded to the Congress (BBC 23/10/2003). On October 23, 2003, when the 
Chamber of Deputies was about to begin the impeachment process, López resigned. A couple of 
months later, on December 2, the Senate was in the last stage of the impeachment trial of Justice 
Moliné O’Connor; with 45 votes out of 64, the Senate impeached him, thus producing the third 
vacancy on the Court for the Kirchner administration. Kirchner appointed Carmen María 
Argibay and Elena Highton de Nolasco to fill the vacancies, two well-known and respected 
lawyers inside and outside the country, making them the first women appointed to the Court by a 
democratically elected regime. Highton de Nolasco’s swearing-in ceremony was on June 9, 
2004; Arbigay’s was on February 3, 2005.44
                                                 
44 Carmen Argobay’s swearing-in ceremony took place more than one year after her nomination, because 
at that time she was working on the International Criminal Court on crimes against humanity in the 
former Yugoslavia.  
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By July 2004, Kirchner’s attack and “rearrangement” of the Court started to have positive 
results. Even though the justices appointed by Kirchner did not have a clear political connection 
to the PJ party or the president (as previously happened), they shared a similar ideology on 
relevant topics such as the pesification and human rights. On the “Cabrera” pesification case, the 
Court decided that those who had withdrawn their money from the bank in pesos had done so 
voluntarily, thus consenting to the pesification; therefore, they could not claim damages (La 
Nación 14/07/2004). This decision not only invalidated thousands of claims against the 
government, but also stopped the massive withdrawal of cash from bank deposits. Despite this 
positive sign, the government continued with the reorganization of the Supreme Court. The next 
in line was Justice Vazquez, the last member of the “automatic majority.” The government had 
already prepared a request for the impeachment of Vazquez for wrongdoing such as forcing 
judge Alicia Iermini to obtain evidence on a case (Abiad and Thieberger 2005). In August 2004, 
during the public hearing, Vazquez publicly condemned his impeachment on the ground that it 
was happening only because he was part of Menem’s group and not Kirchner’s. This declaration 
revealed that Kirchner’s motivation for the entire impeachment process was an ideological one, 
but it also confirmed that Vazquez had always been part of Menem’s political alliance (La 
Gaceta 13/08/2004).45
                                                 
45 During the public hearings for the nomination, Vazquez confessed that he was a friend of Menem 
(Clarín 7/12/1995). Weeks later a private letter to President Menem in which Vazquez promised that his 
decisions in the Court would not let him down was disclosed. 
 On August 25, the justice reported that his car had been shot at three 
times, although luckily none of the bullets hit him (Clarín 26/08/2004). He travelled to Uruguay 
to request political asylum, but Jorge Battle, the president of that country, denied it (La Nación 
26/08/2004). The judge who was in charge of the case never corroborated the story of an attack 
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on the justice. Vazquez tried to resist the political pressure during the trial as much as he could, 
but in the end he resigned on September 1; the fear of having his impeachment confirmed, as in 
the case of Moliné O’Connor, was too strong (La Nación 1/09/2004). With this departure, 
Kirchner had induced four resignations from the bench, but there were still a couple of 
unfriendly justices in the bench to be removed. 
On October 26, the Supreme Court put an end to the uncertainty over the constitutionality 
of pesification. In the “Bustos” case, the Court deemed the pesification constitutional, affirming 
that the 2001 Decree and Emergency Law issued during the crisis were acceptable. The decision 
was strongly criticized, because it seemed that an economic rationale – stabilizing the bank 
system – had prevailed over a judicial rationale – defending property rights (La Nación 
27/10/2004). It was apparent that the decision aimed to put an end to the controversy over the 
constitutionality of the pesification rather than defend the rights of the citizens. The Court 
decision was endorsed by Justices Boggiano, Belluscio, Maqueda, Highton de Nolasco, and 
Zaffaroni, while Justice Fayt voted against it and Justice Petracchi excused himself from voting. 
Once again, the decisions of the rearranged Supreme Court were starting to show congruence 
with government interests.  
The next target was Justice Antonio Boggiano, the last ultra-Menemist member of the 
Court (Página/12 22/11/2004).46
                                                 
46 Even though at the beginning Kirchner decided not to impeach Justice Boggiano due to his strong 
connections to the church (La Nación 12/10/2004), the majority of the Peronist party and the opposition 
supported his impeachment (Página/12 22/11/2004).  
 On December 16 the Chamber of Deputies approved by more 
than 2/3 of the votes (159 affirmative votes out of 170) the impeachment of Justice Boggiano due 
to wrongdoing (Abiad and Thieberger 2005). That same day the Congress approved by a 2/3 vote 
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the nomination of Ricardo Lorenzetti to the bench, another well known and respected lawyer. 
During 2005 the Impeachment Commission worked hard on the Boggiano case; by June the 
senators had decided to suspend the justice from the bench (Clarín 23/06/2005). As in previous 
cases, Boggiano was constantly advised to resign and not continue with the trial (Abiad and 
Thieberger 2005). At the same time, Justice Belluscio decided to resign, on the ground that he 
had already turned 75 years old (it will be recalled that the Constitution of 1994 (Article 99) had 
established that, when a justice reached that age and was willing to continue serving, he had to 
be reconfirmed by the Senate) (Clarín 08/06/2005). Even though, in the case of Justice Fayt in 
1999, Justice Belluscio had endorsed Fayt’s claim to remain on the bench, in his own case the 
justice considered it unethical to take advantage of his earlier decision. However, unofficial 
sources revealed that the government was indeed working on Belluscio’s impeachment 
(Wainfeld and Ginzberg 2005). Boggiano, who was in the last stages of his trial, was still 
resisting the pressure to resign (Abiad and Thieberger 2005). By the end of September, the 
Senate had approved the impeachment and Boggiano was removed from the bench, producing a 
sixth vacancy. Kirchner, in sum, during his first two years in office, induced the departure of six 
out of nine justices and was able to appoint four justices (see Table 3.1). 
Even though Kirchner appointed to the bench four justices with no clear tie to either the 
PJ or himself, they all belonged to a similar political ideology and shared the same interest on 
certain topics like human rights and civil liberties. The rulings of the Supreme Court regarding 
the pesification case and the human rights abuses during the military regime endorsed the 
president’s will, but the lack of a political connection with the president generated certain verbal 
confrontations between the justices and the executive (La Nación 05/09/2006). Even though at 
the beginning of Kirchner’s mandate the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the president’s 
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interests, as time went by the confrontations between the executive and the court came to light, 
revealing that Kirchner had not packed the court with friends as previous executives had done 
(Perfil 31/12/2009).  
In the beginning of 2006, Kirchner sent a law to the Congress to reform the Council of 
Judicature which aimed to retain the veto power on the appointment and impeachment process of 
the judges. The opposition strongly criticized the reform, as they were already denouncing the 
lack of an independent judiciary (La Nación 07/11/2006). By November 2006, there were still 
two Court vacancies to fill and the opposition was condemning the existence of a new 
“automatic majority” in the court. In this context, Senator Cristina Kirchner submitted a bill 
proposing to reduce the number of sitting justices from nine to five so as to reduce the 
disapproval of the opposition and the society. However, the law also reduced the required 
majority for voting, from 5 to 4 votes, and thus potentially helped to resolve the deadlocks in the 
pesification cases (La Nación 29/11/2006). The bill was approved (Law 26.186), but the Court 
remained as it was with seven justices, four of them appointed by Kirchner. In October 2007, 
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner was elected president of the country. This was the second time a 
wife succeeded her husband in the presidency.47
                                                 
. 47 The first time occurred when Isabel Martinez de Perón succeeded Juan Perón after his death. 
 Political analysts referred to her administration 
as the second term of Néstor Kirchner, not only because of the strong continuity in policy but 
also because of the strong denunciation of political manipulation by her husband (Revista 
Noticias 1/11/2007). 
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3.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has used secondary and primary data to describe the executive-court relationship in 
the country. Until 1946, justices in the National Supreme Court had remained on the bench for 
longer periods than afterwards, and departures had resulted mainly from natural causes, like 
retirement and death. The massive impeachment trial and reshuffle in Supreme Court, as well as 
the purges in the lower courts and provincial Supreme Courts during the first years of the Perón 
administration, constituted a critical juncture in the evolution of the executive-court relationship. 
What makes this situation critical is that it has triggered a different type of relationship between 
the branches of government that has generated some positive feedback (Pierson 2004). The 
subsequent changes in administration have imitated Perón’s blow to the Court and thus 
reinforced the lack of tolerance of executives for an unfriendly court. For that reason, after 1946 
executives have in most cases induced the retirement of unfriendly justices so as to craft a 
supportive court. It was precisely this constant reshuffle in court personnel that made it more 
difficult to reverse in the following years the course of action towards a more independent 
judiciary. Even though during some specific administrations, like those of Illia and De la Rua, 
there were no reshuffles in the Court, the several attempts to force the resignation of a justice or 
enlarge the number of sitting justices reinforced the inertia supporting a subservient judiciary.  
Even if after the first Peronist administration the Supreme Court became a clear target of 
attack, since executives envisioned the justices as key players in their revolutionary political 
project, before 1946 the court was also a relevant actor for carrying out revolutions. The 
Acordada of 1930 clearly exemplifies this aspect since the military junta required judicial 
legitimacy for their government. Therefore, it is not that the positive feedback was generated as a 
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result of Peronist and anti-Peronist governments but rather after a change in the conception of the 
executives about the role of the judiciary. This change in their conception was reinforced by the 
successive purges in the Court that gave way to a positive feedback effect. 
While the political manipulation of the Supreme Court justices captured most of the 
attention, this chapter has also illustrated that executives have expanded their control over the 
lower courts as well.  Moreover, this chapter has also pointed up that justices in the Provincial 
Supreme Courts have been constantly removed from the bench as the result of changes in the 
political regimes (from democratic to military regimes and vice versa). Chapter 5 will 
specifically deal with the Provincial Supreme Courts by analyzing the historical evolution of the 
executive-court relationhip in the provinces as well as by evaluating the political determinants of 
the stability of justices on the bench. The political heterogeneity at the subnational level creates 
different patterns of judicial stability and thus of political manipulation.  
The historical evolution of the executive-court relationship provides significant evidence 
to support the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2. Firstly, the constant reshuffles in the Supreme 
Court that happened as the result of changes in the political realignment indicate that justices 
with different political preferences from the ruling executive are more likely to depart from the 
bench than justices with similar political preferences. More precisely, justices appointed during 
democratic periods (and vice versa) were not likely to remain on the bench when the military 
sized power, since they were often perceived as justices with different political preferences and 
thus not acceptable to the regime. Secondly, the continuous reshuffles in the Supreme Court 
happened most of the time during the first years of the incoming executive, thus suggesting that 
executives preferred to craft a supportive court early in their government so as to leverage their 
political power as soon as possible.   
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The preceding chapter also demonstrated that executives, when facing an unfriendly 
court, have often induced the retirement of the justices so as to alter the ideological balance of 
the court. Even though in most cases executives have replaced unfriendly justices with loyal 
ones, as in the cases of the Peronist and the military governments there were a couple of times in 
which executives did not pack the court with friends. For example, Néstor Kirchner appointed 
only one justice, Carlos Maqueda, with a clear political background, while other justices with a 
similar ideology had no clear political tie to either the Peronist party or Perón’s faction (Frente 
para la Victoria). Even though in some cases the court ruled in favor of Kirchner’s interests, as in 
the case of human rights violations48
Section 3.2 showed that Argentine executives have used different strategies to craft a 
supportive court. Although the military, when seizing the presidency via decree, have 
systematically removed justices from the bench both at the National and Provincial Courts 
(Aramburu, Onganía and Videla), civilian executives have tried different ways to induce 
retirement and craft a supportive court. The most common ones were: enlargement of the court 
(during the Frondizi, Illia, Alfonsín, and Menem administrations), impeachment and threat of 
impeachment (during the Perón, Duhalde and Kirchner administrations), age retirement (Menem, 
De la Rua), and discrediting the justices’ performance in the media (Kirchner). Along with these 
strategies, there were five special cases in which executives have used more benevolent forms of 
non-institutional induced retirements to create a vacancy in the court. The logic of these 
 and the pesification of the economy, there were other cases 
in which the court ruled against the interests of the government, as in the union labor case.  
                                                 
48 In 2003 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Congress that the amnesty law protecting military 
personnel from prosecution was unconstitutional. This historic decision paved the way for prosecutions in 
the country, and hundreds of cases were reopened.  
95 
 
resignations is different from the others, since friendly justices stepped off the bench, rather than 
unfriendly ones, either to be appointed to more important jobs (that required more loyalty) or to 
help the executive in policy making. Nevertheless, what drove the resignations of these justices 
was the executive’s motivation rather than their own. During the Ongania and Martinez de Perón 
administrations, three of their most loyal justices were appointed to more important jobs: Justice 
Borda to be Onganía’s Minister of Interior, Justice Aráuz Castex to be Martinez de Perón’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Justice Corvalán Nanclares to be Martinez de Perón’s Minister 
of Justice. During the Menem administration, two justices also stepped down in response to a 
special request from the president. Menem needed vacancies on the Court to obtain support from 
the Radical party for the constitutional reform that would allow him reelection. Menem offered 
those justices more prestigious jobs in exchange for their loyalty and support: Justice Barra was 
promoted to be Minister of Justice, and Justice Cavagna Martinez was made the Argentine 
ambassador to Italy. These five special cases of “benevolent” induced retirements took place 
when the executive had an ideological closeness with the justices, in contrast to the “malevolent” 
induced retirements when it did not. The next chapter evaluates the theory of vacancy creation in 
the National Supreme Court while the following one on the Provincial Supreme Courts.  
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4.0  UNVEILING JUDICIAL TURNOVER IN THE NATIONAL SUPREME COURT 
The preceding overview of Argentine history revealed that judicial turnover has not been 
consistent over the years. The average tenure of a Supreme Court justice from 1900 to 2009 was 
6.7 years. However, 1946 must be considered a critical juncture in the evolution of executive-
court relations, as before that year justices remained in office for 10.6 years on average, while 
afterwards the average tenure was 5.7 years. The previous chapter also illustrated that the arrival 
of Perón to the presidency in 1947 and the consecutive purges in the court by military and 
civilian administrations reinforced the pattern of instability of the justices in office. Moreover, if 
one concentrates only on the last democratic period (1983-2009), the average tenure for a justice 
has been 6.5 years, not that different from the average for the entire period 1947-2009. This high 
rate of instability of justices, even after the return of democracy, indicates that both civilian and 
military executives have manipulated the Court. Still, the question remains: why do Argentine 
justices remain such a short time in office despite having life tenure? What factors can account 
for the high judicial turnover?  
The objective of this chapter is to empirically assess the theory of vacancy creation 
presented in Chapter 2, using data on the Argentine justices of the National Supreme Court. 
Specifically, this chapter uses quantitative data to systematically analyze the 83 departures of the 
Supreme Court justices from the bench from 1916 to 2009 so as to determine how the incentives 
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and preferences of the executives have influenced those retirements. Section 4.1 discusses the 
data and methodology for testing the alternative explanations for vacancy creation. The 
following section presents the results of the survival and competing risk models, and the last 
section outlines the main conclusion.  
4.1 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The dataset contains information about Argentine Supreme Court justices from 1916 to 2009. 
The dependent variable is the year in which a justice departs from the bench, indicating with a 1 
the year the justice exits and a 0 otherwise. Judicial vacancies have been not a rare event but a 
rather familiar one, since they have occurred on average every 1.2 years. The units of analysis 
are justice-years.  
Preliminary descriptive analysis of  judicial turnover in the country reveals that on 
several occasions more than half of the sitting justices have simultaneously departed from the 
bench in a given year, mainly as a result of changes in the type of regime (from democracy to 
military and vice versa). Figure 4.1 shows that the Court has been abruptly reshuffled49
                                                 
49 This is when more than half of the sitting justices depart from the bench in a given year. 
 on 7 
different occasions, starting in 1947 with Perón and ending in 1983 with the return of 
democracy. Three of those reshuffles happened as the result of a military coup (1955, 1966, and 
1976), while the other four occurred as the result of the return of democracy to the country (1947 
and 1973 under the Perón administration, 1958 under Frondizi, and 1983 under Alfonsín). 
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Evidently, the ultimate goal of these abrupt reshuffles has been to pack the court with loyal 
justices. Even though these “packings” of the Supreme Court were the consequence of sudden 
purges in the court, there are other alternatives for crafting a supportive court. One is the gradual 
replacement of unfriendly justices over a period of several years. President Néstor Kirchner 
pursued this strategy over three years, by the end of which he was able to appointing 4 of the 7 
justices. Another means of packing the court with friends is to expand the size of the court. 
Presidents Frondizi and Menem successfully packed the court by increasing the number of sitting 
justices contrary to the experience of Presidents Illia and Alfonsín, who did not obtain the 
necessary support in Congress.50
                                                 
50 By the time Frondizi expanded the number of sitting justices on the court he had already appointed to 
the bench 3 out of 5 justices; after the expansion he had 5 out of 7, making a larger loyal coalition to 
secure his goals, a double packing of friendly justices. Menem was in a different situation, since by the 
time he increased the number of justices he had inherited a court with justices appointed by Alfonsín. The 
1990 enlargement law allowed Menem to pack the court with loyal justices without reshuffling the 
composition, since he appointed 6 out of the 9 justices. Four of the vacancies were the result of the 
enlargement of the court, and the other two were the result of induced retirements of justices. 
 The key issue here is that even though Figure 4.1 shows that the 
court has been abruptly reshuffled 7 times, in fact the court has been packed on 9 occasions due 
to gradual replacements and enlargements. Therefore, reshuffles are an exclusive function of 
removals both abrupt and gradual, while packing is a function also of expanding the number of 
justices. 
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Figure 4.1 Reshuffles in the Supreme Court 1900-2009 
The starting point of this research is the assumption that executives, while in power, want 
to have a supportive court as a way to maximize their political influence on the decisions of the 
judiciary. According to the theory of vacancy creation, executives can craft a supportive court 
not only by appointing friendly justices, as the American literature has long recognized, but more 
interestingly by influencing when a vacancy will occur either by removing unfriendly justices or 
by packing the court with loyal justices. The main hypothesis relates to the political proximity 
between the incoming executive and the sitting justices. It is argued that the justices who share 
the same political preferences as the ruling executives – that is, friendly justices – are likely to 
rule in favor of the executive, whereas the opposite is true for justices who do not share the same 
political preferences as the ruling executive.  
Measuring a justice’s political preferences is a difficult task, because only partial data are 
available about how justices vote on the National Supreme Court and no data are available at the 
Provincial Supreme Court. The only systematized data reveal the way justices vote regarding the 
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constitutionality of a norm; this is not enough information to create an index reflecting an overall 
evaluation of the justice’s preferences over time. As a way to overcome this difficulty, this study 
proposes two types of proxy variables to measure the political proximity of justices and 
executives. The first measure captures the political alignment of the justice to the executive by 
paying attention to the political ID of the appointing executive (both the political party and the 
political faction of the party); the second one mediates the alignment of the justice (both the 
political party and the political faction) by the level of congressional support enjoyed by the 
executive party at the time when the appointment is made. Consequently, the first measure 
stresses the importance of the political alignment of the appointing executive, while the second 
one improves the measure by emphasizing the importance of the partisan power of the political 
parties during the appointment process. 
4.1.1 Alignment to the political party and the faction  
The proximity of the justice to the executive can be determined by the political party of the 
appointing executive, since the idea is that the justice reflects the political preferences of the 
party of that executive (Hagle 1993; Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1995; Zorn and Van Winkle 2000).51
                                                 
51 Even though some recent studies in the American literature have challenged the assumption that 
justices reflect the political preferences of the appointing executive, this type of analysis is hard to carry 
out in Argentina due to data constraints (Szmer and Songer 2005). 
 
So, for example, justices appointed by the president from Party A will likely share the same 
political preferences as Party A. However, in countries with high party factionalism, like 
Argentina especially at the subnational level, it is also important to consider the political 
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factions52
Therefore, while American scholars consider political proximity only when the justice 
shares the same political preferences of the political party of the appointing executive, in this 
case it is also important to consider the political faction of the appointing executive. In countries 
with intra-party fragmentation it is more likely that executives will be considered friends when 
they and the justice in question belong to the same political faction of their party. Consequently, 
 within the political parties of the appointing executive. It may be the case that in 
countries with party factionalism the proximity of the justice to the executive may not 
necessarily be determined by the political party itself but rather by the political faction of the 
appointing executive. So, for example, at the national level, Presidents Kirchner and Menem 
both belonged to the Peronist party; however, President Kirchner’s political faction successfully 
impeached two justices appointed by former President Menem’s faction (Justices Moline 
O’Connor and Boggiano) and forced four more (Justices Nazareno, Lopez, Vazquez, and 
Belluscio) to retire. Evidently, Presidents Kirchner and Menem belonged to different factions of 
the PJ and this was one of the reasons why Kirchner forced the removal of what he considered 
unfriendly justices. At the provincial level, ideological distance is also important, since during 
the last twenty-five years many of the Argentine provinces have been governed by the same 
political party. In the province of Neuquén, for example, the Movimiento Popular Neuquino has 
ruled from 1983 until the present; however, different political factions of that party have 
governed during those years: those loyal to Felipe Sapag or to Elias Sapag. The political 
preferences of each faction clearly differentiate them from the other faction, a distinction 
reflected in the political proximity of the justices appointed by each of the factions.  
                                                 
52  “Political faction” accounts for ideological differences within the same political party. 
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two measures of political proximity are employed: one using the political party of the appointing 
executive, and the other using the political faction of the appointing executive. The dummy 
variable for political party alignment captures whether or not the justice was appointed to office 
by a president of the same political party as the current ruling executive, while the dummy 
variable for faction alignment captures whether or not the justice was appointed to office by a 
president of the same political faction as the current ruling executive. So, for example, in 1991 
President Menem from the PJ appointed Justice Boggiano to the court; during the years that the 
PJ was the ruling party, the dummy variable for party alignment was coded 1 and 0 for the other 
years (when the Alianza was the ruling party). Regarding the dummy variable for faction 
alignment, since Justice Boggiano was appointed by Menem, and the other PJ presidents who 
followed him (Presidents Duhalde, Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez ) were from a 
different faction of the PJ,53
The alignment variables lead to the following hypothesis: first, a justice who belongs to 
the same political faction as the ruling executive is less likely to be removed from the bench; and 
second, a justice who belongs to the same political party as the ruling executive is less likely to 
 faction alignment for Boggiano is coded 1 only during the years of 
the Menem administration and 0 otherwise.  
                                                 
53 Chapter 5 discusses in greater detail the coding rules for this variable, but the main idea is that, if the 
outgoing executive supported the incoming executive during the candidate nomination or the primaries, it 
is argued that they belong to the same faction; whereas, if the outgoing executive supported another 
candidate during the nomination and primaries or even competed himself, then it is argued that they do 
not belong to the same faction. It is also considered whether the incoming executive who has been 
supported by the outgoing executive remains loyal to the faction during his administration. So, for 
example, in the case of Néstor Kirchner from the PJ, former President Duhalde also from the PJ supported 
Kirchner’s nomination but as soon as Kirchner assumed the presidency he clearly betrayed and separated 
from Duhalde’s faction, creating a new faction inside the PJ (called Frente para la Victoria). 
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be removed from the bench. Due to party factionalism, one may expect to find significant results 
on the variable using political faction as a measure of political alignment. 
4.1.2 Ideological distance: alignments to the executive mediated by the partisan power in 
Congress 
Even though the previous variables can capture political proximity between justices and 
executive even in the context of intra-party fragmentation, those variables do not take into 
consideration the role and partisan power of the political parties during the appointment process. 
If the ruling party does not have full control of the Congress to appoint a justice with close 
political preferences, then the justice appointed to the Court would hardly be fully aligned with 
the appointing executive. In the previous measures it was assumed that the executive in office 
had full control over the appointment process, while in this case that assumption is relaxed.  In 
this case it is considered the partisan power of the political parties in the process in conjunction 
with the political party and faction alignment. Like in the previous case there are two measures 
of ideological distance: one is identifying the political faction of the ruling executive while the 
second one is using the political party. Therefore, the ideological distance scales are defined as a 
function of the political alignment between the sitting justice and the executive (either the 
political faction or the political party) mediated by the political support for political parties in the 
Congress during the appointing period. In this case, the appointing process is conceived as 
political negotiation among the parties in Congress.  
Congressional support is relevant because the greater the partisan support of the 
executive during the appointing time, the more likely it is that the appointing executive will 
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select a candidate with similar political preferences (Iaryczower et al. 2002).54
Thus, the ideological distance variables capture the political proximity of the justices to 
the executives by paying attention to the partisan power of the executive in Congress. Due to 
lack of information, in these measures it is only employ congressional support for the political 
party of the executive and not congressional the support for the faction of the executive. Even 
though within Congress there is also some degree of factionalism (known as “bloques”), it is 
hard to obtain that information during the long period of analysis in the National Congress or in 
the Provincial Legislatures. Nevertheless, according to Argentine experts on provincial 
legislatures (Miguel De Luca and Andrés Malamud), the voting behavior at the provincial level 
 If the executive 
had full support (in terms of whatever type of congressional majority the executive needed to 
approve a nomination, either 2/3 or a simple majority), then the justice would have the same 
political preferences (i.e., be a pure clone) as those of the nominating president; otherwise, the 
justice would be a mixed clone of the executive and the legislature, since the ruling party would 
have to negotiate with the other parties to obtain support. This corresponds with what the 
American literature refers to as the strategic behavior of executives during the nominating 
process (Moraski and Shipan 1999; Hammond et al. 2005). The idea is that, based on the 
political distribution of the seats in the Senate, presidents use their power of nomination 
strategically in order to bring the Court in line with their policy preferences. Based on the 
political support that the president enjoys in the Senate, justices can be conceived as pure or 
mixed patronage appointments.  
                                                 
54 Within legislatures, there is also some degree of factionalism (known as “bloques”); however, no data 
are available about it at the provincial level between 1983 and 2008. Nonetheless, experts on provincial 
legislatures suggest that voting behavior at the provincial level is homogeneous within the political party.  
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is prone to be homogenous within the political parties; therefore, it is assumed that parties vote 
cohesively during the appointing process.  
The ideological distance variable is a scale that ranges from 0 to 1. Justices who have the 
same political preferences as the executive or no ideological distance (i.e., a value of 0) are those 
justices who have been appointed by an executive with full control of the Senate during the 
appointing process or by a friendly past executive with control of the Senate.55
On the other hand, justices who do not share the same political preferences or have a full 
ideological distance from the executive (i.e., a value of 1) are those who have been appointed by 
unfriendly executives (either because the executive belong to a different political party or 
political faction) who had full control of the Senate. Following the Menem example, above, 
during the Alianza administration that came after the Menem government, the justices appointed 
in 1990 received the highest score in the measure of ideological distance from President De la 
 So, for example, 
in 1990 President Menem had full control of the Senate; therefore, the justices he appointed in 
that year were very close to his political preferences (i.e., full clone justices), since he did not 
need to negotiate with other parties to appoint them. For the subsequent PJ administrations those 
justices would be also considered politically close to the ruling executive, in the case of the 
ideological distance variable that is based on the political party of the executives, but not for the 
ideological distance variable that is based on the political faction of the executives. In the case of 
the justices who were appointed during the military regime, those justices would be completely 
aligned with the military executives since the Generals had no Congressional restriction on the 
appointment process.  
                                                 
55 Until 1994 the Senate confirmed candidates by a simple majority of the seats, while after the 
Constitutional Reform it took 2/3 of the seats. 
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Rua, since the Alianza government (either the UCR or the FREPASO) did not negotiate with the 
PJ the appointment of those justices at the appointing time. Another example is the justices who 
were appointed during the military government who served also during the democratic period 
(and vice versa), since in those cases the military had no restrictions from the Congress on 
appointing the justices.  
However, as previously mentioned, not all executives had full control of the Senate 
during the appointment process to enable them to select a justice with identical political 
preferences. In those cases, the ideological distance of the justice from the executive is mediated 
by the partisan power of the ruling party. For example, let us imagine that the president from 
Party A (in t0) controls only 40% of the seats of the Senate (Party B controls 35% and Party C, 
25%) and needs a simple majority (51%) to appoint a justice. In this situation, Party A would 
have to negotiate with other parties so as to obtain the necessary votes. Therefore, Party A will 
not be able to select a clone justice (i.e., a justice with identical political preferences), but rather 
a justice with some ideological distance due to the bargaining process with the other parties. 
Taking into account the political advantage of the executive during the appointing process, it is 
likely that the executive would still have a preferential place in the bargaining process.56
                                                 
56 The president is the one who nominates a justice to the bench and, thus, the first political actor in the 
appointing sequence. 
 So, in 
this case, if Party A had 40% of the votes out of 51% (i.e., the executive controlled 78% of the 
total votes necessary for the appointment), the index of ideological distance would be 0.22 points 
(i.e., 1-0.78) indicating that the president had to make limited concessions to the pivotal senator 
outside of his or her party. A 0.22 points in the ideological distance scale reflects that the justice 
does not have the same political preference as the executive, since that would be a value of 0, but 
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rather that the justice has quite similar preferences to those of the executive. Now, let us imagine 
that in the next presidential elections (t+1) Party B wins; then the ideological distance of a justice 
appointed in the previous administration (t0) would be determined by the partisan and bargaining 
power of Party B in the Senate at the appointing time. Since Party A had 40% of the seats out of 
the 51%, then Party A could have sealed an agreement for the appointment with either Party B or 
Party C. Given that both of the parties could have supported Party A in the appointment process 
(since Party A needed only 11% of the seats in the Senate) and there is no way to obtain 
information about the bargaining process for such a long timeframe, in those cases it would be 
computed as if the justice were fully distant from the executive. This is, if Party B or C wins the 
next presidential election, then a justice appointed during the administration of Party A has a full 
ideological distance from the current executive. It is for this reason that this can be conceived as 
an improved variable of the alignment variables since it takes into account the partisan power of 
the political parties during the appointment process.  
4.1.3 Timing of the departure 
The argument is that executives want a supportive court during the first two years of their 
administration57
                                                 
57 The first two years of the administration were coded, because changes in the administration often come 
at the end of the calendar year, when the Judiciary is closed; thus the resignation of the justice happens 
during the following year.  
, because they want to use their political leverage on the judiciary to carry out 
their policies. Three different measures are used to assess this effect: a change in the 
administration, a change in the ruling party, and the establishment of military governments. 
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These dummy variables aim to account for leadership, party, and regime effects. Significant 
results are expected when there are changes in the ruling party, since in most cases incoming 
executives inherit a court with justices appointed by executives from a different party.58 The 
military government variable measures not only the establishment of a military government but 
also those cases in which there were changes within the ruling military elite. As shown above, 
military governments also experienced changes within the ruling elite, so this variable also 
captures when new military executives takes office within the same military regime.59
4.1.4 Political background of the justices 
 One may 
expect to find significant results whenever military governments seized power, since they can 
use their unbounded power not only to close the Congress and overthrow the president but also 
to craft a supportive court. However, as the chapter 3 illustrated, there will probably not be 
significant differences between military and democratic regimes, since both types of regime have 
been able to craft a supportive court. 
Also included is a dummy variable that specifies the justices’ political background, being 1 when 
the justice had a political background and 0 a judicial one. There were some cases in which 
justices had both a political and a judicial career; in those cases the justices were coded as 1 (i.e., 
having a political background), since what matters most is a prior political connection. 
                                                 
58 One exception to this assumption is the change in the ruling party in 2002 when President Duhalde 
from the PJ inherited a Court with a majority of Peronist justices, despite a change in ruling party because 
the Alianza government (UCR and FREPASO) did not appoint new members in the court. 
59 This variable can also be interpreted as regime type, since it is correlated with the presence of military 
rulers in the government.  
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Secondary sources and newspapers60
4.1.5 Executive partisan power 
 were used to code whether or not the appointed justice had 
a political or a judicial background, with special attention paid to the justice’s previous job and 
political relations. Justices with a political background are those that either previously held a 
political position such as congressmen, minister, political advisers or that have a personal 
relationship with the president or his political team. During the military regimes, when political 
parties were proscribed, it was important to code whether or not the justice had a special bond to 
the military. It was predicted that those justices with political (or military) backgrounds would be 
more likely to leave office than those with judicial backgrounds, because incoming authorities 
would likely first remove those justices who represented a political threat. 
The model also includes the executive partisan power hypothesis that stems from a group of 
scholars (Chávez 2004; Iaryczower et al. 2002) who claim that only those executives that have 
the partisan power in Congress to formally remove a justice from office (i.e., impeach) will 
obtain a supportive Court. Even though this study challenges this assumption I include this in the 
analysis as a competing hypothesis. A dummy variable was included to measure strong, unified 
governments (i.e., those where the executive had 2/3 or more of the seats in both chambers) 
coded as 1 and 0 otherwise.  
                                                 
60 The data was gathered from the following list of books, journal articles and working papers (Helmke 
2005; Abiad and Thieberger 2005; Pellet Lastra 2001; Verbitsky 1993; Tanzi 2005; Chávez 2007, 2004; 
Kunz 1989). Data from La Nación, Clarín and Página 12 newspapers were used to complement and 
corroborate the information from the secondary sources. 
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4.1.6  Justice’s age and size of the court 
Along with the previous hypotheses, additional explanations are proposed in relation to the 
preferences and personal characteristics of the justices that recur in the literature. These variables 
aim to evaluate how the personal characteristics of justices influence their stability in office. One 
variable captures the effect of the justice’s age on the probability of departing from office. This 
variable can also be interpreted as a proxy for the health of the justice, since older justices are 
more likely to experience health problems and eventually die in office or retire of their own 
accord. It may, therefore, be predicted that older justices are more likely to step off the bench 
than younger justices. Another variable in the model indicates the size of the Court as a way to 
control for reductions in the number of sitting justices. The expectation is that smaller court 
increases the probability of any justice of leaving office. Table 4.1 presents a summary of the 
variables and their measurement.  
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Table 4.1: Sample information and variable definition 
Variable name Definition Mean Std 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Justice’s departure 
from the bench 
1 if the justice departs from the bench, 
0 otherwise 
0.120 0.325 0 1 
Alignment  with the 
political faction  
1 if justice and ruling executive belong 
to the same political faction, 0 
otherwise 
0.574 0.495 0 1 
Alignment with the 
political party  
1 if justice and ruling executive belong 
to the same political party, 0 otherwise 
0.640 0.480 0 1 
Ideological distance 
with the political 
faction 
a 0-1 scale that captures the 
ideological distance of the justice from 
the ruling executive based on the 
political faction ID of the executive, 0 
having no ideological distance (clone 
justice) and 1 the highest ideological 
distance 
0.462 0.473 0 1 
Ideological distance 
with the political party 
a 0-1 scale that captures the 
ideological distance of the justice from 
the ruling executive based on the 
political party ID of the executive, 0 
having no ideological distance (clone 
justice) and 1 the highest ideological 
distance 
0.390 0.457 0 1 
New administration 1 if there is a change in the 
administration, 0 otherwise 
0.478 0.500 0 1 
New ruling party 1 if there is a change in the ruling 
party, 0 otherwise 
0.304 0.461 0 1 
New military 
administration 
1 if there is a change in the military 
administration, 0 otherwise 
0.111 0.314 0 1 
Background of the 
justice 
1 if the justice has a political 
background, 0 a judicial one 
0.685 0.465 0 1 
Executive partisan 
power 
1 if the executive controls 2/3 of both 
chambers in Congress, 0 otherwise 
0.89 0.285 0 1 
Justice’s age The age of the justice  60.854 9.104 37 91 
Size of the court Number of sitting justices in the court 5.990 1.6504
2 
5 9 
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4.2 UNDERSTANDING JUDICIAL INSTABILITY IN THE NATIONAL SUPREME 
COURT, 1916-2009 
In order to test the previous hypotheses and following the literature, a survival model for discrete 
data was used (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Nixon and Haskin 2000; Squire 1988; Zorn 
and Van Winkle 2000).61
                                                 
61 Because the dependent variable is dichotomous with only 12% of the cases being 1’s, rare events logit 
model is appropriate (King and Zeng 2001). I estimated both rare events logit and logit models with 
Huber/White/Sandwich robust variance estimator to adjusts for within-group (justice) correlation 
(Wooldridge 2002), and I obtained similar results.  Due to the similarity of results between those two 
models, I present the results for the logit model with Huber/White/Sandwich robust variance estimator. 
 Because justices depart from the bench during the judicial calendar 
year, the underlying process is assumed to be discrete; thus the intervals for the duration are 
measured in terms of years. I include a temporal dependence variable, not only because each 
individual case has multiple data points and thus can exhibit temporal dependence, but also for 
the purpose of examining whether or not the stability of a justice in office changes over time. 
The Carter and Signorino (2007) time polynomial method (t, t2, and t3) was used to model 
temporal dependence, since these authors provide evidence that the use of time dummies suffers 
from issues of inefficiency. The dataset contains information about the Argentine justices 
appointed to the Supreme Court from 1916 to 2009. The dependent variable is a dummy that 
indicates with a 1 the year the justice exits office (the event) and a 0 otherwise. The units of 
analysis are justice-years. Table 4.2 presents the results of the survival discrete-model using a 
logit estimator with robust standard errors. Because the alignment variables and the ideological 
113 
 
distance indicators are highly correlated, Model 4.1 presents the results using the alignment 
variables while Model 4.2 using the ideological distance variables.62
                                                 
62 Even though the alignments variables are also highly correlated (0.84), the results still hold when the 
model is run using each of the alignment variables separately. Model 4.2 contains a smaller number of 
observations than Model 4.1 since there are no data available before 1916 regarding the conformation of 
the National Congress. Therefore, the justices appointed before that year who were still serving on the 
court are not included in the sample size. 
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Table 4.2: Survival model of judicial turnover for the Supreme Court, 1916-2009 (all 
retirements)  
 Model 4.1 Model 4.2 
Alignment with the political faction  -1.380** 
(0.599) 
 
- 
Alignment with the political party  0.735 
(0.501) 
 
- 
Ideological distance with the political 
faction 
- 1.613** 
(0.791) 
 
Ideological distance with the political 
party 
 
- -0.706 
(0.595) 
 
New administration 0.408 
(0.449) 
 
0.312 
(0.570) 
New ruling party 1.124** 
(0.497) 
 
1.140** 
(0.562) 
New military administration 1.198** 
(0.399) 
 
1.119** 
(0.402) 
Background of the justice 0.082 
(0.282) 
 
0.286 
(0.330) 
Executive partisan power 0.411 
(0.553) 
 
0.318 
(0.608) 
Justice’s age 0.043** 
(0.020) 
 
0.042** 
(0.199) 
Size of the court -0.111 
(0.115) 
 
-0.144 
(0.129) 
t 0.613*** 
(0.175) 
 
0.534** 
(0.185) 
t2 -0.061*** 
(0.017) 
 
-0.052** 
(0.018) 
t3 0.002*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
Intercept -6.201*** 
(1.583) 
-6.510*** 
(1.483) 
N 666 565 
Wald X2(df) 63.33(12) 55.45(12) 
Prob.> X2 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.185 0.194 
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Log-Likelihood -194.363 -173.681 
Note: *Significant at p<.10; ** at p<.05; *** at p<.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
The results from Model 4.1 indicate that being aligned with the faction of the president 
reduces the probability of a justice of leaving the bench in a given year. The fact that the 
coefficient for party alignment is not statistically significant reveals that the proximity of the 
justice with the faction of the president is more important for accounting judicial turnover than 
with the political party. That is, friendly justices are not necessarily the ones that have been 
appointed by executives from the same political party but rather from the same political faction 
of the party. 
The dummy variables for changes in the ruling party and for changes in the military 
administration are positive and statistically significant. This suggests that during the first two 
years when a new party comes to power, justices are more likely to depart from the bench. The 
coefficient for change in the administration is not statistically significant, which implies that the 
probability of a justice departing from the bench increases not necessary when there is a change 
in the administration but rather when there is a new ruling party in power. The establishment of 
military administrations also increases the likelihood of a justice departing from the bench, 
revealing that justices are unstable under both democratic and military regimes.  
The variable of the justice’s age is also significant; it reveals, as expected, that the older 
the justice is, the more likely he or she will leave the bench. The variable for the executive 
partisan power in Congress is not statistically significant. This indicates that, in fact, there is no 
relationship between the partisan power of the executive and the probability that a justice will 
depart from the bench.  This may be because presidents had (at least) 2/3 of the seats in both 
chambers in only 11 years between 1916 and 2009. The temporal duration terms are significant, 
116 
 
revealing the existence of a temporal dependence on justices’ tenure or a non-linear evolution 
over time. Figure 4.1 (based on Model 4.1) plots the log-odds of judicial departures over time. 
The risk for departing from the bench increases around year seven but the hazard rate expands 
significantly after the second decade in office, what may suggests the effect of the justice’s age 
for retirement. 
 
Figure 4.2: Hazard function from Model 3.1 
Model 4.2 from Table 4.1 presents the results of the survival discrete-model using a logit 
estimator with robust standard errors for the ideological distance variables, one based on the 
political party ID of the executives and the other on their political faction. The results indicate, 
once again, that the greater the ideological distance a justice is from the political faction of the 
current executive, rather than from the political party of the executive, the more likely it is that 
he or she will leave the bench. As in Model 4.1, in this case the political proximity of the justice 
to the political faction of the ruling executive also affects the stability of the justice in office. The 
fact that what matters is the alignment to the political faction, rather than the political party, 
reveals that loyalties are more precise and more closely linked to the preference of the ruling 
executive than what the American literature suggests. In the end, executives do not trust justices 
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with different political preferences since those justices will not protect the executives’ interest in 
the Court. The dummy variable for military changes in administration is statistically significant, 
suggesting that during the first two years of a new military administration justices are more 
likely to depart from the bench. The dummy variable for change in the ruling party also resulted 
statistically significant and in the expected direction, suggesting that justices are more likely to 
depart from the bench during the first two years of a new ruling party in office. The justice’s age 
and the temporal variables are also statistically significant and in the expected direction.63
Because Models 4.1 and 4.2 are non-linear predicted probabilities were computed for the 
justices under different circumstances. Table 4.3 plots the predicted probabilities for Model 4.1 
in various political contexts. On average (i.e. holding all the variables at their mean) a justice has 
0.07 probability of departing from the bench but that probability increases under different 
political context. Let’s consider that there is a change in the civilian administration and the 
justice is aligned with the political faction of the incoming president, then the probability of that 
justice leaving office in a given year increases 11%, while if the justice is not aligned with the 
faction of the current executive the probability increases to 32%. Changes in military 
administration also increase the probability of a justice departing from the bench. If there is a 
change in a military administration and the justice is aligned with the military, the probability of 
the justice leaving office in a given year increases 17%, while if the justice is not aligned with 
the military the probability increases to 28%. Therefore, those justices aligned with a different 
political faction from that of the ruling executives have a greater probability of leaving office 
  
                                                 
63 As in Model 4.1, the temporal duration terms indicates the non-linear evolution of the justice’s hazard 
rate over time and the effect is very similar. The log-odds of judicial departures reveals that justices are 
more likely to leave after 7 years in office and again the hazard rate increases significantly after the 
second decade of the justice in office. 
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during the first years of the administration than those justices aligned with the faction of the 
ruling executive. These results expose not only that incoming executives prefer to craft a 
supportive court during the first years of their government so as to increase their political 
leverage but also that justices are unstable under both civilian and military administrations. 
Democracies have not produced so far a more stable and independent judiciary than military 
governments.  
Table 4.3: Predicted probabilities for Model 4.1 
  Aligned with the 
faction of the 
president 
Not aligned with the 
faction of the 
president 
C
iv
il 
Change in 
administration 
0.105 
(0.019, 0.192) 
 
0.319 
(0.193, 0.444) 
No change in 
administration 
0.024 
(0.003, 0.047) 
0.092 
(0.021, 0.163) 
M
ili
ta
ry
 Change in 
administration 
0.167 
(0.022) 
 
0.276 
(0.066) 
No change in 
administration 
0.039 
(0.013, 0.064) 
0.071 
(0.015, 0.127) 
Note: 95% confidence interval in parenthesis.  
The predicted probabilities for Model 4.2, plotted in Table 4.4, also support the 
importance of politics in explaining judicial stability on the bench. On average (i.e. holding all 
the variables at their mean) a justice has 0.08 probability of departing from the bench. Let’s 
consider that there is a change in the civilian administration and the justice is ideologically 
distant from the ruling president, the probability of the justice leaving office in a given year 
increases 34%, while if the justice is not ideologically distant from the president the probability 
of leaving office reduces to 9%. Similar results are found when there are changes in a military 
administration. If there is a change in a military administration and the justice is ideologically 
distant from the military, the probability of the justice leaving office in a given year increases 
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40%, while if the justice is not ideologically distant from the military the probability reduces 
12%. The political proximity of the justice to the ruling party can affect the stability of the justice 
on the bench, since those justices ideologically distant are more likely to depart from the bench 
at the beginning of a new administration. As in the previous model, justices are unstable under 
both military and democratic administrations.  
Table 4.4: Predicted probabilities for Model 4.2 
  Minimum ideological 
distance 
Maximum ideological 
distance 
C
iv
il 
Change in 
administration 
0.094 
(-0.004, 0.191) 
 
0.341 
(0.198, 0.485) 
No change in 
administration 
0.024 
(-0.001, 0.049) 
0.108 
(0.016, 0.200) 
M
ili
ta
ry
 Change in 
administration 
0.115 
(-0.050, 0.280) 
 
0.396 
(0.170, 0.622) 
No change in 
administration 
0.030 
(0.001, 0.059) 
0.135 
(0.009, 0.261) 
Note: 95% confidence interval in parenthesis.  
It should be noted that the results of Models 4.1 and 4.2 assume that the justice is at risk 
of experiencing only a single event – departing from the bench – and not of different kinds of 
events (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Based on the theoretical model developed in 
Chapter 2, this is not a reasonable assumption since justices can leave the bench due to different 
reasons. More precisely, as Chapter 3 disclosed, justices have been in many time induced to 
depart from the bench either because of political persecution through threats of impeachment 
process or because of political pressures from the executive; while on other occasions the 
departures of the justices from the bench have not been forced. This suggests that there is a 
competing process, in which a justice is at risk of experiencing one of two different kinds of 
events: an induced retirement or a non induced retirement. On the other hand, induced 
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retirement, or involuntary departure, captures those departures in which executives had forced 
the retirement of the justice from office, such as the removal of justices via executive decree as 
occurred at the beginning of the military regimes, impeachments, threats of impeachment, 
changes in the Constitution so as to reduce the number of justices or impose restriction in the 
retirement age, and offer other attractive positions. On the one hand, the non induced departure, 
accounts for those justices who leave the bench because of natural causes, either the justice died 
while in office or the justice retired from the bench.64
                                                 
64 Also included in this category are six cases where it was not completely clear whether or not the justice 
was forced to step off the bench. They were included on this category since it is the default event. 
 Between 1916 and 2009 a total of 83 
justices stepped off the bench. Figure 4.2 shows that 54 justices (65%) have been induced to 
retire from the bench, while the other 29 justices (35%) appear to have stepped off the bench for 
natural causes. Furthermore, most of the natural departures took place during the first half of the 
century, whereas the opposite is true for induced retirements. This suggests not only that most of 
the justices have been forced to step off the bench, but also that this kind of departure has 
become more common since 1947. Therefore, a model was constructed for the different ways in 
which vacancies can occur as a way to obtain a more complete explanation. It is expected that 
the political variables, like the alignment of the justices, the change of administration, and the 
political background among others, would matter to account for those justices that were forced to 
retire from the bench while biological reason, like the age of the justice, would account for those 
justices that voluntary departed from the bench. 
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Figure 4.3: Different kinds of departures of justices from the bench 
Models 4.3 and 4.4 from Table 4.5 show the discrete-time competing risk model, using 
multinomial logit65
                                                 
65 It is worth pointing out that in this case the reference category, the “0”, represents the non-event. 
 with robust standard errors. The first columns account for the induced 
retirement vacancies, while the second columns cover the vacancies that occurred as the result of 
non induced causes (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004 Chapter 10). Model 4.3 incorporates the 
alignment variables, while Model 4.4 covers the ideological distance ones. Let us consider first 
the explanations for the induced retirements for both models (the first columns of Models 4.3 and 
4.4), and then the non- induced retirements. Being aligned with the faction of the ruling president 
reduces the probability of being forced to leave the bench, while being aligned with the political 
party of the executive does not necessarily affect the stability of the justice on the bench. 
Regarding the effect of ideological distance variables, as in model 4.2, the greater the ideological 
distance from the executive in relation to the political faction the more likely that the justice will 
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be forced to depart, while the variable for ideological distance with the political party is not 
statistically significant. This suggests that executives are more likely to induce the retirement of 
unfriendly justices rather than of friendly ones, but more precisely of those justices that do not 
have a close ideological connection. The fact that loyalties are identify with the faction within 
the political party and not with the political party per se, exposes that the loyalty between 
executives and justices are highly personalized that thus, strongly controlled.    
The dummy variables for changes in ruling party and military administration indicate that 
during the first two years when a new party comes to power or a new military executive seizes 
office justices are more likely to be forced to retire from the bench. These results hold true in 
Models 4.3 and 4.4. The time duration variables are also statistically significant in both models; 
this suggests that there is a non-linear evolution of the justices’ hazard rate over time.66
                                                 
66 A plot of the log-odds of the judicial exit over time reveals that in both models the risk of leaving office 
increases around year seven and after the second decade in office the hazard rate considerably expands. 
 The main 
difference with the survival models in Table 4.2 is that, when distinguishing between the types of 
retirements, the justice’s age variable is not statistically significant, suggesting that the age of the 
justices has no impact on the probability of being forced to step down.   
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Table 4.5: Competing risk model of judicial turnover for the Supreme Court, 1916-2009 
 Model 4.3 Model 4.4 
 Induced Non 
induced 
Induced Non 
induced 
Alignment faction -1.771** 
(0.868) 
-0.950 
(0.812) 
 
- - 
Alignment political party 0.776 
(0.571) 
0.853 
(0.871) 
 
- - 
Ideological distance with the faction  - - 1.808* 
(0.985) 
 
1.237 
(1.291) 
Ideological distance with the political 
party 
- - -0.739 
(0.638) 
-0.471 
(1.003) 
 
New administration 0.234 
(0.886) 
0.422 
(0.505) 
 
0.364 
(0.958) 
0.292 
(0.706) 
New ruling party 2.100** 
(0.834) 
-0.616 
(0.828) 
 
1.891** 
(0.850) 
-0.717 
(0.919) 
New military administration 1.610** 
(0.516) 
0.627 
(0.730) 
 
1.450** 
(0.499) 
0.659 
(0.787) 
Background of the justice -0.212 
(0.376) 
0.674 
(0.563) 
 
-0.141 
(0.385) 
0.851 
(0.642) 
Executive partisan power 0.819 
(0.659) 
-0.688 
(1.109) 
 
0.653 
(0.676) 
-0.731 
(1.129) 
Justice’s age 0.29 
(0.023) 
0.065** 
(0.028) 
 
0.029 
(0.023) 
0.068** 
(0.028) 
Size of the court 0.014 
(0.138) 
-0.343 
(0.240) 
 
-0.044 
(0.145) 
-0.333 
(0.269) 
t 0.742** 
(0.280) 
0.252 
(0.247) 
 
0.702** 
(0.269) 
0.168 
(0.392) 
t2 -0.073** 
(0.024) 
-0.030 
(0.029) 
 
-0.067** 
(0.024) 
-0.026 
(0.049) 
t3 0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Intercept -
7.261*** 
(2.113) 
-6.291** 
(2.247) 
-7.765*** 
(1.909) 
-6.525** 
(2.081) 
N 666 565 
Wald X2(df) 109.64(24) 96.81(24) 
Prob.> X2 0.000 0.000 
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Pseudo R2 0.222 0.223 
Log-Likelihood -221.985 -198.991 
Note: *Significant at p<.10; ** at p<.05; *** at p<.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Now, let us consider the explanations for the natural departures (the second columns of 
Models 4.3 and 4.4). The variable for the justice’s age in both Models 4.3 and 4.4 is statistically 
significant, revealing that older justices have a greater probability of voluntarily leaving the 
court. This finding denotes the effect of the justice’s age on retirement. Consider the hypothetical 
case of a justice after five years in office with the other variables at their mean: for every 
standard deviation increase in age (i.e., every 9 years in office), the probability of a justice 
voluntarily leaving the bench increases by 2%,67
The competing risk models revealed that there is, in fact, a competing process going on 
between those induced departures and non-induced ones. Justices have been forced to retire from 
office basically for political and ideological reasons. Incoming executives prefer to have loyal 
justices on the bench appointed by their same political faction; they also prefer to craft that 
supportive court at the beginning of their term. Since the Supreme Court is a relevant political 
actor that can control the other branches of government, specially the executive one, executives 
have exclusively relied only on those justices who were appointed by their same political faction 
rather than by the same political party. This holds true in both democratic and non-democratic 
periods. On the other hand, the competing risk models demonstrated that the departures of those 
justices who were not forced to leave the bench were in fact the result of a biological and natural 
process, since what mattered most was the age of the justice. 
 a weak effect.  
                                                 
67 The predicted probability was calculated for Model 4.3, but the same results were obtained for Model 
4.4. 
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4.3 CONCLUSIONS 
Taken together, the results corroborate the hypotheses of the theory of vacancy creation. 
Specifically, the data suggest that there is a different dynamic going on when accounting for 
judicial turnover in the country. On the one hand, the non-induced or voluntary departures result 
basically from biological causes, since the older the justice the more likely it is that he or she will 
voluntarily step down. This suggests that politics do not influence this type of departure; in fact, 
it is precisely the justice’s own decision and not the executive’s to depart from the bench.  
On the other hand, the evidence revealed that politics does matter when accounting for 
induced retirements from the bench. Executives do not trust unfriendly justices, as suggested by 
the fact that justices with political preferences different from the ruling executives are more 
likely to depart from the bench than those with similar preferences. More precisely, in the 
context of intra-party fragmentation, executives are less likely to force the retirement of justices 
appointed by previous executives from the same faction as opposed to those from the same 
political party. This situation reveals that the political loyalties of justices and executives turn out 
to be more sophisticated and personal than had been expected. This chapter also proved that 
there is a non-linear effect of time for those induced retirements, since this type of departure is 
more likely to take place not only at the beginning of a new administration, but also under an 
administration with a new ruling party, suggesting the political advantages for executives of 
having a supportive court during their term in office.  
Finally, the evidence indicates that democracy has not so far produced more stable and 
independent judiciaries in Argentina. In other words, there is no strong evidence that justices 
under military regimes have an increased likelihood of being removed from office, nor that 
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justices are significantly more stable under democratic regimes. The fact that justices are highly 
unstable under both democratic and military regimes suggests that the democratization process 
has not resulted in a consolidation of the judicial institutions. Chapter 3 can help explain this 
counterintuitive result for the Argentine case. The massive impeachment trial in 1947 originated 
a process of positive feedback in which the cost of changing the direction of events rose 
significantly. Both democratic and military regimes followed the same pattern of executive-court 
relations in which the stability of the justices depended on the stability of the political elites in 
power. This strong legacy of relationships, or path dependency, not only continued through time, 
regardless of the regime type, but was also reinforced along the years. This durable executive-
court relationship explains why democratic governments have not produced so far a more stable 
judiciary than military ones.   
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5.0  INSTABILITY AT THE SUBNATIONAL LEVEL: THE PERSISTENT 
POLITICAL MANIPULATION OF THE SUPREME COURTS 
The previous chapter has empirically corroborated that several of the core hypotheses of vacancy 
creation can account for the high judicial turnover characteristic of the National Supreme Court. 
The objective of this chapter is to extend the analysis of the vacancy creation to the provincial 
Supreme Courts. Have provincial justices, like national justices, also been vulnerable to the 
political manipulation of the executive? Which provinces have a more stable judiciary and what 
factors can account for any differences? Shedding light on the causes of the within-country 
differences would allow formulating a mid-range theory about the stability of justices in office 
that should be applicable to other developing democracies. 
This chapter, which contains original quantitative data collected in the provincial 
Supreme Courts about the justices who were in office between 1983 and 2009, systematically 
analyzes the departures of 525 justices from the 23 provincial Supreme Courts so as to determine 
how the incentives and preferences of the executives have influenced these departures. The first 
section of the chapter contains a brief overview of the main features of the Argentine provinces, 
while the second section presents a descriptive analysis of the different formal and informal 
mechanisms of induced retirement that governors have triggered since 1983. As in the National 
Supreme Court, in the provincial Supreme Courts the vast majority of the justices have been 
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induced to depart from the bench before the end of their terms. The third section uses descriptive 
data to evaluate the differences in the judicial turnover among the provinces. It is mainly here 
that the number of times that Supreme Courts were reshuffled and the average number of years 
that justices served on the courts before 1983 and afterwards are examined. It turns out that, over 
all, provincial justices have been even more unstable than the justices of the National Supreme 
Court. The fourth section uses quantitative data to empirically assess the theory of vacancy 
creation at the subnational level. The main findings corroborate those of Chapter 4, as governors’ 
incentives and preferences can be said to account for the high judicial turnover in the provinces. 
Furthermore, as Chapter 4 illustrated, political loyalties in the context of intra-party 
fragmentation have turned out to be more sophisticated depending whether or no there is party 
competition within the province. In single party provinces justices appointed by previous 
governors from the same political faction are less likely to retire from the bench than those 
coming from different political factions. The last section of the chapter outlines the main 
conclusions.  
5.1 A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE SUBNATIONAL DIFFERENCES 
Argentina is currently subdivided into 23 provinces and one autonomous district (Ciudad 
Autónoma de Buenos Aires). However, in 1990 there were just 22 provinces plus the capital city 
of Buenos Aires, as it was only in that year that the provincialization law No. 23. 775 declared 
Tierra del Fuego the 23rd province of the country; two years later its first governor was elected, 
while in 1993 its High Tribunal of Justices was conformed. The city of Buenos Aires became an 
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autonomous district after the National Constitutional reform of 1994, in which it was granted the 
capacity to have its own constitution and political system. The first governor of Buenos Aires 
was democratically elected in 1996, and the High Tribunal began work in 1998. Thus, due to its 
recent creation, the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires is not included in this sample of counties.  
Argentina is the 8th largest country in the world, and the second largest (after Brazil) 
among the Latin American countries; however, due to weather conditions, a large part of the 
territory is poorly inhabited (United Nations 2007). Because provinces vary not only in terms of 
land area and population but also the level of economic development, Table 5.1 presents 4 
relevant socio-economic indicators that account for these differences. The largest provinces of 
the country are: Buenos Aires, Santa Cruz, Chubut, Río Negro, and Córdoba; all together they 
represent more than 40% of the total surface of the country. However, 68% of the population of 
the country is mainly concentrated in the provinces of: Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Santa Fe, Ciudad 
de Buenos Aires and Mendoza. Even though Santa Cruz, Chubut and Río Negro are among the 
largest provinces, they belong to the Patagonia region; together with Tierra del Fuego they are 
among the provinces with smaller population density because of the harsh weather condition. 
Therefore, except from Buenos Aires, the other three largest provinces of the country are not 
among the most populated ones. It is precisely because of this reason that most political party’ 
campaigns for presidential elections focus on Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Santa Fe, Ciudad de 
Buenos Aires and Mendoza; the most populated provinces of the country. On the other hand, the 
provinces of Tierra del Fuego, Tucumán, Misiones, Jujuy, and Formosa are among the smallest 
provinces in the country and by far below the average population, except from Tucumán that is 
the 6th most populated province and thus, relevant for national politics.  
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Table 5.1: Socio-economic indicators at the subnational level 
Provinces 
Population 
(2001) 
Surface 
(Km2) 
Poverty  ** 
(%households) 
GDP*** (% of 
the National 
GDP) 
Buenos Aires 13,827,203 307,571 15.9 42.47 
Catamarca 334,568 102,602 26.9 0.47 
Cdad. de Bs As 2,776,138 203 7.2 16.37 
Chaco 984,446 99,633 35.2 2.09 
Chubut 413,237 224,686 20.9 0.99 
Córdoba 3,066,801 165,321 14.4 6.67 
Corrientes 930,991 88,199 30.5 1.73 
Entre Ríos 1,158,147 78,781 19.9 2.65 
Formosa 486,559 72,066 36.4 0.73 
Jujuy 611,888 53,219 34.9 0.81 
La Pampa 299,294 143,440 13.3 0.82 
La Rioja 289,983 89,680 24.2 0.70 
Mendoza 1,579,651 148,827 16.3 3.49 
Misiones 965,522 29,801 30.9 1.70 
Neuquén 474,155 94,078 22.8 1.15 
Río Negro 552,822 203,013 23.2 1.27 
Salta 1,079,051 155,488 34.6 1.63 
San Juan 620,023 89,651 19.2 1.50 
San Luis 367,933 76,748 19.8 0.79 
Santa Cruz 196,958 243,943 16.0 0.48 
Santa Fe 3,000,701 133,007 15.3 7.43 
Sgo. del Estero 804,457 136,351 35.2 1.20 
Tierra del Fuego 101,079* 21,571 22.2 0.31 
Tucumán 1,338,523 22,524 27.2 2.55 
Total Country 36,260,130 2,780,403 17.7 100 
Note: * Neither the Argentine territory in the Antarctic nor the Falkland Islands (980.874 Km2) are 
included in this table. ** Percentage of households with unsatisfied basic needs (NBI). The value 
represents the average poverty for the province in 1980, 1991, and 2001. *** GDP as a percentage of 
the national GDP based on the level of household electricity consumption (Mirabella de Sant and Nanni 
2004). The value represents the average GDP of the province in 1990, 2000 and 2009. Sources: Mirabella 
de Sant and Nanni (2004) and INDEC (2001b, 2001a, 1991, 1980). 
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The third indicator of Table 5.1, often considered as a proxy for poverty, captures the 
percentage of households in the province with unsatisfied basic needs.68 As happens in many 
developing democracies, poverty varies greatly within the country, especially between the capital 
city and the provinces. Formosa, Santiago del Estero, Chaco, Jujuy and Salta have more than 1/3 
of their households living below the poverty line, while Ciudad de Buenos Aires has less than 
8% of its households with unsatisfied basic needs. The poverty indicator is correlated with the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the provinces, since the provinces with the highest GDP69
                                                 
68 The NBI index uses a group of variables to identify poor areas in the country. A person is considered to 
be poor if he lives in a household with: (1) more than 3 persons per room; (2) a non-conventional house, 
like a mud hut or rented quarters; (3) a house with no indoor flush toilet; (4) a child between 6 and 12 
years old who is not attending a school; and (5) household head who is poorly educated and economically 
responsible for four or more persons. For further information, please refer to INDEC (2001a, 1991, 1980). 
The value represents the average percentage of households with unsatisfied needs in the last three national 
censuses: 1980, 1991 and 2001 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censo de la República Argentina 
1980, 1991, 2001a). 
 are 
the ones with the lowest percentage of their households living below the poverty line. The GDP 
of Buenos Aires, Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Córdoba and Mendoza combined represents 
76.4% of the national GDP, with Buenos Aires and Ciudad de Buenos Aires being the wealthiest 
economies in the country. The GDP of the other 20 provinces represents the remaining 23.6% of 
the national GDP (each province having, on average, 1.2% of the national GDP). Therefore, the 
wealthiest provinces in Argentina, which are also the ones with the greatest number of 
69 Due to the lack of historical data at the subnational level regarding GDP, this analysis follows de Sant 
and Nanni’s (2004) procedure for computing the provincial GDP, which is estimated as a percentage of 
the national GDP based on the level of household electricity consumption in each province. The value 
represents the average GDP of the provinces in 1990, 2000 and 2009. The author is deeply indebted to the 
generosity of Maria Cristina Mirabella de Sant and Eugenio Nanni for sharing their dataset and assisting 
in updating the variables to 2009. Since 2007 the INDEC, the Argentine Census Bureau in charge of 
producing the national and provincial statistics, has been strongly denounced for manipulating the 
economic indicators of the country ─ especially the inflation rate and GDP (La Nación 3/02/2007); thus 
the values of the provincial GDP of the provinces for 2008 and 2009 were computed according to their 
performance in previous years. 
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inhabitants, become relevant actors in national politics because of the large size of their 
constituencies for presidential elections and also because of their fiscal contribution to the 
federal tax-sharing agreement.  
Finally, it is important to point out that the provinces with a smaller GDP are also the 
ones that have had a single-party system since 1983. Formosa, Jujuy, La Pampa, La Rioja, 
Neuquén, Río Negro San Luis and Santa Cruz share in common not only their small share of 
their GDP compared to the national GDP but also the fact that the same party has been ruling 
these provinces from 1983 to the present (the UCR in Río Negro, the Movimiento Popular 
Neuquino in Neuquén and the PJ in the other 6 provinces). The province of San Luis represents 
an extreme case of a dominant single party because, unlike the other provinces, in which there is 
some political competition among the internal factions of the dominant party, the Rodríguez Sáa 
family has been governing the province over the last 27 years.  Catamarca and Santiago del 
Estero used to be like San Luis, but the federal intervention in Catamarca in 1991 put an end to 
the Saadis’ reign, while in Santiago del Estero the second federal intervention in 2004 
dismantled the Juarez’ supremacy. Nevertheless, both provinces still rank low in their GDP and 
have high percentages of their households living below the poverty line.  
5.2 THE LOGIC OF VACANCY CREATION IN THE PROVINCIAL SUPREME 
COURTS, 1983-2009 
Chapter 3 briefly showed that, since 1916, the provincial Supreme Courts have indeed been 
politically manipulated by their governors. Before 1983 high courts were reshuffled more than 
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once, not only after regime changes but also as the result of changes in the governor. The partial 
data available for some provinces before 1983 indicate that most of the vacancies were induced 
by the incoming governors either via a decree, as happened during military regimes, or via non-
institutional mechanisms like discrediting the justices, as happened especially during the 
transitions from military to civilian administrations (Córdova 1994; Montilla Zavalía 2007).  
Because there are no studies available indicating the reasons why provincial justices have 
departed from the bench, a qualitative research project was carried out to fill that gap. Original 
data regarding the departures of the provincial justices between 1983 and 2009 were collected 
from over 27 provincial and national newspapers preserved in the newspaper archive at the 
Argentine Library of Congress.70
                                                 
70 The author is deeply indebted to Diego Castelfranco, Luis Cecchi and Ignacio Puente for their 
invaluable research assistance in collecting the data for the provinces of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Jujuy, La 
Rioja, San Juan and Santa Fe. 
 More than 700 newspaper articles were examined in the course 
of a five-months-long data-gathering process. The collection of data was complemented and 
corroborated with interviews and books, since the quality of provincial journalism and freedom 
of the press varied greatly from province to province. Moreover, it was not until the 1990s that 
judicial news was reported on a daily basis; before that time, the judiciary was often absent from 
newspaper coverage.  The triangulation of data allowed the author not only to enhance the 
accuracy of the data but also to fill in the gaps during those times of absence of data in the local 
newspapers. The diversity of the data-gathering strategy, in fact, permitted identification of the 
reasons why justices departed from the bench in 33% of the cases of provincial justices who 
were in office between 1983 and 2009. The majority of the unidentified cases belong to the 
justices who departed before the 1990s.  
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Since the return of democracy in 1983 and 2009, a total of 525 justices left the bench in 
all the Argentine provinces. For 180 of them it was possible to determine their reason for 
leaving. Graph 4.1, which is the result of the effort to systematize the qualitative data gathered, 
classifies the justices according to their reasons for departing from the bench. As in the National 
Supreme Court, the majority of the provincial justices were forced to retire from the bench, while 
only 4% of them died71
                                                 
71 In Catamarca, Justice Oscar Guillermo Diaz died on December 7, 2000 (La Unión 8/12/2000), and 
Justice César Ernesto Oviedo on April 2, 2008 (La Unión 3/4/2008). In Chaco, Justice Aquiles Hernan 
Sotelo died on November 21, 1997 (Norte, 22/11/1997). In Córdoba, Justice Berta Kaller Orchansky died 
on December 11, 2003 (La Voz del Interior 11/12/2003). In Corrientes, Justice Carlos Contreras Gomez 
died on April 17h, 1996 (El Litoral 18/4/1996), and Justice Marcos Derqui on September 9, 1999 (El 
Litoral 10/9/1999). In Jujuy, Justice Amado Roberto Cura died on January 16, 1994 (El Tribuno 
17/1/1994) and Justice Raúl Octavio Nocetti died on June 1, 2004 (El Tribuno 2/6/2004). In Misiones, 
Justice Primo A. Bertolini died on October 6, 2006 (El Territorio 7/10/2006), and Justice Ismael Carlos 
Acosta on September 22, 1996 (El Territorio 22/11/1996). In Tierra del Fuego, Justice José Salomón died 
on September 3, 2002 (Ramonet 2007). In Tucumán, Justice Arturo Domingo Ponsati died on April 9, 
1998 (La Gaceta 10/4/1998). 
 while in office. Graph 4.1 summarizes both the institutional and non-
institutional mechanisms of vacancy creation used by governors over the years. 
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Figure 5.1: Reasons for leaving the provincial Supreme Courts, 1983-2009 
Among the institutional mechanisms of vacancy creation, the most popular one was the 
use of executive decrees during federal interventions to remove the justices from the bench. 
Since 1983 to 2009 the national government intervened in 4 provinces because of extreme cases 
of government corruption and wrongdoing: Corrientes in 1992 and 1999, Catamarca in 1991, 
Santiago del Estero in 1993 and 2004 and Tucumán in 1991. In those cases the president of the 
country, with the assent of the Congress, took control of the province and removed the local 
authorities, including the justices of the courts. A total of 66 justices (37%) were removed as a 
consequence of national interventions in those four provinces, some of them at the beginning of 
the intervention (32 justices), others at the end when the situation was normalized (25 justices); 
still others were removed during the intervention as a result of a change in the ruling authority (6 
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justices), and the remaining (3 justices) were removed because of disagreements with the 
intervener.72
Another institutional mechanism of vacancy creation used by governors in 18 cases was 
to offer attractive retirement benefits to the sitting justices so as to induce their retirement.
  
73 The 
incoming Peronist governor in Tierra del Fuego in 1999, Carlos Manfredotti, issued Law No. 
460, which established the compulsory retirement of the justices and judges in the provinces who 
were at least 50 years old and had 5 years of benefit contributions (Ramonet 2007). As a result of 
this permissive law, 3 out of the 5 sitting justices in the Court retired from the bench (Justices 
Felix González Godoy, Omar Alberto Carranza and Tomas Hutchinson) as well as 83% of the 
federal judges (Página 12 3/10/2007) from their courts. A similar situation took place in Río 
Negro, when in 199474
                                                 
72 During the first intervention in Corrientes, when Claudia Bello left the province and Ideler Tornelli was 
appointed as provincial authority, all the justices appointed by Bello were removed from the bench, so 
that Tornelli could appoint new ones. A similar situation came about when Pedro Benjamín Aquino left 
the province and Luis Prol became the new authority; that is, all the justices were removed from the 
bench.  
 the governor Horacio Massaccesi modified the retirement law so as to 
create 3 vacancies out of the 5 seats in the court (Justices Edgar Nelson Echarren, Jorge Luis 
Garcia Osella and Nely Azucena Flores retired from the bench) (Río Negro 14/05/1994). The 
73 In September 2008, President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner issued a decree (Decree 1401/2008) that 
was to allow many justices in Mendoza to formally retire from the bench. The current governor of the 
province is Celso Jaque, from the PJ, while the previous two administrations were from the UCR party. 
The decree would help to reshuffle the court, since 5 out of the 7 justices (Herman Salvini, Fernando 
Romano, Pedro Llorente, Aída Kemelmajer and Carlos Bhöm) are eligible to retire from the bench 
(Mendoza online 25/11/2008). 
74 In 1992 the governor tried to issue a bill calling for compulsory retirement; it would have produced a 
reshuffle in the judiciary, but the opposition did not support it (Río Negro 20/08/1992). 
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governor of Neuquén in 2001, Jorge Sobich,75 also issued a bill (Law No. 2.378) with flexible 
requirements for retirement, in this case inducing the retirement of 3 out of the 5 justices 
(Justices Fernando Regino Macome, Luis Armando Vidal and Rodolfo Gabriel Medrano). In 
Entre Ríos, Governor Sergio Montiel in 2000 issued a life annuity law (“renta vitalicia” ─ Law 
No. 9.241) for those justices who retired from the bench; the bill was approved in the legislature 
because the ruling party had majorities in both chambers (El Día 20/05/2000). Three out of nine 
justices (Justices Carlos Nesa, Julio Herrera and Jesús Solari) retired. In Misiones, Governor 
Carlos Rovira issued a bill to induce the retirement of Justices Luis Absi, Julio Eugenio Dionisi 
and Marta A. Poggiesse de Oudin.76
                                                 
75 In 1995 Jorge Sobich tried to modify the retirement law so as to craft a more favorable court, but he did 
not have support in the congress (Río Negro 29/12/2009). 
 The retirement of these three justices plus the death of 
Justice Primo Bertolini in October and the impeachment of Justice Marta Catella in February 
2006 produced 5 vacancies on the court. Therefore, Governor Rovira was thus able to appoint 5 
out of the 9 justices in Misiones. The governor of Tucumán, Jose Domato, also issued a bill 
offering attractive retirement benefits in 1989 so as to create vacancies on the Court. However, in 
this case, and contrary to the other examples, Justice René Mario Goane resigned before the law 
was passed because of the excessive political manipulation of the justices; he believed it was not 
acceptable to take advantage of the extra benefits (La Gaceta 2/11/1992). Finally, in 1988, 
Justices Eduardo Martinez Echenique and Alberto Serra from the province of Córdoba also 
retired from the bench, but in this case they were forced to do so because they had reached the 
official retirement age (La Voz del Interior 12/02/1988). A similar situation happened in La 
76 In this case the law established that those who retired would have a pension of 85% of their salary 
rather than 82%, which is what was established by most provinces (Misiones online 10/05/2006). 
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Rioja with Justice Agustín Benjamín de la Vega, when he was not reappointed once he reached 
retirement age.77
The impeachment trial was also used as an institutional mechanism to induce the 
retirement of provincial justices, but, as in the National Supreme Court, only a small number of 
justices were actually removed by this procedure. Since 1983 a total of 9 justices were 
impeached, and 40 were threatened with an impeachment trial (see Graph 4.1). The first such 
trial was carried out in San Juan in 1986, when Justices Carlos Graffigna Latino and Eduardo 
Aguiar Aranciva decided to accept the writ of amparo presented by two legislators opposed to 
their dismissal from the chamber (Diario de Cuyo 6/3/1986). The decision of the court was 
strongly criticized by the government, which then pressured the justices to dismiss the amparo 
with an impeachment. The trial took place, and the justices were removed in June 1986 (Diario 
de Cuyo 18/06/1986). The second impeachment trial occurred in 1985 in Santiago del Estero 
against Justice Remigio Carol. Even though the justice was formally accused of wrongdoing in 
the “Santa Ana Case” in 1984, at a time when he was a federal justice (El Liberal 4/3/1985), the 
interpretation of the trial suggested that it was actually a reprisal from the government against the 
justice’s illegal practices.
 
78
                                                 
77 Governor Carlos Reutemann from Santa Fe tried to force the retirement of Justice Casiano Iribarne in 
1995 when the justice reached retirement age. In this case, the justice presented a writ of amparo to the 
Supreme Court and remained on the bench (Página 12 Rosario 1/09/1999). 
 The next impeachment trial also took place in Santiago del Estero, 
when in 1991 Justices David Oscar Beltran and Santiago Grand were found guilty of corruption 
in the “Sleibe case” (El Liberal 4/06/1991). The trial occurred during debates about increasing 
the number of sitting justices on the court, a circumstance that allowed the Peronist governor, 
78 Interview with Dr. David Oscar Beltran, October 30, 2008, Hotel Gran Coventry, Santiago del Estero.  
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César Iturre, to craft a more favorable court, because all the justices had been appointed by 
Carlos Juarez, also a Peronist but from a different faction from Iturre. In the end, the court was 
enlarged from 7 to 9 justices; Governor Iturre was able to appoint 5 out of the 9, because Justice 
Baudillo Sayago, who had also been threatened with impeachment, resigned. In 1993 Justice 
Carlos Nellar was impeached from the Supreme Court of San Luis because of wrongdoing; he 
was the only justice who faced trial, because the rest of the justices resigned before a trial could 
be scheduled. In 2004 Justice Leoni Beltran from Santiago del Estero was also impeached, in this 
case because of wrongdoing and ignorance of the law. His impeachment trial was part of the 
“court cleaning” process carried out by the governor so as to prevent a federal intervention in the 
province (El Liberal 8/8/2003). All the justices on the court (Ernesto Kozameth, Clara Herrera de 
Celiz, Jose Azar and Myriam Argibay de Bilik) were accused, but they decided to retire rather 
than go to trial. As it happened, the “cleaning” did not prevent federal intervention but rather 
accelerated it. The province of Misiones also carried out an impeachment trial, in this case 
against Justice Marta Catella; the accusations mainly focused on the justice’s decisions against 
government interests on electoral issues (Centro de Estudios Sociales y Legales 2007). The 
justice was found guilty and removed from the bench in 2006. A couple of months later the 
Attorney General, Lloyd Jorge Wickström, was also removed via an impeachment trial. Both 
trials were strongly criticized by the local Bar Association and by NGOS because of their 
violation of due process (Centro de Estudios Sociales y Legales 2007; Wickström 2008). The 
final impeachment trial took place in Neuquén in 2008, when Justice Eduardo José Badano was 
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accused of a lack of independence during the impeachment trial of Attorney General Ricardo 
Mendaña (Diario Judicial 11/8/2008).79
Governors have also triggered other institutional mechanisms of vacancy creation such as 
allowing the reappointment of justices to the federal court, terminating the terms of the justices 
and cutting back their salaries. These strategies, however, have been less widely used than the 
others. Regarding the first strategy, in 6 cases governors have allowed the reappointment of 
justices to other courts [Justices Jesús Daniel Los Arcos Vidarrueta from La Pampa (La Arena 
29/1/1994), Nerio Roberto Bonifati from Neuquén (Río Negro 10/11/1990), Ernesto Iglesias 
Hunt from Río Negro (Río Negro 13/5/1993), Oscar Eduardo Gatica from San Luis (Diario 
República 21/5/1997), Juan Pedro Cortelezzi from Tierra del Fuego (Ramonet 2007) and Emilio 
Juan Sarulle from Tucumán (La Gaceta 28/3/1995)]. La Rioja is the only province that decided 
to abruptly end the term of the justices due to a reduction in the number of sitting justices; this 
took place in 2002 after Constitutional reform was approved.
 
80
                                                 
79 Justices Roberto Fernandez and Oscar Sommariva were also accused, but they resigned before their 
trials (Río Negro 18/4/2008). 
 As a result of the constitutional 
reform, Governor Ángel Maza chose Justices Domingo Tulián, Mario Gerardo Guzmán Soria, 
80 A reduction in the number of sitting justices has also been implemented in other provinces. In Buenos 
Aires Law No. 13.662/07 reduced from 9 to 7 the sitting justices, but the vacancies were to occur when 
the justices voluntarily departed from the bench (as with Law No. 26.183/06 relating to the National 
Supreme Court). In 1995 Río Negro also reduced the number of justices (Law No. 2.910/95) from 5 to 3, 
whereupon two justices (Jorge Luis Garcia Osella and Nely Azucena Flores) retired from the bench due to 
implementation of an attractive retirement benefit law. In 1993, when San Luis reduced the number of 
justices to 5 (Law No. 4.212/93), vacancies resulted from the induced retirement of the sitting justices due 
to threats of impeachment. In Formosa in 1995 the court reduced the number of justices from 5 to 3 (Law 
No. 1.169/95), and the attractive retirement benefit facilitated the retirement of two justices. Justices 
Roberto Fernandez and Oscar Sommariva were also accused, but they resigned before trial (Río Negro 
18/4/2008). In Santiago del Estero the federal intervention of 1994 reduced the court from 9 to 5 justices, 
and finally in Misiones in 2003 the governor also decided to reduce the number of justices from 9 to 5 
(Law No. 3.964/03) by encouraging gradual departures; however, in 2005 another law reversed that 
decision (Law No. 4.245/05). For further details please refer to Castagnola (2009, Chapter 1). 
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Daniel César Herrera, and Tomás José Yoma to force their departure (Diario Judicial 
25/8/2003).81
Governors have also triggered non-institutional mechanisms of vacancy creation. One of 
the most popular informal mechanisms of vacancy creation was the threat of removal via 
impeachment. Since 1983 a total of 40 justices from 12 provinces departed from the bench, with 
San Luis being the most successful, having produced 8 vacancies in all, Neuquén was the second 
most successful with 6 vacancies, followed by Santiago del Estero, Córdoba and Salta in third 
place with 5 vacancies each. In San Luis in 1993, 6 of the justices of the Supreme Court faced 
accusations leading to impeachment due to impropriate behavior (El Diario de la República 
24/7/1993); 5 of them
 Finally, on three occasions justices departed from the bench due to cutbacks in 
salaries: in 1993 Justice Oscar Agustín del Valle Galindez from Jujuy (Pregón 30/12/1993), in 
1995 Justice Eduardo Horacio Podestá de Oro from San Juan (El Cuyo 26/12/1995), and in 2002 
Justice Carlos Andino from Tierra del Fuego (Ramonet 2007).  
82
                                                 
81 Those justices were precisely the ones who had opposed reform due to violations of constitutional 
procedure while the reform was being enacted.  
 resigned before the trial was carried out (El Diario de la República 
15/07/1993), while the justice who faced an impeachment trial, Carlos Nellar, was found guilty 
and removed from the bench (El Diario de la República 7/10/1993). The second massive 
departure due to threats of impeachment took place in 2005, when the national government was 
deciding whether or not to intervene in the province due to the excessive denunciations of 
corruption in the local government (Página 12 5/4/2004). Local authorities encouraged the 
impeachment of the Supreme Court justices with the ultimate goal of “reorganizing the 
82 Justices César Carmen Zucco, Carlos Aguillermo Maqueda, Luis Escudero Gauna, Cruz Ortiz and Luis 
Antonio Amitrano. 
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judiciary” and thus preventing the intervention. Chief Justice Guillermo Catalfamo and Justices 
Elvira del Carmen Gatica and Aníbal Asturdillo left the bench, and Attorney General Julio César 
Agúndez (La Nación 11/3/2005) also quit, which ended up dissuading the proposed intervention. 
A similar situation occurred in Santiago del Estero in 2003, when the national government was 
also considering federal intervention. In that case, the possibility of an impeachment trial 
resulted in the departure of 4 out of the 5 justices (Chief Justice Ernesto Kozameth and Justices 
Clara Herrera de Celiz, José Azar and Myriam Argibay de Bilik), while the remaining justice, 
Leoni Beltran, was formally removed through an impeachment conviction (La Nación 
17/11/2003). However, despite the massive departures of justices, in this case the federal 
intervention was carried out. Departures due to threats of impeachment also took place in 
Neuquén. In 1985 Chief Justice Helvecio Martín Barba was threatened with impeachment due to 
his unfavorable ruling on a case, and the other 4 justices of the court tendered their resignations 
in solidarity with him (Río Negro 5/11/1985). In the end, Chief Justice Barba and three other 
justices83 retired due to the political threat of impeachment. In 2008 Justices Jorge Oscar 
Sommariva and Roberto Omar Fernández also departed from the bench as the result of numerous 
threats of impeachment, with the death of the teacher Fuentealba being one of those warnings 
(CTA Neuquén 2008).84 In 1995 in Córdoba 585
                                                 
83 Justices Arturo Ernesto González Taboada, Luis Emilio Silva Zambrano and Héctor Eduardo Olcese. 
 out of the 7 justices also departed from the 
bench as a way to avoid an impeachment trial. Again, the accusations against the justices 
because of wrongdoing (Crónica 20/11/1995) took place when there was a change in the ruling 
84 Justice Eduardo José Badano, contrary to the other justices, decided to face the impeachment trial; the 
jury found him guilty. 
85 Justices Venancio Petitto, Manuel Ayán, Rogelio Berardo, Roberto Loustau Bidau and Daniel Carreras. 
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political faction (La Voz del Interior 21/11/1995). In 1990 Justice Baudillo Sayago from 
Santiago del Estero left the bench when accusations of corruption reached the legislature (El 
Liberal 20/12/1990). Governors in Salta also triggered this informal mechanism of vacancy 
creation: thus, in 1988 Justice Abraham Reston and Chief Justice Luis Adolfo Saravia departed 
due to an impeachment trial focusing on the “Saltagate,”86
                                                 
86 In the political “Saltagate” scandal, the Chief Justice of the Court and Emilio Cantarero, a government 
legislator, were tape-recorded discussing the sentences of the court. 
 and in 1990 Justices Milton Morey, 
Manuel Pecci and Marcelo Sergio O’Connor left the bench as the result of threats of 
impeachment because of their decision to declare unconstitutional the impeachment of Vice-
Governor Pedro Máximo de los Rios. In La Rioja three justices departed from the bench because 
of threats of impeachment: Justices Ramón Ruarte and Alberto Luis Baigorrí in 2004 as the 
result of Governor Ángel Maza’s desire to reshuffle the court; and Justice Francisco Ricardo 
Martínez after accusations of impeachment because of wrongdoing. However, Justice Martínez 
announced that Vice-Governor Herrera and Chief Justice Ávial had pressured him to set aside a 
sensible decision in a case of interest to them. In Tucumán in 1988 all the justices tendered their 
resignations to Governor José Donato because of strong accusations of wrongdoing and the 
possibility of impeachment, but the governor rejected them (La Gaceta 28/6/1988). Nonetheless, 
Justices Carlos Malfussi and José Ricardo Falú resigned (La Gaceta 1/7/1988). In Tierra del 
Fuego two justices resigned as the result of threats of impeachment: in 2002, Justice Ricardo 
Klass and in 2008, Justice Mario Robbio (Ramonet 2007). In Santa Fe, when Governor Carlos 
Reutemann assumed office, as a way to craft a more favorable court he started to pressure some 
justices to depart. Justices Casiano Iribarrne and Decio Ulloa resigned in 2000, when they were 
accused of wrongdoing (Página 12 Rosario 2/2/2002, Página 12 Rosario 23/3/2002). Justice 
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Sergio Eduardo Valdecantos from Jujuy was accused in 2004 of receiving a pension 
simultaneously with his salary (known as “the fake pension case”) and decided to retire from the 
bench before his impeachment trial began (Pregón 6/8/2004). In La Pampa in 2001 Justice 
Alberto Iglesias was about to face an impeachment trial because he was accused of bugging the 
other justices’ offices; however, he departed from the bench during the process (La Arena 
24/02/2001).  
Another informal mechanism of vacancy creation has been to foster internal disputes in 
the court, such as confrontations between those justices who are close to the ruling executive and 
those who are not. A total of 5 justices from the provinces of Neuquén, Catamarca and Córdoba 
departed for this reason. In Neuquén Justice Martín Pio Elustondo left the bench in 1986 due to 
internal disagreements with Justice Bonifati (Río Negro 1/10/1986). In 1989 Chief Justice Héctor 
Pedro Iribarne from Neuquén retired from the bench when other justices requested that he be 
given a psychiatric exam (Río Negro 18/8/1989). In 1992 Justice Federico Alberto Rua from 
Neuquén departed due to moral disagreements with incoming Justice Marcelo Juan Otharán (Río 
Negro 28/4/1992). In 2004 Justices Otharán and Ernesto González Taboada retired due to 
internal disagreements with justices appointed by Governor Jorge Sobich (Centro de Estudios 
Sociales y Legales 2005). In Córdoba in 2001 Justice Adan Luis Ferrer also left the bench as the 
result of internal disagreements with other justices of the court (La Voz del Interior 19/9/2001). 
An additional informal strategy of vacancy creation is the discrediting of the justices in 
the media. The provinces of Catamarca, Chubut and San Luis used this strategy to create a total 
of 6 vacancies. In San Luis, Justices Oscar Alberto Bianchi, Elias Taurant and Alberto Estrada 
Dubor resigned in 1996 as the result of an insulting newspaper campaign aimed at reshuffling the 
court. The local newspaper, owned by the governor’s family, published a photomontage of the 
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faces of the justices superimposed on the bodies of strippers, thereby leading to the departure of 
the justices (El Diario de la República 26/11/1996). In Catamarca, Chief Justices José María 
Sarreabayrouse Varangot and Antonio Miguel Lupiañez left the bench when Attorney General 
Moreno strongly criticized the justices’ behavior and rulings (La Unión 25/11/1984, La Unión 
31/10/1984). Finally, Chief Justice Raúl Martín from Chubut departed from the bench in 1990 
due to demeaning media coverage related to the impeachment trial against him (El Chubut 
1/4/1990). 
Only on two occasions have justices departed from the bench because members of their 
families were allegedly involved in a scandal. In the case of Justice Eduardo Molina from Chaco, 
the government implicated his son in a corruption scandal presumably because the justice had 
refused to halt investigation of killings in Puerto Videla attributed to the government (Diario del 
Norte 23/12/2006). In Santiago del Estero Justice Mariano Utrera was forced to resign from the 
bench when a local newspaper disclosed that her daughter, who was working in the judiciary, 
had falsified her legal diploma (El Liberal 11/6/1996).   
Finally, a total of 8 justices left the bench to become involved in politics. These 
departures represented a reward for the justices, since, contrary to the other cases, in these 
situations they were being promoted because of their strong loyalty to the governor. In the 
National Supreme Court there are also a couple of cases similar to these, as Chapter 3 described. 
In Córdoba, Justice Roberto Loustau Bidaut resigned from the bench in 1986 because he was 
offered the job of presiding over the constitutional reform assembly of 1987 (La Voz del Interior 
23/7/95); in 1990 he was reappointed to the provincial Supreme Court. Justice Octavio Cortes 
Olmedo, also from Córdoba, resigned from the bench in 1991 to become the Governor’s Minister 
in the province (La Voz del Interior 18/12/91), and Chief Justice Luis García Castrillón from San 
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Juan left to enroll in the Bolquismo Party (Diario de Cuyo 21/11/1993). In Neuquén Justice 
Aydeé Vazquez de Arguello resigned in 1993 to run as a candidate for vice-governor in the 
executive elections. Justice Vázquez was a friend of Felipe Sapag, and it is believed that her 
nomination was designed to take away votes for the candidacy of Jorge Sobich, the main rival of 
Felipe Sapag in their political faction of the MPN Party (Río Negro 7/2/1993). Justice Oscar 
Massei from Neuquén and Chief Justice Alfredo Carlos Dato from Tucumán departed from the 
bench because they were offered seats as National Deputies (Río Negro 12/5/1995, El Siglo 
16/8/2007), while Justice Carlos José Antonio Sergnese from San Luis was offered a seat in the 
National Senate (La Nación 9/4/1999). Justice Carlos Alberto Zannini resigned from the Court in 
Santa Cruz when Kirchner left the province to assume the presidency of the country; President 
Kirchner then appointed Zannini as his Legal and Technical Secretary (Abiad and Thieberger 
2005). 
Overall, the previous description reveals that governors have triggered a wide variety of 
formal and informal mechanisms of vacancy creation in the past 27 years. Moreover, the data 
suggest that governors have been inclined to activate both institutional and non-institutional 
mechanisms to induce the retirement of the justices, with the threat of impeachment being the 
most successful one among the non-institutional ones. As at the national level, more justices 
have departed from the bench because of threats of impeachment (or during the impeachment 
trial itself) than because they were actually convicted, and only a small number of justices died 
while serving on the court.  
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5.3 EXPLORING VARIATIONS IN THE PROVINCIAL JUDICIAL TURNOVER 
One indicator of the instability of justices in office is the number of times that the high courts 
were reshuffled. From the beginning of the twentieth century until 1983, the Supreme Court of 
Córdoba was reshuffled 12 times,87 and the court of Buenos Aires 8 times.88
                                                 
87 Since 1900 the court of Córdoba was reshuffled in 1914, 1925, 1947, 1949, 1955, 1958, 1960, 1963, 
1966, 1972, 1973 and 1976 (Biblioteca Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Córdoba 2007). 
 Many provincial 
Supreme Courts were created during the 1950s and early 1960s as a result of the national 
provincialization laws. The Supreme Court of Entre Ríos was created in 1950 (before was the 
Superior Tribunal) and was reshuffled 4 times until 1983; the Supreme Court of Chaco was 
reshuffled 6 times between 1954 and 1983; and the court of La Pampa was reorganized 5 times 
between 1955 and 1983 (Ghiggi 2007; Poder Judicial de la Provincia de La Pampa 2007; Poder 
Judicial de la Provincia del Chaco 2009). The high courts of Chubut, Formosa, and Santa Cruz 
were created in 1959; they were reshuffled 3 times in Chubut and Formosa and 5 times in Santa 
Cruz (Poder Judicial de la Provincia del Chubut 2007; Córdova 1994; Lamote 2007). The high 
court of Río Negro began to function in 1960, and the court of Neuquén in 1961; until 1983 these 
courts were reshuffled 5 and 4 times, respectively (Pelaez 2007; Poder Judicial de la Provincia de 
Río Negro 2009). Evidently, provincial high courts during this period were more vulnerable than 
the National Supreme Court itself, since during those years the national court experienced a total 
of 6 reshuffles (in 1947, 1955, 1958, 1966, 1973 and 1976). These preliminary data indicate that, 
88 Since 1905 the court of Buenos Aires was reshuffled in 1905, 1943, 1946, 1952, 1955, 1958, 1973 and 
1976 (Departamento Histórico-Judicial 2006). 
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prior to the democratization process in 1983, there was a legacy of reshuffling the provincial 
high courts, with many of them proving even more unstable than the national one.89
However, the legacy of reshuffling the provincial high courts did not end when 
democracy was reestablished in 1983, as happened with the national court (which was then 
reshuffled for the last time). Graph 4.2 displays the number of times that provincial high courts 
were reshuffled after the return of democracy in 1983 and 2009.
  
90
                                                 
89 Preliminary data from Mendoza reveal that, between 1941 and 1983, the high court was reshuffled 7 
times (Poder Judicial de la Provincia de Mendoza 2009). In Tucumán and Jujuy the courts were 
reshuffled 6 and 5 times, respectively, between 1950 and 1983 (Montilla Zavalía 2007; Caballero 2007).  
 The Supreme Courts of 
Santiago del Estero, Corrientes and Neuquén were reshuffled in the last 27 years between 5 and 
6 times each, which amounts to one reshuffle every 5 years and a half. It is important to point out 
that Santiago del Estero and Corrientes have twice experienced interventions by the national 
government: Corrientes in 1992 and 1999, and Santiago del Estero in 1993 and 2004. With this 
information in mind, one can see that Neuquén is the province with the greatest number of 
reshuffles without federal intervention. The province of La Rioja ranks next after Neuquén, with 
4 reshuffles. These two provinces share in common not only the high number of times that their 
courts have been reshuffled during democracy without federal intervention, but also that they 
have been ruled by the same political party since 1983 (the Movimiento Popular Neuquino in 
Neuquén and the Peronist Party in La Rioja). This evidence demonstrates that reshuffles are not 
necessarily the byproduct of changes in the regime or in the ruling party. The intra-party 
90 Reshuffles when the military regime ended in 1983 were not computed in the graph. As previously 
mentioned, all the provinces except in the case of San Juan had reshuffled their courts when democracy 
was reestablished in the country.  
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fragmentation in Neuquén and La Rioja offers a strong explanation for the instability of their 
judiciaries.  
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Figure 5.2: Reshuffles in the provincial Supreme Courts, 1983-2009 
Note: Total number of reshuffles on the Provincial Supreme Courts: Santiago del Estero 6; Corrientes and Neuquén 
5 times; La Rioja 4; Catamarca, San Juan, and San Luis 3 times; Chubut and Tierra del Fuego 2 times; Córdoba, La 
Pampa, Mendoza, Misiones, Salta, and Tucumán 1 time; and Buenos Aires, Chaco, Entre Ríos, Formosa, Jujuy, Río 
Negro, Santa Cruz, and Santa Fe did not have a reshuffle during this period. 
 
Judicial turnover is another good indicator to consider when examining the instability of 
the justices in office. Table 5.2 presents the average tenure of the provincial justices prior to and 
after 1983. For seven provinces91
                                                 
91 Catamarca, Corrientes, La Rioja, Misiones, Salta, Santiago del Estero and San Luis. 
 this study provides no data about the tenure of their justices 
prior to 1983 because of the difficulties in gathering such data. Prior to 1983, in six provinces 
(Formosa, La Pampa, Neuquén, Río Negro, Santa Cruz and Santa Fe), justices remained on the 
bench on average for less than 3 years, while in only three provinces (Buenos Aires, Mendoza 
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and San Juan) did justices serve on the bench on average for as long as 5 years. The average 
tenure for that period for the National Supreme Court justices was 6.8 years, while the average 
tenure of the provincial justices was 3.8 years. These data reveal that the instability of the 
justices at the provincial level was far more crucial than at the national level, since in some 
provinces deputies or senators served more years in office than their Supreme Court justices.  
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Table 5.2: Average tenure of Provincial Supreme Courts justices 
 
Average tenure 
before 1983 
Average tenure 
1983-2009 
Average 
improved 
Buenos Aires 5.111 8.41 9.38 
Catamarca - 2.94 3.8 
Chaco 3.32 6.25 8.47 
Chubut 4.93 6.55 6.76 
Córdoba 4.584 4.58 5.65 
Corrientes - 2.49 2.98 
Entre Ríos 4.765 7.95 8.62 
Formosa 2.626 7.27 9.19 
Jujuy 3.747 8.38 8.11 
La Pampa 2.848 9.33 9.29 
La Rioja - 4.54 4.58 
Mendoza 5.179 3.5 7.24 
Misiones - 10.4 9.74 
Neuquén 2.3110 5.84 5.27 
Río Negro 2.8111 7.20 8.23 
Salta - 4.68 4.72 
Santa Cruz 2.812 6.75 7.44 
Sgo. Del Estero - 3.17 3.26 
Santa Fe 2.9313 9.38 9.26 
San Juan 5.614 6 9.15 
San Luis - 4.67 4.95 
Tierra del Fuego N.A.* 3.78 3.81 
Tucumán 4.1315 3.37 4.31 
Prov. Average 3.84 5.35 6.23 
National 
Average 
6.85 6.50  
Note: 1Since 1905; 2since 1954; 3since 1959; 4since 1900; 5since 1951; 6since 1959; 7since 1950; 8since 1955, 9since 
1941, 10since 1961, 11since 1960, 12since 1959, 13since 1962, 14since 1962 and 15since 1950. *The Supreme Tribunal 
of Tierra del Fuego was created in 1993. 
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Since 1983 the average tenure of the provincial justices increased in most cases, except in 
Córdoba, which remained the same, and in the provinces of Mendoza and Tucumán, in which the 
average tenure was reduced. In Mendoza, the average tenure of the justices prior to 1983 was 
5.17 years, while since 1983 it has been 3.5 years. In Tucumán, justices remained in the bench an 
average of 4.13 years before 1983 and afterwards for only 3.37 years. These data are quite 
revealing, since many well-known Argentine NGOs like CELS, ADC and Poder Cuidadano, as 
well as a study published by Bill Chavez (2004), place Mendoza at the top of their rankings. One 
possible explanation for this is that 5 out of the 7 current justices on the Supreme Court of 
Mendoza have been on the bench for over 20 years92
                                                 
92 Justices Aida Kemelmajer Carlucci and Hernán Amilton Salvini were appointed to the bench in 1984, 
Justices Fernando Romano, Pedro Jorge Llorente and Jorge Horacio Nanclares in 1987, Justice Carlos 
Böhm in 1997 and Justice Alejandro Pérez Hualde in 2004 (Poder Judicial de la Provincia de Mendoza 
2009). 
; thus the average tenure on this court does 
not reflected the prior experience of the sitting justices. If their total tenure of is taken into 
account, then the average in Mendoza increases to 7.24 years. As a result of this analysis, 
comparable measures of the average tenure in the rest of the provinces were computed, but there 
were no significant changes except for Chaco and Formosa, where the average tenure increased 
by 2 years (in Chaco, to 8.47 years, and in Formosa, to 9.19 years), and for San Juan, where that 
figure increased by 3 years (to an average tenure of 9.15 years). Only in Buenos Aires, Jujuy, La 
Pampa, Misiones and Santa Fe did their justices served on average more than 8 years on the 
bench, while in Catamarca, Corrientes, Santiago del Estero, Tierra del Fuego and Tucumán their 
justices served for less than 4 years. Evidently, there is great variation in the average tenure of 
justices in the provinces, a situation that reflects the heterogeneity of cases at the subnational 
level. Even though some provinces have a longer average tenure than the justices from the 
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National Supreme Court, still the average tenure for all the provinces after 1983 is 5.35 years, 
lower than the national average tenure of 6.50 years.  
5.4 UNDERSTANDING JUDICIAL TURNOVER IN THE PROVINCIAL SUPREME 
COURTS, 1983-2009 
The objective of this section is to empirically test the theory of vacancy creation at the 
subnational level. This section uses quantitative data to systematically assess the 525 departures 
of justices from the 23 Argentine provinces since the return of democray in 1983 so as to 
determine how the incentives and preferences of the governor have influenced those retirements.  
The dataset contains original data on the provincial justices who served on the bench in 
the Argentine provinces since 1983. The empirical part of this chapter resembles the comparable 
section of Chapter 4, since it uses similar econometric models and the same main independent 
variables. The dependent variable in this case is the year in which a justice departs from the 
bench; a 1 indicates the year the justice exits, while a 0 is used otherwise.  
The main assumption is that the governors, once in office, want to have a supportive 
court so as to maximize their political power. The main hypothesis relates to the political 
proximity between the incoming governor and the sitting justices. It is argued that justices who 
share the same political preferences as the ruling governor ─ that is, friendly justices ─ are likely 
to rule in favor of the governor, whereas the opposite is true for justices who do not share the 
same political preferences as the ruling governor. As in Chapter 4, two measures of political 
proximity area used: the justice’s alignment with the governor’s political party or political 
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faction, and the ideological distance variable (alignment with the governor ─ political party or 
political faction ─ mediated by the partisan power in Congress). Briefly, the first measure 
contains two dummy variables that capture whether or not the sitting justice was appointed by 
the same political party as the current governor (first dummy variable) or the same political 
faction (second dummy variable).93 The second measure is an improved version of the alignment 
variables, since it takes into consideration the role and the partisan power of the political parties 
during the appointment process.94
Different sources of information were used for measuring political factions at the 
subnational level. Governors were considered to be from the same political faction when the 
outgoing governor or the interna faction of the governor supported the candidacy of the 
incoming governor. This information was collected from different sources depending on the 
electoral laws of the provinces. In some cases the information was taken from the primary 
elections within the parties or the sublemas in the elections (double simultaneous voting), and in 
other cases from reading the local newspapers during the electoral campaigns; subsequently, 
interviews with local experts were carried out to corroborate the information gleaned from the 
newspapers. Those cases in which incoming governors betrayed the political faction that had 
 This second measure also contains two variables that range 
from 0 to 1, with 0 referring to those justices who do not indicate an ideological distance from 
the governor’s political party (one variable) or political faction (second variable), and 1 the 
opposite.  
                                                 
93 For further details of the measurement issues of these variables please refer to Chapter4, Section 4.1.1. 
94 For further details of the measurement issues of these variables, please refer to Chapter 4, Section 4.1.2. 
Original data were collected at the subnational level regarding the composition of the legislature to create 
the improved ideological variable variable for the 23 provinces since 1983 (Vuletin and Castagnola 
2009). 
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supported them during the elections were also taken into account, as happened, for example, in 
Santiago del Estero with Governor Iturre. In those instances, even though the incoming governor 
was from the same interna as the outgoing one, it was coded as a different interna since once in 
office the incoming governor no longer belonged to the same faction as the outgoing one. 
Because at the subnational level many provinces have a single-party system, it is 
expected that the political faction variables (in terms of both alignment itself and alignment 
mediated by partisan power) matter greatly in those provinces. In order to test this hypothesis, 
the model incorporates a dummy variable that indicates with 1 the provinces in which a single 
party has been ruling the province since 1983 and 0 otherwise. The provinces with a single-party 
system are: Formosa, Jujuy, La Pampa, La Rioja, Neuquén, Río Negro, San Luis and Santa Cruz. 
The interaction between the single-party variable and the political faction variable should allow 
us to explore whether or not intra-party competition in those provinces can account for the 
stability of justices on the bench. The American literature claims that the political proximity of 
the justice to the executive can be determined by the political party of the appointing executive; 
however, this study challenges that hypothesis by claiming that the political proximity can more 
realistically be determined by the political faction of the appointing executive.    
Along with the ideological variables, the model also includes the timing hypotheses. The 
main argument is that governors want a supportive court during the first years of their 
administration, since they want to use their political leverage on the judiciary to carry out their 
policies right from the start. Two different variables are used to measure this effect: a change in 
the administration and a change in the ruling party. These dummy variables aim to account for 
the leadership and party effect; that is, significant results are expected when there is a change in 
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the ruling administration, since in most cases incoming executives inherit a court with justices 
appointed by executives from a different party. 
The model also includes the executive partisan power hypothesis in order to examine 
whether or not justices are more vulnerable to governors who are backed by strong partisan 
power in Congress. Two control variables are proposed. The first variable aims to capture the 
size of the court as a way to control for reductions in the number of sitting justices. The 
expectation is that reducing the number of sitting justices increases the probability of any single 
justice leaving office. The second variable controls for the years in which the provinces 
experienced a federal intervention; in other words, it is expected that during such intervention 
justices are more likely to depart from the bench.  
In order to test the previous hypotheses along the lines found in the literature, a survival 
model for discrete data was used (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Nixon and Haskin 2000; 
Squire 1988; Zorn and Van Winkle 2000). As in Chapter 4, included are the Carter and 
Signorino (2007) time polynomial methods to model temporal dependence, not only because 
each individual case has multiple data points and thus can exhibit temporal dependence, but also 
for the purpose of examining whether or not the stability of a justice in office changes over time. 
The units of analysis are justice-years. Table 5.3 presents the results of the survival discrete-
model using a logit estimator with fixed effects (using country dummy variables) with robust 
standard errors for both models. Because the alignment variables and the ideological distance are 
highly correlated, Model 5.1 presents the results using the alignment variables, with Model 5.2 
using the ideological distance variables.  
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Table 5.3: Survival model of judicial turnover for the Provincial Supreme Court, 1983-2009  
 Model 5.1 Model 5.2 
Alignment with the political faction  -0.264 
(0.283) 
- 
Alignment with the political party  -1.547*** 
(0.238) 
- 
Alignment with the political faction in a 
single-party province 
-0.692** 
(0.244) 
- 
 
Ideological distance from the political faction - 0.287 
(0.316) 
Ideological distance from the political party - 
 
1.434*** 
(0.270) 
Ideological distance from the political faction 
in a single-party province 
- 0.545** 
(0.250) 
Single-party province 1.628*** 
(0.470) 
0.151 
(0.573) 
New administration 0.209 
(0.155) 
0.171 
(0.153) 
New ruling party 0.353** 
(0.174) 
0.554** 
(0.178) 
Executive partisan power 0.140 
(0.222) 
0.239 
(0.224) 
National Intervention 1.957*** 
(0.331) 
2.133*** 
(0.325) 
Size of the court -0.186** 
(0.067) 
-0.188** 
(0.067) 
t 0.304*** 
(0.094) 
0.406*** 
(0.094) 
t2 -0.027** 
(0.008) 
-0.035*** 
(0.000) 
t3 0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Intercept -1.187 
(0.750) 
-3.310*** 
(0.707) 
N 3489 3478 
Wald X2(df) 399.17(33) 367.30(33) 
Prob.> X2 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.151 0.141 
Log-Likelihood -1094.085 -1101.160 
Note: *Significant at p<.10; **at p<.05; ***at p<.001. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Country dummy 
variables are not reported due to space limitations. 
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The results from Model 5.1 indicate an interesting pattern of loyalty relations between 
justices and governors. The interpretation of the coefficients deserves special attention because 
of the interaction coefficient between alignment with a political faction and a single-party 
province. The fact that the coefficient for alignment with the political faction is not statistically 
significant suggests that there is no meaningful relationship between those justices who are 
aligned with the governor in provinces without a single-party system and their leaving the bench. 
In other words, in provinces with a multiparty-system, the stability of the justices is not 
necessarily related to the appointing political faction of the governor.95 The coefficient for the 
interaction variable did prove statistically significant and in the expected direction, meaning that 
in provinces with a single-party system being aligned with the political faction of the governor 
reduces the probability of the justice departing from the bench.96
The dummy variables for changes in the ruling party and single-party system produced 
statistically significant results. This suggests that, during the first two years after a new party 
comes to power, justices are more likely to depart from the bench. The coefficient for change in 
 This suggests that, when there 
is no change in the ruling party, justices are not necessarily stable on the bench since in those 
situations the stability of the justices is more closely related to the political faction of the 
appointing authority. Finally, the variable for alignment with a political party also proved 
statistically significant and in the expected direction, which reveals that a justice being aligned 
with the political party of the governor can indeed reduce the probability of his or her leaving the 
bench. 
                                                 
95 When testing for the double effect of being in the same faction and party of the president the probability 
of a justice departing from the bench reduced (it was used Lincom command in STATA). 
96 The Lincom command in STATA was used to test for the interaction effect of the variables.  
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the administration is not statistically significant, which implies that the probability of a justice 
departing from the bench increases does not necessarily when there is a change in the 
administration, but rather when a new ruling party comes into power. It is important to point out 
that the effect of single party province is greater than expected justices are more likely to depart 
from the bench in those provinces regardless of the political proximity with the ruling governor. 
These results are consistent with those from Chapter 4. Secondly, being a justice in a province 
with a single-party system who is not aligned with the political faction of the governor also 
increases the probability of that justice departing from the bench.  
The variable for the executive partisan party is not statistically significant, suggesting that 
the more political competition a province has, the less likely it is that a justice will depart from 
the bench. This results corroborates those of Chapter 4 since in fact, there is no relationship 
between the partisan power of the executive and the probability that a justice will depart from the 
bench. Moreover, this lack of finding is consistent with a recent study about provincial courts in 
Argentina that shows that political competition does not protect judicial stability either (Leiras et 
al. 2009). The dummy variable for intervention also showed significant results in the expected 
direction, suggesting that, during a federal intervention, justices are more likely to depart from 
the bench. The variable for the size of the court also corroborates the findings in Chapter 4, since 
it reveals that changes in the number of sitting justices can also affect the stability of the justices, 
as enlarging the number reduces the probability of a given justice to depart from the bench, while 
the opposite is true when governors decide to reduce the number of justices. Finally, the 
temporal duration terms are significant, revealing the existence of a temporal dependence on 
justices’ tenure or a non-linear evolution over time. The log-odds of judicial departures over time 
reveals that the risk for departing from the bench increases around year seven but the hazard rate 
161 
 
expands significantly after the second decade in office, what may suggests the effect of the 
justice’s age for retirement.  
Model 5.2 from Table 5.3 presents the results of the survival discrete-model using a logit 
estimator with fixed effects and robust standard errors for the ideological distance variables. The 
results corroborate those of Model 5.1 except in the case of the single-party province.97
In a single-party province, when there is a change in the ruling administration and the 
justice is from the same political faction as the incoming governor, the probability of the justice 
departing from the bench in a given year is 15%, while if the justice is not aligned with the 
political faction of the incoming governor the probability increases to 27%, almost the double. 
When there is no change in the ruling administration and the justice is aligned with the political 
faction of the governor, then the probability of the justice departing from the bench is 9%, while 
if the justice is not aligned with the governor the probability increases to 17%. Consideration of 
the scenario for those provinces with a multi or two-party system yields the following: when 
there is a change in the ruling party and the justice is from a different party, the probability of 
 Because 
Models 5.1 and 5.2 are non-linear, for a substantive interpretation predicted probabilities were 
computed for the justices under different circumstances using the results from Model 5.1. On 
average (i.e., holding all the variables at their mean), a justice has 0.08 probability of departing 
from the bench, but that probability increases in different political contexts. First consideration 
will be given below to the scenario for a justice serving on a court in a province with a single-
party system, and then to one for a justice serving in a province with a multi or two-party system.  
                                                 
97 Model 5.2 has less number of observations because Justice Raúl Eduardo Arangure from Entre Ríos is 
excluded from the model since he entered the Court in 1976 and there is no data available about the 
executive partisan power at that time. 
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departing from the bench in a given year is 25%. However if the sitting justice had survived a 
changed in the ruling party (i.e. the justice was not aligned with the previous governor) and now 
the justice is aligned with the same political faction as the incoming governor, the probability of 
the justice leaving the bench is 5% (less than the average probability) while if the justice is from 
a different faction of the same party the probability increases slightly to 7%. In provinces with 
political competition governors prefers to deal with justices nominated by them rather than by 
justices nominated by the opposition. 
 Evidently, the pattern of political loyalties between the justices and the provincial 
governor varies according to the type of party system. Being aligned with the political faction of 
the governor matters more in those provinces in which a single party has been ruling, while 
alignment with the political party itself matters more in those provinces in which there is 
political competition. What this finding reveals is that intra-party competition in provinces with a 
single-party system plays a central role in accounting for judicial turnover, since it can have the 
same effect as inter-party competition in provinces with multi-or two party systems. The 
literature about provincial parties in Argentina have recognized that in subnational politics it is 
often a small group of leaders or a single person (in those extreme single party cases like the 
province of San Luis) who generally dominates the political parties (De Luca et al. 2002; Jones 
2002) but there is no systematic analysis of how these leaders compete for power; nor the logic 
of intra-party competition. Even though intra-party competition at the provincial level has not 
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been extensively studied,98
So far it has been demonstrated that provincial justices both in single-party and in 
multiple-party provinces have high probabilities of departing from the bench when a new 
administration takes office. But are incoming governors more likely to craft a supportive court in 
some provinces than in others? Table 5.4 displays the predicted probabilities of the provincial 
justices’ leaving the Supreme Court, in order to explore in which provinces governors are more 
likely to craft a supportive court. Corrientes, Santiago del Estero, Catamarca, Tucumán, Neuquén 
and Tierra del Fuego rank the highest in the table. It is important to recall that federal 
interventions were carried out in Corrientes, Santiago del Estero and Catamarca, perhaps 
explaining their high position in the rank order. Neuquén is a province with a single-party system 
while Tucumán and Tierra del Fuego have a multi-party system. This finding corroborates that 
both intra-party and inter-party competition matters greatly, not only for judicial turnover but 
also for local politics. Even though Mendoza is traditionally considered by scholars and NGOs as 
the most independent and stable judiciary in the country, Table 5.4 reveals that, in fact, other 
provinces rank higher.  
 the existing research suggests that the political competition within the 
province will depend basically upon patronage, pork barrel politics and clientelism.  
 
                                                 
98 Steven Levitsky (2003, 2001a, 2001b) has extensively analyzed intra-party competition in the Peronist 
Party organization, however, mainly at the national level. 
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Table 5.4: Probability of a justice leaving the Supreme Court, by province 
 Pr. of a justice leaving the court 
Buenos Aires 0.09 
Catamarca 0.18 
Chaco 0.08 
Chubut 0.11 
Córdoba 0.13 
Corrientes 0.22 
Entre Ríos 0.09 
Formosa 0.09 
Jujuy 0.09 
La Pampa 0.07 
La Rioja 0.16 
Mendoza 0.11 
Misiones 0.07 
Neuquén 0.17 
Río Negro 0.10 
Salta 0.14 
Santa Cruz 0.11 
Sgo. del Estero 0.21 
Santa Fe 0.08 
San Juan 0.07 
San Luis 0.14 
Tierra del Fuego 0.17 
Tucumán 0.18 
  
Among the provinces that rank lowest in the table are La Pampa, Misiones and San Juan. 
It is important to recall that on these provinces the same faction or a couple of factions have been 
ruling the province most of the time and also in the case of La Pampa and San Juan governors 
have been able to craft a supportive court by enlarging the number of sitting justices. 
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5.5 CONCLUSION 
The present chapter uses original data to examine the judicial turnover at the subnational level by 
paying special attention to the way governors have traditionally induced the departure of justices 
as well as the reasons that motivated those retirements. The preliminary data collected for 
provincial justices who served on the bench before 1983 revealed that governors have recurrently 
manipulated the conformation of the courts by reshuffling the justices. Before 1983, the average 
judicial turnover in the provinces was lower than the average turnover at the National Supreme 
Court, suggesting that the political manipulation of justices was more dramatic at the subnational 
level. After 1983, when democracy was reestablished in the country, governors kept reshuffling 
the courts and provincial justices continued being highly unstable on the bench. However, even 
though the average tenure of the justices improved upon the restoration of democracy, progress 
was not as significant as might have been expected. As Chapter 4 disclosed, democracy has not 
necessarily produced more stable judiciaries in Argentina.  
The systematization of the qualitative data gathered from primary and secondary sources 
about the different strategies used by governors to induce the departure of justices from the 
bench shows that governors created vacancies on the Court by other means besides the 
impeachment trials highlighted in the literature. In fact, the impeachment trial was only one 
strategy of vacancy creation among others, as it turns out that only 3% of departures resulted 
from an impeachment trial. Because impeachment removals had been systematically reported by 
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the local newspapers,99
Finally, the survival models reveal that the incentives and preferences of the governors 
account for the degree of judicial stability in office. As Chapter 4 demonstrated, governors do 
not trust justices appointed by other governors, especially if they belong to another political 
faction. Because at the provincial level there is a great heterogeneity of cases, it was possible to 
elucidate how political loyalties work more specifically under different scenarios. On the one 
hand, in provinces with a single-party system, the instability of the justices can be explained 
because of intra-party competition, since in those cases governors would not trust justices 
appointed by a different political faction. This suggests that intra-party competition can have the 
same effect as inter-party competition in a province featuring a multi-party system. On the other 
hand, in provinces that do have a multi-party system (or, at least, a two-party system), judicial 
turnover results from the competition between the parties and in some provinces also within the 
factions (as in the cases of Córdoba, where the change of administration from Eduardo Angeloz 
to Ramón Mestre, both from the UCR, produced a reshuffling in the court, or Santiago del 
 that 9% could be even lower, if one takes into account the fact that data 
were found regarding only 33% of the departures. Graph 4.1 illustrates that governors triggered 
widely diverse strategies of formal and informal mechanisms of vacancy creation, one of the 
most successful being the offer of attractive retirement benefits. It is precisely by examining 
those strategies that it is possible to shed light on the way governors were able to craft supportive 
courts.  
                                                 
99 Because in many cases provincial impeachment trials appeared in provincial jurisprudence, local 
jurisprudence was also consulted to ensure that no impeachment trial was missing. Abeledo Perrot (Lexis 
Nexis) and Sistema Argentino de Informática Jurídica (SAIJ) databases were carefully checked.  
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Estero, where the confrontation between Governors Iturre and Juarez, both from the PJ, resulted 
in the enlargement of the court and the removal of 3 justices).  
Even though the political proximity between the governor and the sitting justices can 
account for the stability of the justices on the bench, the models proved, in addition, that the 
governor’s court-packing capacity can also account for this phenomenon. The enlargement or 
reduction in the number of sitting justices results in a significant factor for understanding the 
variations in judicial stability. Governors have frequently used formal mechanisms of vacancy 
creation not only to induce departures but also in some cases to create new seats on the court. 
The qualitative data revealed that governors had systematically used institutional mechanisms to 
craft a supportive court, a strategy that often involved changes in the provincial constitutions or 
in the law. The objective of the next chapter is precisely to examine whether or not these changes 
in the institutional rules can affect the stability of the justices on the bench. 
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6.0  THE INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF JUDICIAL TURNOVER AT THE 
SUBNATIONAL LEVEL 
 
 
The previous chapters examined whether or not politics affects judicial turnover at the levels of 
both the National and Provincial Supreme Courts in Argentina. Overall, the evidence revealed 
that politics does contribute to explaining the instability of the justices on the bench. However, 
the evidence from the previous chapters also indicates that institutional rules appear to be a 
significant factor affecting the instability of the justices, because governors have recurrently 
changed the regulations regarding the number of sitting justices. Not yet examined is the extent 
to which institutional rules themselves might promote or impede judicial turnover.  
Argentina is a federal country divided into 23 provinces and the autonomous city of 
Buenos Aires. The provinces are also autonomous, retaining all the powers not specifically 
entrusted to the national government; this allows them to dictate their own constitutions, 
respecting always the principles established in the National Constitution (Bielsa and Graña 
1999). It is precisely this feature that has produced a high degree of internal heterogeneity in 
constitutional design and led to different patterns of judicial organization as well. This chapter, 
based on the variations in institutional organization both across provinces and within each 
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province, explores how different institutional rules influence the stability of justices on the 
bench.  
Below are analyses of original data gathered from 54 provincial constitutions and laws 
from 1983 to 2009 related to the functioning of the local supreme courts.100
6.1 EVOLUTION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL RULES OF THE SUPREME COURTS 
FROM 1983 TO 2009 
 The analysis of the 
legal norms and constitutions focuses on the type of tenure system, procedures for appointment 
and removal, the court-packing capacity of executives, and the responsibilities of the courts, 
among others. The next section provides descriptive information for examining the institutional 
evolution of the provincial courts in terms of the function of the supreme courts, while the 
following section presents the results of a negative binomial model used to test the institutional 
determinants of judicial turnover at the subnational level in the last 27 years. 
6.1.1 The capacity of executives to pack the court 
The original text of the National Constitution of 1853 (Article 91) established a fixed number of 
nine sitting justices for the National Supreme Court. With the constitutional reform of 1860, 
however, that part of the article was eliminated, and there has been no subsequent specific 
regulation on that topic. In developing democracies, the vagueness regarding this feature is 
                                                 
100 The author is indebted to Juan Manuel Benvenuto, Maximiliano Cerra, Gabriela Rendon, and 
Jacqueline Goldszer for their research assistance in gathering the data. For a more comprehensive analysis 
of the provincial normative, please refer to Castagnola (2009).  
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generally associated with institutional rules highly vulnerable to political manipulation, since the 
total number of sitting justices can be modified by law. The provinces of Buenos Aires, 
Corrientes, Salta (since 1986), Misiones, and Tucumán have followed the same institutional 
design as the national government (see Table 6.1, column 1), while the rest of the provinces have 
implemented variations on that rule. Table 6.1 displays the different institutional rules adopted 
by the provinces between 1983 and 2009 regarding the court-packing capacity of the executive.   
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Table 6.1: Institutional evolution regarding the court-packing capacity of executives, 1983-2009 
  
No 
specification 
Fixed number 
of sitting 
justices 
Minimum number 
of sitting justices 
 Range in number 
of sitting justices 
Buenos Aires 
C1934, 
C1994   
 
Catamarca   C1966, C1988  
Chaco   C1957, C1994  
Chubut    C1957, C1994 
Córdoba  
C1923, C1987, 
C2001  
 
Corrientes 
C1960, 
C1993 
 
 
 
Entre Ríos   C1933  
Formosa 
 
 
C1957, C1991, 
C2003 
 
Jujuy   C1986 C1935 
La Pampa   C1960, C1994  
La Rioja 
 C2008  C1933, C1986, 
C1998, C2002 
Mendoza   C1965, C1997  
Misiones C1958    
Neuquén  C2006 C1957, C1993  
Río Negro   C1957 C1988 
Salta 
C1986, 
C1998 
C1929 
 
 
San Juan  C1927 C1986  
San Luis    C1962, C1987 
Santa Cruz   
C1957, C1994, 
C1998 
 
Santa Fe   C1962  
Sgo. del 
Estero  
C1960 C1986, C2002, 
C2005 
 
Tierra del 
Fuego   
C1991  
Tucumán 
C1907, 
C1990, 
C2006   
 
Nation 
C1853, 
1994     
 
Note: The years when the constitutions were adopted appear in the columns.  
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One institutional variation of the rule clearly specifies the total number of sitting justices 
(Table 6.1, column 2). This rule can have a more favorable effect on developing democracies, 
since the clarity of the norm could prevent the political manipulation of the courts; that is, only 
through constitutional reform would it be possible to change the total number of sitting justices. 
Constitutional reforms are more difficult to carry out than changes in the law, since they require 
more political negotiation and more time. As Table 6.1 shows, with the return of the democracy 
to the country in 1983, the provinces of Córdoba, Salta, San Juan, and Santiago del Estero 
restricted the court-packing capacity of the executive; however, as time went by, only the 
province of Córdoba maintained that rule, while the other three provinces adopted more 
imprecise regulations, empowering the executive and the legislature to manipulate the 
composition of the court. As a matter of fact, shortly after the changes in the constitutional rules, 
these provinces did increase the number of sitting justices on their courts. Nevertheless, La Rioja 
(since 2008) and Neuquén (since 2006) moved in the opposite direction from Salta, San Juan, 
and Santiago del Estero. In the last round of constitutional reform, these two provinces decided 
to restrict the court-packing capacity of the executive by clearly establishing in their 
constitutions the total number of sitting justices. Through all these shifts in the constitutional 
rules, only the province of Córdoba was consistently able to limit executive power, while the 
other provinces followed that pattern only sporadically.  
The second variation in the national government rule, and the most popular, established a 
minimum number of sitting justices on the court (Table 6.1, column 3). This rule, like that 
adopted by the national government, is also vulnerable to political manipulation due to the lack 
of specificity of the maximum number of justices. Currently, 57% of the provinces have adopted 
the maximum or minimum rule, and 22% the no-specification rule, revealing that politicians 
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have preferred a certain ambiguity in institutional design in 79% of the provinces. Finally, the 
third variation established a minimum and maximum number of justices on the court (Table 6.1, 
column 4). In this case, executives have a restricted capacity to pack the court, since there is a 
maximum number of sitting justices established in the constitution. Currently, four provinces 
have adopted this rule. 
Even though most of the provinces have adopted imprecise institutional rules (i.e., they 
have not restricted the executive’s court-packing and unpacking capacity), one may still ask how 
many provinces have indeed changed the total number of sitting justices. Table 6.2 shows how 
many times the provinces have either increased or decreased the number. Since 1983 fourteen 
provinces have changed the total number of sitting justices in their courts: seven of them 
(Buenos Aires, Chubut, Córdoba, Entre Ríos, La Pampa, San Juan and Santa Cruz) did it once; 
four (Río Negro, Salta, San Luis, and Santiago del Estero) and the national government did it 
twice; two (Formosa and La Rioja) did it three times; and the province of Misiones changed the 
total number of justices four times.101
 
 It is important to mention that, out of the nine provinces 
(Catamarca, Chaco, Corrientes, Jujuy, Mendoza, Neuquén, Santa Fe, Tierra del Fuego and 
Tucumán) that did not change the number of justices, the province of Tierra del Fuego came into 
the sample only in 1992, after its incorporation as an autonomous province. Overall, more than 
half of the provinces (61%) changed the total number of sitting justices at least once, which 
suggests that executives have indeed manipulated the composition of the courts.  
                                                 
101 For further details about the reasons why the provinces modified their total number of justices, please 
refer to Castagnola (2009).  
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Table 6.2: Number of times the provinces changed the total number of sitting justices on their Supreme 
Courts between 1983 and 2008 
No change One change Two changes Three or more changes 
1. Catamarca 
2. Chaco 
3. Corrientes 
4. Jujuy 
5. Mendoza 
6. Neuquén 
7. Santa Fe 
8. Tierra del Fuego 
9. Tucumán 
1. Buenos Aires   
(L13662/07) 
2. Chubut (L5475/06) 
3. Córdoba (C1987) 
4. Entre Ríos 
(L8065/88) 
5. La Pampa 
(L1407/92) 
6. San Juan (C1986) 
7. Santa Cruz 
(L2404/95) 
 
1. Nation 
(L23774/90, 
L26183/06) 
2. Río Negro 
(L2245/88, 
L2910/95) 
3. Salta (L6985/98, 
D3367/07, 
L7515/08) 
4. San Luis 
(L4929/91, 
L4212/93) 
5. Santiago del 
Estero (L5861/91, 
L6011/94) 
1. Formosa (L712/87, 
L1169/95, L1354/00) 
2. La Rioja 
(L5635/91, L7249/02, 
C2008) 
3. Misiones 
(L2441/87, L2819/90, 
L3964/03, L4245/05) 
Note: “L” corresponds to the number of the law, followed by the year of its going into effect; “C” corresponds to the 
year of the provincial constitution; and “D” corresponds to the number of the decree, followed by the year of its 
going into effect. 
 
Moreover, Table 6.2 reveals that, during the last 27 years, there were 27 changes in the 
total number of sitting justices both at the national and subnational levels, suggesting an average 
of at least one enlargement or reduction per year. Have these changes become more frequent 
since the enlargement of the National Supreme Court in 1990? Before 1990 there were six 
changes in the total number of justices, while during the nineties there were ten changes, and 
from 2000 to 2009 there were eleven changes. This suggests that changing the number of justices 
serving the courts was a steady characteristic of the Argentine judiciaries rather than something 
that resulted after the change in the National Supreme Court in 1990. In conclusion, since the 
return of democracy, most of the provinces (87%) have adopted institutional rules that do not 
clearly establish the total number of sitting justices; moreover, more than half of the provinces 
(61%) changed that number at least once.  
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6.1.2 Tenure system for the justices 
Both the national and provincial constitutions establish that justices shall hold office during good 
behavior, as a way to guarantee the independence of the justices from political interference. 
However, not all of the provinces have guaranteed life tenure to their justices; rather, many of 
them have adopted fixed-term tenure. Lifetime appointments produce job security and help 
ensure the court’s independence from the President and Congress. Even though life tenure is 
generally associated with having justices independent of the political hierarchy, fixed tenures can 
also have the same effect, if the length of the tenure does not coincide exactly with the tenure of 
the appointing authorities. When the tenure of the justice does coincide with that of the 
appointing authorities, then there is potential for abuse (Madison et al. 1787-1788). Table 6.3 
displays the different tenure systems adopted by the Argentine provinces since 1983. Although 
Salta is the only province that still has fixed-term tenure for its justices, in 1983 there were five 
other provinces that also had fixed terms: Catamarca until 1988, Jujuy and San Juan until 1986, 
La Rioja until 1998, and Tucumán until 1991. Except for La Rioja, the other four provinces 
modified the tenure system in their first constitutional reform, while La Rioja did so in its second 
reform. 
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Table 6.3: Institutional evolution regarding the tenure systems in the provinces, 1983-2009 
 
Life tenure Fixed tenure 
Nation (C1853, 1994)  
Buenos Aires (C1934, 1994)  
Catamarca (C1988) Catamarca (C1966): 4 years on probation 
Chaco (C1957, C1994)  
Chubut (C1957, C1994)  
Córdoba (C1923, C1987, 
C2001)  
Corrientes (C1960, C1993, 
C2007)  
Entre Ríos (C1933)  
Formosa (C1957, C1991, 
C2003)  
Jujuy (C1986) Jujuy (C1935): 6 years with reelection 
La Pampa(C1960, C1994)  
La Rioja (C1998, C2002, 
C2008) 
La Rioja (C1933): 1 year on probation 
La Rioja (C1986): 6 years with reelection 
Mendoza (C1965, C1997)  
Misiones (C1958)  
Neuquén (C1957, C1993, 
C2006)  
Río Negro (C1957, 1988)  
San Juan (C1986) San Juan (C1927): 3 years on probation 
- Salta (C1929, C1986, C1998): 6 years with reelection 
San Luis (C1962, C1987)  
Santa Cruz (C1957,C1994, 
C1998)  
Santa Fe (C1962)  
Sgo. Del Estero (C1960, C1986, 
C2002, C2005)  
Tierra del Fuego (C1991)  
Tucumán (C1991, C2006) Tucumán (C1907): 10 years 
Note: The years of adoption of the constitutions appear in parentheses.  
 
In Catamarca, until the constitutional reform of 1988, the justices were appointed for a 4-
year term trial period; once those justices had completed the trial period, in the absence of any 
disciplinary action they automatically obtained life tenure (Article 195, Constitution 1988). 
Between 1983 and 1988 only Justice Mario Alejandro Guzmán completed the four-year trial 
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period, since the other justices resigned earlier due to political pressure. It is important to 
mention that the term of the governor and legislatures in Catamarca coincides exactly with the 
length of tenure of the justices, producing an obvious potential for abuse.  
La Rioja, until the constitutional reform of 1998, had a fixed-term tenure system, but that 
was changed as time went by. In 1983 the justices were appointed for a one-year trial period; if 
they survived that period, they automatically obtained life tenure (Article 98, Constitutional 
Province 1933). Evidently, the trial period system can undermine the independence of the 
justices, since their confirmation to the bench will depend completely upon their prior 
performance. The trial period system can be conceived of as a safety net mechanism for the 
appointing authorities, because they have the capacity to remove disloyal justices from the bench 
without a complicated institutional process. According to the data from the Supreme Court of La 
Rioja, all the justices appointed under that rule passed the one-year trial period; however, four 
out of the five justices tendered their resignations during the constitutional reform in 1986 when 
the tenure system changed. The reform of 1986 represented a significant change in the 
independence of the provincial justices, since the province adopted a system of six years of 
tenure with the possibility of reelection. Between 1986 and 1998 11 justices were appointed to 
the Court; five of them completed their terms, and two of these (Justices Domingo Tulian and 
Vicente Miguel Delonardi) were reelected to the bench. Less than half of the justices were able 
to complete their terms (the average tenure of a justice for that period being 3.7 years), and the 
reelection option was not frequently used. Even though in 1998 La Rioja adopted a life tenure 
system, the average length of tenure for the justices was not affected, since on average justices 
remained in office for no more than 5.8 years.  
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Until 1986 San Juan also had a fixed-term system, in this case a three-year trial period 
with the possibility of obtaining life tenure afterwards. This province was the only one that did 
not remove any justices upon the return of democracy in 1983, because the governor during the 
last military regime happened to belong to the same family as the newly elected governor. That 
is why the three justices obtained life tenure, one of them (Justice Eduardo Aguiar Aranciva) in 
1984 and the other two (Justices Carlos Graffigna Latino and José Héctor Baistrocchi) in 1985. 
Jujuy, Salta and Tucumán are the provinces with the longest fixed tenure as well as those 
that did not implement a trial period system. In the case of Jujuy, until 1986 justices were 
appointed for a fixed term of six years with the possibility of reelection, while in the case of 
Tucumán, until 1991 justices were appointed for a ten-year term. In both provinces the terms of 
the justices did not coincide with those of the appointing authorities; moreover, in contrast to the 
other provinces that also had fixed-term tenure, justices were not appointed for a trial period. The 
justices appointed in Jujuy remained on the bench during the constitutional reform of 1986 and 
continued serving for additional years, some of them having been reelected. In Tucumán none of 
the justices appointed between 1983 and 1990 were able to complete their terms; in fact, justices 
remained on the bench on average for less than three years, serving less time than a legislator or 
a governor.  
Salta is the only province that still has a fixed term for justices, in this case a six-year 
term with the possibility of reelection; until 1998 those justices who were reelected automatically 
obtained life tenure. Between 1983 and 2009, 32 justices were appointed to the Supreme Court 
of Salta, but only 12 of them (37.5%) completed their terms. As in the case of La Rioja, the 
reelection rate was also low, since only four justices were reelected, three of them (Justices 
Rodolfo Urtubey, Guillermo Posadas, and María Cristina Garros Martínez) once, and the other 
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one (Justice Edgardo Vicente) twice. Only Justice Urtubey obtained life tenure, since the other 
reelections took place after the constitutional reform of 1998, at which time the provision for life 
tenure was eliminated. Since 1983 justices in La Rioja have remained on the bench for an 
average of 4.8 years. It would seem that the length of tenure did not have a clear influence on the 
stability of the justices. 
Overall, most of the Argentine provinces adopted the life tenure system, as those that 
started with a fixed term gradually changed to the life one. The evidence reveals that, in those 
provinces that had fixed terms, the justices almost never finished their mandates, with average 
tenure ranging between 3 to 5 years regardless of the length of the terms.  
6.1.3 The appointing process 
In Argentina, both the national and subnational Supreme Court justices are appointed indirectly. 
The judiciary is the only branch of government in which its members are not democratically 
elected by the people but rather are selected by the other branches. It is precisely this 
characteristic that may engender doubts regarding the legitimacy of the justices’ decisions 
(Gargarella 1997). Most of the provinces have adopted the congressional model of judicial 
appointment in which the executive nominates the candidate and the Senate confirms the 
nomination.102
                                                 
102 In unicameral provinces, it is the entire legislature that approves the candidate. 
 The only exceptions to this mechanism are the provinces of Chaco, Río Negro 
(since 1988), San Juan (since 1986) and Tierra del Fuego, in which either the executive or the 
legislature is absent from the process.  
180 
 
In Chaco and Tierra del Fuego, the Council of Magistrates presents a short list of 
candidates, and the executive is in charge of appointing one of them. Even though in this process 
the legislature is not explicitly present, some of the members of the council are legislators. The 
council of Chaco has a total of seven members: two justices from the local Supreme Court, two 
legislators, two lawyers from the local Bar Association, and the Attorney General. In the case of 
Tierra del Fuego, the council also has a total of seven members: one justice from the local 
Supreme Court, two lawyers from the local Bar Association, the Attorney General, two 
legislators, and one representative from the executive branch.  
In Río Negro, justices are appointed by a council specially created for that task. It is 
composed of the governor, three lawyers from the local Bar Association, and three legislators. In 
the case of a tie, the vote of the governor counts double (Article 204, Constitution 1988). Finally, 
San Juan adopted in 1986 a special mechanism of appointment in which the governor is not part 
of the process. In this province the Council of Magistrates is in charge of presenting a short list 
of candidates, while the local legislature appoints one of them. The council has a total of five 
members: two lawyers from the local Bar Association, one legislator, one justice from the local 
Supreme Court, and one representative from the executive branch.  
Even though some researchers affirm that, when the judiciary is involved in the 
appointment procedure, there is little space for politicians to manipulate the appointment (Ríos-
Figueroa 2006), in the previously mentioned four provinces participation of the judiciary has not 
necessary prevented manipulation. In Río Negro and Tierra del Fuego, four out of the seven 
members of their councils (57%) are politicians, while in Chaco three out of seven (43%) and in 
San Juan two out of five (40%) are likewise. In the first two provinces it is difficult to suppose 
that politicians would not manipulate the appointment process, since they represent more than 
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half of the total members and, consequently, of the votes. In the case of Chaco, it is important to 
recall that, even though this province was the first one to introduce the council into the 
appointment process, it was not until 1994 that the council in fact started to participate therein. 
Before that year, justices were appointed according to the congressional model, due to lack of 
establishment of the council (Article 164 from the 1957 Constitution and Article 158 from the 
1994 Constitution). Nevertheless, the three appointments that took place in Chaco after 1994103
Another important aspect of the appointment process, along with the authorities’ 
involvement, is the voting procedure either to select the candidate (in those provinces with a 
short list) or to confirm the nomination (in those cases with a congressional model). At the 
national government level, from 1983 until the present time, the required majority for confirming 
candidates has undergone one change. Before the constitutional reform of 1994, a candidate was 
approved by a simple majority of the votes of the Senators present, while after the reform the 
candidate required 2/3 of the votes of the members present. The ultimate goal of the reform was 
to increase the consensus in the appointment process, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of the 
 
have been strongly criticized by the press and civil society. Local NGOs have denounced the 
violation of the process in the selection of the candidates, presenting claims against the 
constitutionality of the process and requesting removal of the justices (Centro de Estudios 
Nelson Mandela 2008). As of the end of 2009, those claims were still unresolved. Overall, 
variations in institutional design have not necessarily produced appointments independent of the 
political power structure. 
                                                 
103 Justice Rubén Avalos was appointed in 1997, Justice Ricardo Franco in 1998, and Justice Rolando 
Toledo in 2000. 
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justices. Table 6.4 displays the institutional evolution at the subnational and national levels 
regarding the majority required in the appointing process.  
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Table 6.4: Institutional evolution regarding the required majority for appointing justices to the Court, 1983-
2009 
 
Simple majority of 
members present 
Simple majority 
of total members 
2/3 majority of 
members present 
2/3 majority of total 
members 
Buenos Aires C1934 (S) C1994 (S)   
Catamarca C1966 (S), C1988 (S)    
Chaco  
  C1957 (JC), C1994 
(JC) 
Chubut C1957 (L)   C1994 (L) 
Córdoba 
C1923 (S), C1987 (S), 
C2001 (L) 
   
Corrientes C1960 (S), C1993 (S)    
Entre Ríos C1933 (S)    
Formosa 
C1957 (L), C1991 (L), 
C2003 (L) 
   
Jujuy C1935 (L), C1986 (L)    
La Pampa C1960 (L), C1994 (L)    
La Rioja 
C1933 (L), C1986 (L), 
C1998 (L), C2002 (L), 
C2008 (L) 
   
Mendoza C1965 (S), C1997 (S)    
Misiones    C1958 (L) 
Neuquén C1957 (L), C1993 (L)  C2006 (L)  
Río Negro 
C1957, (L) C1988 
(JC) 
   
Salta 
C1929 (S), C1986 (S), 
C1998 (S) 
   
San Juan 
C1927 (JC), C1986 
(JC) 
   
San Luis C1962 (L), C1987 (S)    
Santa Cruz 
C1957 (L), C1994 (L), 
C1998 (L) 
   
Santa Fe C1962 (JS)    
Sgo. del 
Estero 
C1960 (L), C1986 (L), 
C2002 (L), C2005 (L) 
   
Tierra del 
Fuego 
C1991 (JC)  
 
 
Tucumán C1990 (L), C2006 (L)  C1907 (S)  
Nation C1853 (S)  C1994 (S)  
Note: The years of adoption of the constitutions appear in the columns. S = Senate, L = Unicameral Legislature, JS = Joint 
session of both chambers of Congress, and JC = Judicial Council. 
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The provinces adopted four different types of majorities: a simple majority of members 
present, a simple majority of total members, a 2/3 majority of members present, and a 2/3 
majority of total members. Evidently, the greater the number of votes required, the more difficult 
it is to reach consensus, but the greater the legitimacy of the justice appointed. If consensus was 
hard to obtain, then political parties would have to negotiate with other parties and thus moderate 
their preferences for specific candidates. As Table 6.4 shows, by 1983 most of the provinces had 
adopted a rule calling for confirmation by a simple majority of members present; the exceptions 
were Tucumán, requiring a 2/3 majority of members present, and Chaco and Misiones, 
specifying a 2/3 majority of total members. In 1990 Tucumán decided to require confirmation by 
only a simple majority of members present, thus adopting the same procedure as the national 
government. However, since 1994 some provinces have decided to follow the same 
constitutional reform as the national government, thereby increasing the level of consensus 
needed for the appointment. Buenos Aires in 1994 slightly increased the majority required by 
specifying a simple majority of total members rather than of members present; Neuquén in 2006 
enlarged the majority to 2/3 of members present; and Chubut in 1994 called for confirmation by 
2/3 of total members. Overall, most of the provinces have decided to take greater control over the 
appointment process by requiring only a narrow majority, while only six provinces have chosen 
to widen the consensus needed. Political parties in general are not willing to moderate their 
political and ideological preferences in connection with the appointment process.  
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6.1.4 The removal process: impeachment  
The National Constitution adopted the congressional model of impeachment, similar to that used 
in the United States but with minor modifications (Sabsay 2004). Even though most of the 
Argentine provinces followed that model also, some provinces implemented a hybrid model 
known as the “impeachment jury.” The main difference between the two systems is the type of 
actors involved in the process: in the congressional model the legislative branch is the main 
actor, while in the other models other actors participate as well. In the congressional model of 
impeachment, the lower chamber is charged with making the accusation against the justice, 
while the upper chamber operates as the jury, deciding whether or not to convict the justice.104
Nowadays all the provinces have adopted the same removal process as the national 
government except for San Luis and Tierra del Fuego, both of which have impeachment juries. 
In 1983, however, La Rioja, San Juan, and Santiago del Estero still had juries. La Rioja and San 
Juan changed to the congressional model in 1986 in their first constitutional reform, while 
Santiago del Estero changed in 2002 during its third reform. The impeachment jury used in La 
Rioja since 1933 included aspects of the congressional model, since the legislature was in charge 
 
On the other hand, while “impeachment juries” are generally made up of a diverse group of 
people coming from all three branches of government, the nature of the process is the same 
(Camps 2000).  
                                                 
104 The unicameral provinces have implemented variations on this model. For example, in Chubut, 
Córdoba, Río Negro, and La Rioja, the legislature is divided in half, with one half in charge of the 
accusation and the other of the trial. In La Pampa and Tucumán, the legislature creates two commissions, 
with legislators assigned to one of them, while in Formosa the legislature creates only the commission for 
the accusation, the rest of the legislature being in charge of the trial. It is important to point out that these 
commissions always reflect the same proportion of political parties as in the legislatures themselves.  
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of the accusation against the justice, while a special commission acted as the jury. This jury was 
composed of the president of the local Supreme Court, the president of the Educational Council, 
the mayor of La Rioja, the Attorney General, four lawyers from the local Bar Association, and 
four citizens (Article 117, Constitution 1933). In San Juan the jury provided for in the 1927 
Constitution had five members: three legislators and two justices from the local Supreme Court, 
while in Santiago del Estero the jury had a total of nine members: one justice from the local 
Supreme Court, three legislators, three lawyers from the local Bar Association, and two judges. 
The jury from San Juan had a strong political presence, since three out of the five members came 
from politics. In Tierra del Fuego the Council of Magistrates is in charge of impeaching the 
justices; thus, the political component is also strongly present.  
San Luis represents an interesting case since, even though the province has always had an 
impeachment jury, the composition of the jury changed with the reforms in the Constitution. At 
the beginning (since 1962), the jury was composed of twelve members, all of them from the 
legislature, while in the 1987 constitutional reform the jury structure was changed. Since that 
time the jury has had a total of nine members: the president of the local Supreme Court, three 
legislators, two lawyers, and three judges. The political influence on the structure of the jury 
changed from 100% as of 1927 to 33% since that time, revealing at first sight a significant 
curtailment of political influence on the process. However, local NGOs have revealed that the 
process is still highly politicized, because it is often the case that the judges and lawyers on the 
jury are friends or supporters of the local government.  
To sum up, most of the provinces have followed the same congressional model of 
impeachment as in the national government, handing over to the local legislature the 
responsibility of trying and punishing justices accused of wrongdoing. Even though some 
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provinces adopted impeachment juries composed of a diverse group of people, most of them 
were still highly monopolized by politicians. Politicians have not so far decided to depoliticize 
the impeachment process.  
As in the appointment process, the other relevant aspect is the majority required for 
convicting the defendant. The national constitution dictates that justices may be formally 
removed from the bench by a 2/3 majority of senators present, forcing the latter to reach a greater 
consensus than when appointing justices to the bench. Indeed, most of the provinces also have 
called for a simple majority of senators present to appoint justices, but a majority of 2/3 of 
members present for impeachment. Table 6.5 shows the institutional evolution of the provinces 
regarding the majority required for convicting a justice of the court.  
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Table 6.5: Institutional evolution regarding the required majority for removing justices from the court, 1983-
2009 
  
Majority of 
members 
present  
Majority of 
total members 
2/3 of members 
present  
2/3 of total 
members 
Buenos Aires 
C1934 (C), C1994 
(C)        
Catamarca   
  C1966 (C), C1988 
(C)    
Chaco   
  C1957(C), 
C1994(C)    
Chubut C1957 (C)      C1994 (C)  
Córdoba C1923 (C)    C1987 (C)  C2001 (C)  
Corrientes       C1960 (C), C1993 (C)  
Entre Ríos C1933 (C)        
Formosa 
    
  
C1957 (C), C1991 (C), 
C2003 (C)  
Jujuy       C1935 (C), C1986 (C)  
La Pampa 
  
  
C1960 (C), C1994 
(C)    
La Rioja       
C1933 (J), C1986 (C), 
C1998 (C), C2002 (C), 
C2008(C)  
Mendoza 
    C1965 (C), C1997 
(C)    
Misiones       C1958 (C)  
Neuquén 
    
  
C1957 (C), C1993 (C), 
2006 (C)  
Río Negro       C1957 (C), C1988 (C)  
Salta     
C1929 (C), C1986 
(C), C1998 (C)    
San Juan   C1927 (J)   C1986 (C)  
San Luis C1987 (J)   C1962 (J)   
Santa Cruz     
C1957 (C), C1994 
(C), C1998 (C)    
Santa Fe     C1962 (C)    
Sgo. del Estero 
C1960 (J), C1986 
(J) 
  C2002 (C), C2005 
(C)    
Tierra del 
Fuego   
C1991 (J) 
    
Tucumán     
C1907 (C), C1990 
(C), C2006 (C)    
Nation     
C1853 (C), C1994 
(C)    
Note: The years of adoption of the constitutions appear in the columns. C = Congressional Model, and J = Impeachment Jury 
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In 1983 six provinces (Buenos Aires, Entre Ríos, Chubut, Córdoba, Santiago del Estero 
and San Luis) called for a majority of the members present to vote for removal of justices from 
the bench; one province (San Juan) required a majority of the total members; 8 provinces 
(Catamarca, Chaco, La Pampa, Mendoza, Salta, Santa Cruz, Santa Fe and Tucumán) called for 
2/3 of the members present; and the other 7 provinces (Corrientes, Formosa, Jujuy, La Rioja, 
Misiones, Neuquén and Río Negro) required 2/3 of the total members. As can be seen, at the 
beginning of this period a greater number of provinces required a higher degree of consensus for 
removing a justice from the bench in comparison to that for appointing a justice. However, as 
time went by, many provinces increased the required majority for convicting a justice. Chubut in 
1994 passed from the lowest level of difficulty for convicting a justice (majority of the members 
present) to the highest level of difficulty (2/3 of the total members). San Juan followed the same 
pattern by moving in 1986 from requiring a majority of the total members to 2/3 of the total 
members. Córdoba followed a two-step process in enlarging the consensus: in 1987 it increased 
its requirement to 2/3 of the members present, and in 2001 to 2/3 of the total members. Santiago 
del Estero in 2002 also raised the bar for consensus from a majority of the members present to 
2/3 of the members present. Even though there was a clear trend among the provinces toward 
increasing the level of difficulty for convicting a justice, San Luis followed a different pattern. In 
1987 the province reduced the required majority from 2/3 of the members present to the majority 
of the members present. By the end of 2009, 20 provinces out of 23 required a 2/3 majority of 
the votes, half of them from the members present and the other half from the total members.  
In conclusion, the provinces have generally moved toward a more rigorous system for 
removing a justice from the bench as compared to appointing one. This implies that a higher 
degree of consensus is required to remove a justice than to confirm him or her on the court. It is 
190 
 
still not clear why that is so, since getting onto the court should be as difficult as getting off; 
however, it may be that politicians are more interested in facilitating the entrance of the justices 
as opposed to their exit. As the previous chapters have shown, executives have often relied on 
informal mechanisms for inducing the retirement of justices rather than the impeachment process 
itself. If this is the case, then politicians would tend to be less concerned about the majority 
required for removing a justice than for appointing one. That is to say, politicians are strongly 
motivated not to make appointing a justice more difficult; otherwise, removing a justice from the 
court would not be that beneficial, since executives would not be confident about who will serve 
next on the court. 
6.2 THE INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF JUDICIAL TURNOVER IN THE 
PROVINCES 
The previous section illustrated how the evolution of institutional rules influenced the frequency 
of turnover of justices. These rules, and their variations, reveal the incentives of politicians and 
especially of governors over time. What is not yet clear is whether institutional rules are 
important to understanding variations in the stability of justices on the bench. Can institutional 
rules really influence judicial turnover? This section uses a Negative Binomial estimator (NB)105
                                                 
105 Because the dependent variable has an abnormal distribution (most of the observations are 
concentrated between 0 and 1 departure) it is not appropriate to run an OLS regression. It would violate 
several of the assumptions resulting in biased coefficients (DeMaris 2004; Kennedy 2003). In cases like 
this one, it would be more appropriate to perform either a Poisson or a Negative Binomial regression or a 
Continuous Parameter Binomial since these procedures are suitable for count responses with an abnormal 
distribution (DeMaris 2004; Long 1997). However, a Poisson regression cannot be perform in this case 
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with fixed effects to determine the importance of institutional rules in studying the factors that 
affect judicial turnover at subnational levels (Long and Freese 2006; Long 1997). The 
advantages of performing a NB regression are not only that it assumes the existence of an 
overdispered distribution but also that it relaxes the assumptions that the probability of an event 
occurring at one time is constant and independent of all previous events (King 1998). 
Substantially, this means that the rate of a justice leaving the bench is not constant across 
provinces, and that the number of departures in a year is related to the number of departures in 
the previous year. The dependent variable is the number of justices departing from the bench in a 
given year, and the unit of analysis is province-year. The dataset contains a total of 611 
observations and original data from the 54 provincial constitutions from 1983 until the present 
time. 
Table 6.6 displays the statistical model of judicial turnover for the 23 provinces since the 
return of democracy in 1983 and 2009. The predictors seek to capture the institutional conditions 
and the political factors that may explain the frequency of judicial turnover in the different 
jurisdictions. The first variable captures the capacity of executives to modify the total number of 
justices on the bench, indicating with a 1 if the constitution establishes a fixed number of justices 
and 0 otherwise. The hypothesis suggests that having a fixed number of justices would increase 
the number of justices departing from the bench because, if a governor cannot increase the 
number of sitting justices, then it is expected that the governor would remove some of them to 
                                                                                                                                                             
because the mean of the dependent variable is not do they equal to its variance, and the events 
accumulating over a period are neither independent nor have a constant rate of occurrence (King 1998). 
Performing a Continuous Parameter Binomial would also be inappropriate since it has an overdispersed 
distribution density (the variance exceedings the mean) rather than an underdispered one. Therefore, 
based on the specificities of the distribution of the dependent variable, the coefficients are estimated here 
with a Negative Binomial Regression (NB) (Long 1997). 
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craft a supportive court. The second dichotomous predictor measures whether or not the 
provinces have established life tenure for the justices. The expectation is that adopting a life 
tenure system will reduce overall judicial turnover.  
There are two variables representing the level of difficulty for the required majority in the 
appointing and removal processes, namely, two scale variables ranging from 1 to 4, 1 being the 
lowest level of difficulty and 4 the highest. The different levels of difficulty correspond to those 
examined in Tables 6.4 and 6.5.106
                                                 
106 Level 1 = majority of members present, Level 2 = majority of total members, Level 3 = 2/3 of 
members present, and Level 4 = 2/3 of total members. 
 The level of difficulty for appointing or removing a justice is 
negatively correlated with the number of justices departing from the bench: the higher the level 
of difficulty, the less likely that justices will leave the bench.  
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Table 6.6: Institutional determinants of judicial turnover at the subnational levels, 1983-2009 
 Model with 
fixed effects 
Fixed number of justices  -0.449 
(0.352) 
Life tenure -0.769** 
(0.279) 
Difficulties in appointing -0.001 
(0.126) 
Difficulties in removing -0.046 
(0.118) 
Jurisdiction over administrative cases 0.047 
(0.228) 
Tenure restrictions -0.125 
(0.369) 
New administration 0.180 
(0.176) 
New ruling party 0.664*** 
(0.204) 
Partisan power of the governor -0.003 
(0.217) 
Intervention 1.566*** 
(0.370) 
Size of the court -0.035 
(0.064) 
Constitutional reform 0.758** 
(0.258) 
Constant -0.041 
(0.706) 
Wald X2 (df) 81.53(12)*** 
N 611 
Note: *Significant at p<.10; ** at p<.05; *** at p<.001.  
The following variable captures whether or not Supreme Court justices are allowed to 
hear contentious administrative cases. Justices are not responsible for these cases when the 
province has a provincial court (Contentious and Administrative Court of Appeals) with special 
jurisdiction over this type of case. Contentious administrative cases refer to complaints arising 
from citizens or companies against the government, which means that one of the parties in the 
trial is the local administration. It is for this reason that contentious administrative cases are 
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extremely sensitive for the government, which would have a special interest in resolving such 
disputes. When the local Supreme Court justices are responsible for hearing this type of case, 
then their sphere of decision-making increases along with the potential impact they can have on 
politics. If this happens, politicians also have a potential interest in manipulating the composition 
of the justices because of the increasing impact they can have on politics. The expectation is that, 
when justices are responsible for hearing contentious administrative actions, then their turnover 
may be higher, while the opposite is true when Supreme Court justices are not responsible for 
deciding these sensitive cases. The other dichotomous predictor measures whether or not local 
constitutions impose age restrictions on the justices. It is expected that, when there is a restriction 
of this kind, justices will be more unstable in the bench.  
Table 6.6 includes three variables related to the political factors that may also be 
accounting for judicial turnover. As in models from Chapters 4 and 5, in this case also are 
included the timing hypotheses and the partisan power of the executive. The main argument is 
that governors want a supportive court during the first years of their administration, since they 
want to use their political leverage on the judiciary to carry out their policies right from the start. 
Two different variables are used to measure this effect: a change in the administration and a 
change in the ruling party. The other political variable captures the partisan power of the 
executive. According to the hypothesis of Chavez (2003) and Iaryczower et al. (2002), it is 
expected that, when the executive controls both chambers in Congress with 2/3 of majority, 
justices will be more unstable on the bench. 
Finally, Table 6.6 also includes three control variables. The first variable aims to control 
for federal intervention in the provinces, since during an intervention justices are more likely to 
depart from the bench than at other times. The second variable is a dummy variable that indicates 
195 
 
whether in that year the province experienced constitutional reform, since changes to the 
constitution often have an impact on the stability of the justices. The other variable measures the 
size of the court as a way to control for reductions in the number of sitting justices. The 
expectation is that reducing the number of sitting justices increases the probability of any single 
justice leaving office. 
The results of Table 6.6 indicate that political factors matter more than institutional rules 
in accounting for provincial judicial turnover. The variable for life tenure is the only institutional 
variable that had statistically significant result and in the expected direction. Adopting a life 
tenure system reduces the number of justices departing from the bench compared to having a 
fixed tenure system. The fact that the variables for the appointing and removal processes do not 
lead to statistically significant results may be because it is problematic to assume that the ordinal 
scale is an interval scale. As a way to solve for this problem each variable was recorded into two 
dummy variables so as to evaluate if the effect is given by the proportion of the majority 
required, either a simple or a 2/3 majority, by whether the majority is based from the members 
present or the total members. The results of that model are consistent with the one in Table 6.6 
showing that there is no relationship between the required majority for appointing and removing 
justices and the stability of the justices on the bench. 
Regarding the political variables, the results are consistent with those of Chapter 5: 
changes in the ruling party increase the number of justices departing from the bench. This 
suggests that there is an overlapping of changes in the ruling administration and in the court 
more precisely, whenever there is a change in the ruling party it is expected that there will be 
changes in the conformation of the Supreme Court. Also, Table 6.6 shows the null finding of the 
executive partisan power hypothesis, revealing that there is no relationship between the partisan 
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power of the governor and the frequency of the justices leaving the bench.107
Because count models are non-linear, the substantive interpretation of the coefficient is 
not straightforward. The factor change as a percentage was computed using the formula (exp(β)-
1*100) (Long and Freese 2006: 360). According to the model, having life tenure reduces the 
frequency of judicial turnover by 54%. In other words, if the expected number of justices 
departing in a given year were 10, then the expected number of justices having life tenure who 
left the bench would be reduced to 5. Following changes in the ruling party judicial turnover 
increases by 95%, suggesting that during those years the frequency of departures is likely to 
almost double. A similar result is found for those years in which constitutional reforms were 
carried out, since turnover increases 113%. Finally, during federal interventions it is very 
unlikely that justices will remain on the bench, since at those times judicial turnover increases by 
379%, suggesting that during those years the frequency of departures almost quadruples.  
 This result is 
consistent with those of Chapters 4 and 5 and with those of Leiras et al. (2009). The control 
variables for provincial intervention and constitutional reform also had statistically significant 
results. Having a federal intervention increases the number of justices departing from the bench, 
as does provincial constitutional reform.  
                                                 
107 Because in many provinces legislators can impeach a justice with a simple majority, the model run 
here relaxes the assumption for the partisan power hypothesis by using a simple majority in both 
chambers rather than 2/3 of the seats. Nevertheless, the results are still consistent with those of Table 6.6. 
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6.3 CONCLUSION 
Institutional rules do not play a central role in explaining judicial turnover in the provinces: it is 
politics that matters most. The data presented in this chapter have revealed, on the one hand, a 
great level of heterogeneity in the institutional design of the provincial judiciaries and, on the 
other, that none of these variations can account for the instability of the justices on the bench. In 
other words, it is the governors’ incentives and preferences that account for the judicial turnover 
rather than the institutional rules regarding the functioning of the court. The only rule that turns 
out to be significant is having a life tenure system, which suggests that the tenure system itself is 
relevant to keeping justices on the bench. The models in this chapter have also shown that 
neither the appointing nor removal processes matter to the stability of the judiciary, contrary to 
what the literature suggests about the importance of impeachment trials (Chávez 2004; 
Iaryczower et al. 2002). However, it has been demonstrated that, during years of constitutional 
reforms, justices are more unstable on the bench. If instability increases during those years, even 
though the institutional rules are not necessarily relevant to explaining that instability, then what 
this situation maybe elucidating is that it is the changes in the rules, not the rules per se, that 
account for the instability of the justices. This situation exposes once more the importance of the 
incentives and preferences of politicians in shaping the stability of the justices. Finally, the 
findings in this chapter also corroborate the results of the previous chapter: that there is an 
overlap between changes in the executive office and changes in the conformation of the court; 
with the incoming governor evidently leading the judicial system changes.  
Overall, the results of this chapter provide evidence to confirm the theory of vacancy 
creation. First, it was demonstrated that politics plays a central role in accounting for judicial 
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instability rather than the institutional rules regulating the judiciaries. Second, it was shown that 
the changes in the institutional rules, and not the rules themselves, have also proved to be 
relevant, which suggests that executives have triggered both institutional and non-institutional 
strategies for inducing judicial retirements. Third, the null finding between the partisan power of 
the executive and the stability of the justices on the bench revealed that justices are not 
necessarily more vulnerable under powerful executives than under weak ones. It is not the 
partisan power of the executive that determines the frequency of judicial turnover, but rather the 
political incentives and ideology of the sitting justices themselves.  
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7.0  CONCLUSION 
Courts are powerful actors in politics. However, until the recent decade, scholars in the region 
have often neglected their importance for the understanding of politics. Justices have the capacity 
to control the President and the Congress; while at the same time influence the policy-making 
process (Baum 1998). It is not news that in developing democracies politicians have often tried 
to control the decisions of the courts by manipulating their conformation. However, until now no 
research had explicitly addressed which factors affect judicial turnover or how executives have 
been able to manipulate the conformation of the courts. This research aims to fill that gap in the 
literature and contribute to the understanding of executive-court relations in developing 
democracies. The following section discusses the main findings of this research in light of the 
debates in the existing literature, while the final section explores the theoretical relevance of the 
findings for the study of judicial instability in other developing democracies. 
7.1 RETHINKING JUDICIAL INSTABILITY IN DEVELOPING DEMOCRACIES 
The strategic or the attitudinal model of judicial behavior? 
The existing research affirms that life tenure for Argentine justices is not respected, given that 
the way justices vote (regarding, say, the constitutionality of a law) can account for their 
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instability in office (Helmke 2005; Iaryczower et al. 2002; Scribner 2004; Helmke 2002). 
However, these studies have not tested the assumption that the way justices vote can, in fact, 
account for their instability. What is even more puzzling is that the high judicial turnover of 
Argentine justices provides contradictory evidence. If justices can, in theory, regulate their 
stability on the bench by ruling for or against the ruler, then why have Argentine justices not 
simply done that? In other words, this study has called into question the argument that in 
Argentina executives act according to the strategic behavior model rather than the attitudinal one 
(Segal and Spaeth 2002). 
One of the main findings of Chapters 4, 5 and 6 is that executives do not trust justices 
appointed by other executives with different political preferences; in fact, there is an overlap 
between the electoral executive cycles and judicial turnover. The evidence in the previous 
chapters has systematically revealed that executives (especially at the beginning of their terms) 
do not buy into the strategic behavior model that claims that justices appointed by executives 
with different political preferences would nonetheless rule in favor of the incoming executive in 
order to survive in office. In the end, what these findings reveal is that, in general, Argentine 
presidents and governors have been very averse to risking unfavorable outcomes when it comes 
to the Supreme Courts. Executives have been more conservative, or reluctant to risk, than the 
literature predicted.   
It is precisely because executives believe in a more attitudinal behavior model relating to 
the justices that the political proximity between incoming executives and the justices is important 
in accounting for judicial stability on the bench. The results in Chapter 5 from the provincial 
level analysis disclosed with great detail that the loyalty between executives and justices is 
highly personalized and, thus, strongly controlled. On the one hand, in provinces with a single-
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party system, justices appointed by an executive from a different political faction from the 
incoming executive are more likely to depart from the bench than those who have been 
appointed by executives from the same faction. On the other hand, in provinces with a multi- or 
two-party system, what matters more is the political party of the appointing executive rather than 
the faction.  
 
Is it only executives with strong partisan power in Congress who can manipulate the 
conformation of the Court? 
The studies carried out on the Supreme Court in Argentina have systematically claimed that there 
is a relationship between the partisan power of the executive and the capacity of the executive to 
manipulate the composition of the court. More precisely, these studies affirm that only those 
presidents with strong political power (i.e., unified governments with supermajorities in the 
legislature) can craft a supportive court and affect justices’ stability in office (Chávez 2004; 
Iaryczower et al. 2002). This is because only those presidents who have the political power to 
formally remove a justice from office (i.e., by impeachment) can guarantee themselves a 
supportive court. Even though this assumption seems convincing, the evidence from the National 
and Provincial Supreme Courts does not corroborate this belief. The empirical results from 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 suggest that, in fact, there is no relationship between the partisan power of 
the executive and judicial turnover ─ that is, that justices are not necessarily more unstable when 
executives have the power to formally remove them from the bench. The qualitative research in 
Chapters 3 and 5 sheds light on this finding by illustrating how executives without significant 
partisan power in Congress were, nonetheless, able to induce the retirement of justices from the 
bench and craft a supportive court.  
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The systematic null finding about the partisan power of the executive brings up the 
unsolved puzzle of how political competition and party fragmentation shape judicial 
independence. So far, the literature argues that party competition is the key mechanism for the 
fragmentation of political power, which in the end would produce a more independent judiciary 
because power was not concentrated in one branch of government (Chávez 2004). Or, in other 
words, when executives do not have the partisan power in Congress to control the stability of the 
justices on the court (i.e., the power. to impeach the justices), then they are more likely to vote 
sincerely on the cases that come before them, because presidents cannot arbitrarily remove them 
(Iaryczower et al. 2002). But the evidence in the Argentine case, both at the national and 
provincial levels, indicates that neither party hegemony nor party competition has necessarily 
produced a more stable judiciary. Executives irrespective of their partisan power in Congress 
have been able to manipulate the composition of the courts by triggering both formal and 
informal mechanisms of vacancy creation. In fact, a broader analysis of other Latin American 
cases also challenges this assumption. Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador are often characterized as 
countries with a fragmented party system, but this fragmentation has not necessarily produced 
stable and independent judiciaries. Between 1900 and 2009 Supreme Court justices in Bolivia 
have remained in office an average of 3.6 years, in Brazil for 10.7 years and in Ecuador for 4.2 
years (Pérez Liñán and Castagnola 2009b, 2009a). Future research on intra-branch relations and 
judicial independence should carefully address this unsolved puzzle.  
 
Tracing the strategies for inducing the retirement of justices from the bench 
Chapters 3 and 5 have exposed the different institutional and non-institutional mechanisms 
aimed at inducing retirements that executives have used to manipulate the conformation of the 
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courts. One of the most revealing findings is that impeachment has not been the most popular 
method for crafting a supportive court. The literature has strongly acknowledged the 
impeachment trials as the most popular strategy for executives to create vacancies on the court. 
However, the systematic analysis of the departure of justices from the national Supreme Court 
from 1916 to 2009 and the provincial courts since 1983 suggests that, in fact, executives have 
developed more ingenious tactics for inducing the retirement of justices. The threat of an 
impeachment trial, for example, or the offer of attractive retirement benefits and possible 
reappointment were the two most successful strategies among the institutional and non-
institutional mechanisms of vacancy creation. In the end, executives have developed the ability 
to multiply and diversify strategies for inducing retirement, and many of those new ploys are 
being reproduced in other provinces, as, for example, Law 460 of Tierra del Fuego that 
established compulsory retirement of justices. 
Along these lines, the results of Chapter 6 revealed an interesting finding, namely, that 
the institutional rules regarding the functioning of the provincial courts do not play a central role 
in accounting for judicial turnover ─ that is, the rules have neither impeded nor promoted the 
departure of the justices. Indeed, what the evidence exposed is that what matters in accounting 
for judicial instability is the changes in constitutional rules rather than the rules per se. In the 
end, it is the instability of the institutional rules that affects the stability of the justices on the 
bench. The changes in the rules are, in fact, reflecting the changes in the preferences and 
incentives of the governors who are faced with an unfriendly court. 
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7.2 JUDICIAL INSTABILITY BEYOND ARGENTINA 
The previous chapters have provided considerable evidence for a theory of vacancy creation 
related to the justices of the Argentine national and provincial supreme courts. But the argument 
applies more generally to any situation in which executives manipulate the conformation of the 
high courts. In fact, this theory of vacancy creation appears consistent with the experiences of 
several supreme courts in Latin America as in Peru and Paraguay, and in other developing 
democracies such as Indonesia, Russia and Ukraine (Pompe 2005; Trochev 2008).  
Presidents in Peru have often manipulated the conformation of the Supreme Court and 
the Constitutional Tribunal, with Alberto Fujimori being the most representative case. In 1990 
Fujimori assumed the presidency; shortly thereafter he launched neoliberal economic reforms 
that produced a rapid decrease in public support (Stokes 2001). The opposition, which was in 
control of both chambers of Congress, was able to obstruct the government’s ability to enact 
those economic reforms. By 1992 Fujimori, with the support of the military, carried out a 
presidential coup (often called an “auto-coup”) to put an end to the political deadlock. The 
Congress and the Constitutional Tribunal were closed down. In June 1996 the Constitutional 
Tribunal was reopened and new members were appointed. Soon after that Fujimori started to 
campaign for re-reelection (i.e., a third term in office) based on the recently enacted Law No. 
26.657 that allowed him to run for a third consecutive term. The Bar Association of Lima 
asserted that the law was unconstitutional. On November 20, 1996, five out of the seven 
members of the Constitutional Tribunal ruled against the re-reelection, and soon those justices 
began to suffer political pressures and moral coercion. On January 2, 1997, Justices Ricardo 
Nugent López Cháves and Luis Díaz Valverde requested a new vote on the issue. At that time, 
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four justices refrained from casting a vote, while Justices Manuel Aguirre Roca, Delia Revoredo 
Marsano and Guillermo Rey Terry again ruled against the applicability of Law 26.657. The 
degree of political pressure against the justices of the Constitutional Tribunal to reverse the 
decision was far from evident, so the National Congress, on February 28, 1997, created a special 
commission to investigate possible abuses. Shortly after that initiative, the government’s party 
requested the impeachment of those three justices because of wrongdoing. In May 28, 1997, the 
three justices were found guilty and removed from the bench. Fujimori was re-reelected, but 
social protest and the exposé of the Montesinos bribery scandal that led to the defection of 
opposition leader Alberto Kuri accelerated Fujimori’s fall.   
Even though in many developing democracies executives have often manipulated the 
conformation of the courts, there are some countries where this theory does not apply. The 
identification of these cases does not undermine the strength of this research but rather bolsters 
it. When middle range theory is being developed, it is important to identify not only where the 
theory can be applied but also where it cannot, since it is precisely by this process that a better 
understanding of the topic can be achieved. The experience of the Supreme Court and 
Constitutional Tribunal in Ecuador reveals that, in fact, there is another form of political 
manipulation that is not necessarily carried out by the executive, but rather by the political 
coalitions in Congress. One of the most striking features about the instability of the Supreme 
Court justices in Ecuador is that it was the Congress, rather than the executive, that set the pace 
for judicial departures. The purges of the Supreme Court in 1985, 1997 and 2004 resulted from 
resolutions of the National Congress, where legislators simply declared the termination of 
judicial tenure (Albuja Martínez 2008). These legislative resolutions were the direct result of 
changes in the political coalitions in Congress and, thus, the rearrangement of the ideological 
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positions of the parties that were then replicated on the court. In this case, it is precisely the high 
fragmentation of the political parties in Congress (and the constant reconfiguration of the 
coalitions) that has produced the high judicial instability in the bench. Evidently, the political 
competition inside Congress has not generated, so far, positive results in the judiciary, as 
scholars had predicted. A similar situation applies to the Constitutional Tribunal, where from 
1997 to 2007 the reconfiguration of Congressional coalitions resulted in the tribunal’s reshuffling 
on six occasions (Grijalva 2010). 
Another interesting feature about the Ecuadorian case that exposes the importance of 
Congress is the role of the Constitutional Tribunal regarding its capacity of constitutional review. 
In Ecuador the judicial review was, for the most part, delegated to Congress. The Tribunal of 
Constitutional Guarantees (TCG) was finally incorporated in the Constitutional reform of 
1967,108
                                                 
108 The TCG was incorporated in the Constitutional reform of 1945, but eliminated in the reform 
of 1946 (Ávila 2004). 
 but this tribunal had a limited capacity of judicial review that became even more 
diminished as time went by (Ávila 2004). In the Constitutional reform of 1978, it was established 
that it was not the TCG but rather Congress that had the capacity to suspend a law (Ordóñez 
Espinosa 2000). It was not until the Constitutional reform of 1996 that judicial review became an 
exclusive feature of the judiciary branch. Overall, Ecuador represents an interesting case to 
explore, since it combines features of strong presidentialism with a highly fragmented party 
system in which the President’s party rarely has control over Congress; thus, it is Congress rather 
than the President who manipulates the conformation of the court (Mejía Acosta 2006; Shugart 
1995; Shugart and Carey 1992). Future studies should address this issue. 
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To conclude, studying the factors that account for judicial instability in office becomes 
relevant for the understanding of politics and intra-branch relations, since the judiciary has often 
been neglected. Therefore, the incorporation of the judiciary into studies about politics produces 
significant improvement in the theory building of the discipline. Given the high incidence of 
judicial instability in developing countries, and the fundamental importance of courts to the 
democratization process, there is a need for further study on the topic. This research has 
proposed possible lines of investigation that would contribute to the discipline’s understanding of 
the role of the courts in democratization and the conditions under which courts can become more 
or less useful in the consolidation of democratic governance. 
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